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Introduction
Mona Thowsen
Publish What You Pay Norway (PWYP Norway)
Roy Krøvel
OsloMet – Oslo Metropolitan University
Many recent examples of international investigative journalism seem to 
follow the same pattern: Someone employed in a large and often multi-
national company such as a bank or a law firm becomes so dismayed by 
the things they witness that they decide to tell someone. This someone 
is typically a journalist. For the whistleblower, life will most likely never 
be quite the same. For two years, Raphaël Halet writes in this volume, he 
“lived a real thriller, a story worthy of a spy novel”. In retrospect, how-
ever, most whistleblowers realize that the thriller aspect quickly fades. 
As Halet notes after years of legal struggles, in reality he had “sacrificed” 
his “personal welfare for the common good”. For the journalist, working 
on a major leak could bring professional recognition and personal sat-
isfaction. Most journalists can count on the backing of a community of 
journa lists and other supporters. Nevertheless, as Craig McKune, Lina 
Chawaf, Rodrigo Véliz and others in this book explain, investigating 
the rich and powerful can also lead to serious legal or personal safety 
problems. 
This book is about illicit financial flows. More precisely, it is about 
journalists, auditors, lawyers, activists, whistleblowers and others who 
have risked much to shed light on this opaque world. The stories range 
from revelations of murky deals in South Africa, the fallout from the 
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Panama Papers in Iceland, Syria and Armenia, the dirty business of 
coal mining in Guatemala, and the luxurious life of bankers in Spain. 
The whistleblowers behind some of the most notorious financial scan-
dals speak, as do lawyers and specialist auditors. The book also includes 
peer-reviewed articles from an interdisciplinary group of researchers and 
practitioners from the fields of law, economics and journalism. Revela-
tions such as Lux Leaks, Swiss Leaks, the Panama Papers and Paradise 
Papers demonstrate how much societies around the world lose because of 
illicit financial flows, corruption and tax fraud. The articles in this book 
ask what can be done to make transparency possible. Only when key 
financial information is transparently reported for each country it will be 
possible to expose and hinder illicit financial flows and to discuss how to 
distribute wealth fairly between states and within states, and to see how 
value is created and distributed within a company. 
Much of what we know about illicit financial flows is because of 
whistleblowers and investigative journalists. The Luxembourg Leaks, 
for instance, was a journalistic investigation conducted by the Interna-
tional Consortium of Investigative Journalists published in 2014 based 
on confidential information about Luxembourg’s tax rulings set up by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers from 2002 to 2010. The tax rulings for over 
three hundred multinational companies based in Luxembourg were 
made public. The investigation shed light on a tax regime that was 
highly beneficial to multinational companies. International accounting 
firms set up tax rulings with schemes to transfer revenues to Luxem-
bourg. Findings also showed that multinationals used mechanisms such 
as transfer pricing and intra group loans to move profits out of countries 
to reduce taxes. 
Swiss Leaks (2015) has been called the biggest leak in Swiss banking his-
tory. It was started by information leaked by a computer analyst concern-
ing the accounts of 100,000 clients and 20,000 offshore companies held by 
HSBC in Geneva. HSBC later agreed to pay €300 million to avoid going to 
trial in France for enabling tax fraud. More recently, the  Panama Papers 
and the Paradise Papers have made headlines for revealing more about 
global illicit financial flows and those who make them possible. According 
to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 140 politicians 
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from more than 50 countries have been connected to offshore companies 
in 21 tax havens in the Panama Papers. In 2018, international networks of 
journalists continued producing investigative journalism resulting in, for 
example, the Football Leaks and the Implant Files investigation. 
These investigations are complicated and the financial mechanisms 
immensely complex. The point here is not the details of transfer pric-
ing, tax rulings or intra group loans. The important lesson is that when 
society learns about financial secrecy, the information rarely comes from 
governments or transnational companies (TNCs). More likely, it comes 
from whistleblowers, investigative journalists, civil society organizations, 
and increasingly also from academia.
An interdisciplinary problem 
This book is a result of two interdisciplinary conferences and workshops. 
In 2016 we organized  the first  Making Transparency Possible confer-
ence, a three-day event with 40 speakers from 19 countries. Since then, 
we have continued organizing workshops and conferences annually. The 
approach has been to invite a broad range of professions, disciplines and 
institutions. They each bring their own unique experiences, expertise and 
analyses of increasingly complex global financial integration. The varied 
backgrounds help highlight different aspects of illicit financial flows. The 
debates have underlined the many implications illicit financial flows have 
for, for example, national and international law, accounting practices, 
investigative journalism, labor unions, international development. 
In this process, we have collaborated closely with 30 investigative jour-
nalists from countries such as Guatemala, Ecuador, Colombia, Nigeria, 
Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, South Africa, Russia, Iceland and Norway. Addi-
tionally, we have been helped by whistleblowers, journalism scholars, 
economists, professors of law, and auditors, as well as tax authorities, 
financial prosecutors, development agencies, etc.
As Sambrook and co-authors write in the aptly titled Global Team-
work, “journalists should stop thinking they can always ‘go it alone’” 
(Sambrook et al., 2018, p.95). The financial complexity, the legal issues and 
the enormous volume of information involved in investigating such leaks 
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demand cooperation on a massive scale across borders and disciplines to 
succeed. Completely new types of global networks of investigative jour-
nalists have emerged over the last few years adhering not as much to the 
logic of competition as to the logic of mutual aid. ‘Sharing’ and ‘coopera-
tion’ have become the new buzzwords. 
Similarly, journalism scholars should stop thinking they can always 
“go it alone”. Understanding the emerging global networks investigating 
these and similar leaks requires insights from economics, law, computer 
science and a range of other disciplines. 
The significance of illicit financial flows (IFFs) 
Investigations into the Luxembourg Leaks, Swiss Leaks, Panama Papers, 
Paradise Papers and similar revelations of illicit financial flows matter. 
The harm is perhaps most clearly seen in illicit flows out of developing and 
emerging economies, although wealthy economies also suffer. Estimates 
of illicit financial flows will always be by definition uncertain. Neverthe-
less, a study from Global Financial Integrity has taken on the challenge. It 
estimates illicit financial flows from developing and emerging economies 
at US $1 trillion in 2014 (Global Financial Integrity, Illicit Financial Flows 
to and from Developing Countries: 2005–2014, 2017). The outflow of capital 
impoverishes communities and societies especially in the global South. 
The UN acknowledges that illicit financial flows increase inequality 
within and among countries. Therefore the UN Sustainable Development 
Goal 10.5 seeks to, “Improve the regulation and monitoring of global 
financial markets and institutions and strengthen the implementation 
of such regulations.” The UN Sustainable Development Goal 16.4 addi-
tionally connects curbing illicit financial flows to the main target: “To 
promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, 
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclu-
sive institutions at all levels.” 
Despite international focus on capital flight, corruption, secrecy juris-
dictions, corporate havens, money laundering and criminal activities, 
efforts to increase transparency continue to face significant opposition. 
These efforts are met with resistance from politicians, official institutions, 
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legal firms, accounting firms and multinational companies in all regions 
of the world. The political tendency seems to be inertia, to do nothing or 
to pretend to be doing something while at the same time making sure 
that the core privileges for these same groups remain largely unchanged. 
While the journalistic investigations mentioned above are impressive and 
important, much remains to be done. Perhaps the most serious challenge 
is to create sustained public interest, which over time can contribute to 
challenging the structures and mechanisms that make illicit financial 
flows possible, and challenge those who benefit from maintaining the 
current situation. 
The structure of the book
The book mirrors the workshops and seminars. We start with investi-
gative journalists sharing practical experiences from researching illicit 
financial flows, tax avoidance and corruption. The journalists frame the 
issues and help us ask the right questions. This is followed by articles by 
civil society activists, whistleblowers, lawyers and auditors. The second 
section of the book contains peer-reviewed articles discussing and ana-
lyzing some of the many questions raised in the first section. 
Interdisciplinarity is necessary to begin to understand illicit financial 
flows and this type of emerging investigative journalism. Thus it is cru-
cial to bridge the divide between practitioners and researchers. Scientific 
research can help shed light on the issues raised in this book. Moreover, 
those who practice investigative journalism produce important knowl-
edge on a daily basis. A dialogue between researchers and practicing 
investigative journalists helps advance both the knowledge and under-
standing of illicit financial flows and investigative journalism. So far, a 
number of topics have emerged from discussions at the Making Trans-
parency Possible conferences.
First, global teamwork within the international networks of investi-
gative journalists points to a future of cross-border cooperation in jour-
nalism that could enhance journalism’s capacity to investigate complex 
issues, such as illicit financial flows. Second, the increasing opaque-
ness of financial markets requires interdisciplinary teamwork. Teams 
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investigating illicit financial flows need to build alliances with experts 
in law as well as economics. Third, those investigating these issues must 
take digital as well as physical safety seriously. As several chapters in 
this book point out, special consideration needs to be made regarding 
the safety of members of international teams working in or from regions 
with high levels of violence, and relatively few legal protections for jour-
nalists. Finally, as these chapters demonstrate, without whistleblowers we 
would know little of the world of illicit financial flows. The role of the 
whistleblower needs to be further investigated. 
This book is an attempt to start a discussion of these questions. We 
hope that it will be a small step forward.
Part I
Craig McKune is a South African investigative journalist who has worked 
on a number of high profile cases in South Africa. At the 2016 Making 
Transparency Possible conference, McKune discussed safety with other 
investigative journalists. He explained that while South Africa was very 
violent, journalists were not physically in danger. In “It Happens Over-
night”, McKune recalls how one of the other journalists warned him that 
“these things happen overnight”. McKune tells the story of investigating 
the Gupta brothers who built a South African business network using a 
web of offshore companies to channel financial flows, while maintain-
ing strong ties to President Jacob Zuma. Investigative journalists such as 
McKune spent years researching the Gupta leaks. In the process,  McKune 
explains, journalists were increasingly targeted. While a vigilant and 
organized civil society is important, he is not confident that it is enough.
“The Coal-Case of Guatemala” is written by Rodrigo Veliz Estrada, a 
Guatemalan investigative journalist. Veliz worked for the newspaper 
Nómada when it received information linking judges, lawyers, public 
prosecutors, immigration officers, an ex-US ambassador, high-ranking 
politicians and the then president’s son-in-law to complex and illegal 
schemes aimed at inducing institutions to give priority to a US electric 
power company. It is hard to estimate the precise degree of corruption 
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and volume of capital flight, as the core problem is secrecy. Still, peo-
ple in places like Guatemala feel the cost of corruption and capital flight 
every day. Veliz also contributed to revealing how groups on the far right, 
formed by retired military officials and supported by companies, were 
behind death threats and groups linked to massacres. During the process, 
Veliz himself received implicit death threats, as have so many investiga-
tive journalists in Guatemala. 
“Armenian ‘Hero’ of Panama Papers Becomes a Fighter Against Corrup-
tion” is written by Kristine Aghalaryan. Aghalaryan works for the NGO 
Hetq, the Investigative Journalists Collective of Armenia, which partici-
pated in the Panama Papers investigation and uncovered ties to Armenia. 
The Chief Compulsory Enforcement Officer in charge of overseeing that all 
court rulings are properly enforced was one of the officials found to have 
ties to offshore economic zones. His political position had made it possi-
ble for him to advance his private interests, while at the same time hide 
his income. The NGO filed a complaint with the Special Investigative Ser-
vice (SIS) to carry out a proper investigation in the public interest. While 
initially dismissed, they later managed to reopen the case. In this chapter, 
Aghalaryan explains how the NGO spent years on the case witnessing first-
hand the dubious investigation that in effect prevented any prosecution.
“Do Stories from Your Heart” is by the Icelandic investigative journa-
list Jóhannes Kr. Kristjánsson, whose interview with the former prime 
minister of Iceland, Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, led to his resig-
nation after he was asked about his wife’s involvement in companies 
exposed though the Panama Papers leak. The interview went viral. The 
former president’s reaction was to attack the journalists conducting the 
interview, the media, and reporters in general, rather than admit to any 
wrongdoing. Kristjánsson writes that the Directorate of Internal Revenue 
has demanded almost half a billion krona in outstanding taxes from 16 
individuals based on information in the Panama Papers, and in addition, 
hundreds of names remain to be investigated. Kristjánsson points out 
that for this kind of journalism to happen everybody involved needs to 
leave their egos at the door and work together.
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Lina Chawaf, executive director of Rozana Radio, won the 2018 Report-
ers Without Borders Press Freedom Award. During the Panama Papers 
investigation, Rozana worked on the story of Rami Makhlouf, a cousin of 
the head of the Syrian regime, Bashar Al-Assad. In “Safety in Journalism 
in Syria”, Chawaf discusses the dangers of speaking truth to power in a 
country such as Syria. “Delivering the truth threatens all those carrying 
guns on all sides of the conflict,” Chawaf explains. The chapter details 
some of the many examples of threats and violence experienced by inves-
tigative journalists and reporters in Syria. The chapters ends with a brief 
account of the safety programs being developed there for journalists. 
Simona Levi is a theatre director and co-founder the Spanish group 
Xnet and 15MpaRato, a “citizens’ device to bring to court those respon-
sible for the economic crisis in Spain”. In “‘We, the citizens, can fight 
against corruption.’ Open Source Jailing of Corrupt Bankers and Politi-
cians Device: A Case Study”, Levi narrates how ordinary citizens inves-
tigated the Spanish banking ‘crisis’. The campaign led to the exposure 
of an extensive misuse of funds. In 2018, at least 65 high-profile bank 
executives and board members received sentences from Spain’s Supreme 
Court after the revelation that the group had spent €12.5 million on per-
sonal expenses ranging from vacations and jewelry, to meals in expen-
sive restaurants. 15MpaRato is not made up of experts such as bankers, 
lawyers, economists or attorneys, Levi explains, but of non-specialists. 
Instead of relying on experts, Xnet launched an anonymous online 
service that people could contribute to (the Xnet Mailbox for Citizen 
Leaks). Additionally, the activists launched a “political crowdfunding” 
campaign to finance judicial costs. 
William Bourdon and Amélie Lefebvre build on more than 15 years of 
experience defending whistleblowers. In “A Long Way to Go for Whistle-
blowers”, Bourdon and Lefebvre sum up some of the key battles. The recog-
nition of whistleblowers is primarily a question of protection, the authors 
write. Being seen as courageous informers is secondary. If the status of 
being a whistleblower does not afford them protection, they will be vul-
nerable. According to Bourdon and Lefebvre, it is imperative for a potential 
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whistleblower to consult with a technician such as a lawyer, in order to mea-
sure possible support from unions, associations or from the media. Jour-
nalists can support those who are about to blow the whistle by invoking 
the right to protect their sources. However, contacting journalists can in 
some cases run the risk of exposing whistleblowers to legal proceedings, the 
authors remind us.
Antoine Deltour is a former PricewaterhouseCoopers employee who 
provided information to French journalist Edouard Perrin. The so-called 
Lux Leaks scandal shed light on how Luxembourg had helped large cor-
porations cut their global tax bills. It was the biggest leak of its kind until 
the Panama Papers. In “Whistleblowing on Luxembourg’s Tax Prac-
tices”, Deltour explains how the company had been logging everything 
that happened on their computer network. The company was thus able 
to find traces of Deltour’s copying two years after the events. He then 
had to emerge from anonymity. Numerous lawsuits and appeals later, the 
Luxembourg Supreme Court finally recognized the right to whistleblow 
according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Deltour sees this as an “undeniable victory for the right to information”. 
However, he simultaneously fears that the length of his legal battle may 
deter other potential whistleblowers. 
Raphaël Halet is the second former PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
employee who leaked information to the media. The first round of the 
Lux Leaks scandal erupted in 2012 (see above). At the time, Halet worked 
in a strategic department and had access to all tax documents created by 
PwC for their clients. Watching a documentary based on the first leak, 
Halet realized that the “documents presented as proof of tax evasion are 
the documents I handle every day. Now they are like fire in my hands.” 
If he did nothing, he would be complicit in the system of tax evasion; if 
he reacted, he would put his future at risk. “I cannot continue without 
doing anything,” Halet writes in “Being a Whistleblower”. However, 
when Deltour was acquitted in 2018, the court upheld the conviction of 
Halet. Halet did not meet the whistleblower criteria. Nevertheless, Halet 
writes, “Thanks to my revelations, the European Commission found that 
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Luxembourg gave illegal tax benefits to Amazon worth around €250 mil-
lion. Apple (€13 billion), Ikea (€1billion) and dozens of companies are 
also being sued by Margrethe Vestager (the European Commissioner for 
Competition).”
Frian Aarsnes draws on nearly 30 years of experience in auditing 
extractive industries, as well as international consulting, and asks: “What 
Tools Can States Use When Faced with Systematic Tax Avoidance?” 
According to Aarsnes, states seemed unable to handle the issues arising 
from the behavior of multinational companies. The chapter presents tools 
that can be used unilaterally by states to reduce tax avoidance to a min-
imum. “Put simply, if states individually or collectively use the toolbox, 
they can handle almost all the issues in international taxation identified 
today,” Aarsnes writes.
Part II – Academic Perspectives
In “Combating Corruption: Investigative Journalists on the Frontlines”, 
Kalle Moene and Tina Søreide seek to understand how investigative 
journalism contributes to controlling corruption. The authors are inter-
ested in what the disciplines of journalism and economics can learn 
from each other. Writing from the perspective of economics, Moene and 
Søreide find, “The more authoritarian leaders weaken integrity standards 
in governance, the more financial secrecy providers facilitate grand scale 
crime; and the more barriers there are for journalists who seek to disclose 
misdealing, the more important it is to join forces across countries and 
across disciplines.”
“Investigative Journalism on Oil, Gas, Mining: Has Technology Made a 
Difference?” by Anya Schiffrin and Ryan Powell builds on existing lit-
erature and the authors’ extensive experience with global investigative 
journalism to discuss why investigative reporting on oil, mining and tax 
avoidance is thriving. Schiffrin and Powell find that “digital tools and 
data-driven reporting has helped journalists do a better job of holding 
governments and corporations to account”. Journalists now use big data 
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and data visualization to report and write powerful stories. Mobile and 
social media platforms make it easier to disseminate the work effectively.
Jenik Radon, Mahima Achuthan and Nandini Ravichandran explain 
the benefits of transparency through disclosure of the real or ultimate 
owners of a company (beneficial ownership) in their chapter, “Beneficial 
Ownership: Filing the Gap in Transparency and Accountability in the 
Extractive Industries and Improving Governance”. The authors argue 
that increased transparency helps reduce natural resource revenue leak-
ages. Precious financial resources can instead be invested in public pri-
orities such as education, healthcare and infrastructure. Additionally, 
transparency helps foster competition, reduces corruption and promotes 
fair business practices.
As the global economy becomes increasingly opaque, new forms of col-
laboration between journalists and civil society are emerging to protect 
democracy and the rule of law. In “It’s All in the Game: Journalism, Whis-
tleblowing and Democracy Under the Rules of the Global Economy”, 
Petter Slaatrem Titland analyzes discussions of whistleblower protection 
in the EU and Norway in light of the Lux Leaks whistleblower–journalist 
collaboration and the internal whistleblower in the Telenor/VimpelCom 
corruption case. Titland calls for parliaments to update legislation affect-
ing collaborative investigative journalism, and whistleblower protections 
in particular.
“What Is a Leak, Who Is a Whistleblower? An Evaluation Within the 
Scope of the Cumhuriyet Newspaper, Can Dündar and MİT Trucks Case,” 
written by Dr. Behlül Çalışkan, examines the famous MİT Trucks Case in 
Turkey. The former editor-in-chief of the center-left newspaper Cumhuriyet 
was later awarded prestigious international prizes for whistleblowing, and 
for the reporting on weapons shipments to Islamist fighters in Syria. In 
this chapter, however, Çalışkan questions the definition of the MİT Trucks 
scandal as a “whistleblowing leak” that “served the public interest in terms 
of its revelations, the identities of its sources, its wider political entangle-
ments, and the timing of its emergence into the public domain”. 
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Elisabeth Eide continues the examination of the journalist–whistleblower 
relationship in “Chilling Effects on Free Expression: Surveillance, Threats 
and Harassment”. According to Eide, whistleblower Edward Snowden 
played a pivotal role in helping investigative journalism expose modern 
global surveillance. Her chapter addresses global surveillance and pres-
ents examples of how it deters public intellectuals and other citizens from 
voicing their opinions in the public sphere. In addition, the chapter dis-
cusses consequences for the future of investigative journalism.
“Reporting on Unfinished Business: Emerging Digital Media and Investi-
gative Journalism in Guatemala”, by Ingrid Fadnes, takes the reader back 
to Guatemala (see also Rodrigo Véliz). Fadnes calls for more knowledge 
of specific local and national contexts in order to develop manuals for 
in-depth journalism. Fadnes is particularly concerned about safety and 
security issues. Cross-border reporting on links between national political 
elites and illicit financial flows increases the risk of attacks on journalists. 
However, little research has been done on the safety and security risks of 
partners in countries, for instance in Latin America, when they partici-
pate in global collaborative investigative journalism. 
In “‘What someone wants kept in the dark.’ An Analysis of the Norwegian 
Panama Papers Coverage”, Birgitte Kjos Fonn asks whether the Panama 
Papers investigation contributed to influencing public understanding. 
Did the revelations raise public awareness in relation to transparency? 
Fonn sees leaks as valuable journalistic tools, and international coopera-
tion in deciphering the contents of the leaks as essential. However, leaks 
are not enough, Fonn writes. “To make the system transparent, journal-
ists have to monitor law-making and international cooperation (and the 
lack of such) also in between ‘the great leaks’.”
“Making Sense of Overwhelming Flows of Financial Data”, by Mona 
Thowsen and Roy Krøvel, asks what journalism educators can learn 
from investigative journalists working on revelations such as the Panama 
Papers, Paradise Papers, Lux Leaks and Swiss Leaks. Can this type of 
cross-border cooperation help prepare journalism educators for a future 
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in which money increasingly flows across borders? The authors argue 
that educators need to provide students with at least a basic understand-
ing of core economic and financial concepts. At the same time, build-
ing on qualitative interviews with journalists around the world working 
on stories connected to illicit financial flows, corruption and tax havens, 
Thowsen and Krøvel find that investigative journalists demonstrate a 
considerable capacity for collective, self-organized learning while they 
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South African investigative journalist
In December 2016, in Oslo, a group of journalists traded tales of intim-
idation, arrest, repression and murder. The Russians had a list of dead 
colleagues. A Somali journalist had been forced to work in exile, while 
a Briton had hired bodyguards to guard against men lurking outside 
her home.
She was Clare Rewcastle Brown. She showed us photographs of a corpse 
cemented into an oil drum and thrown into a swamp – a public prosecu-
tor in the 1MDB Malaysian corruption case. We had met at a conference 
at the Oslo Metropolitan University to discuss how we investigate and tell 
tales of corporate and political corruption, bad government, nepotism, 
and so on, and what threats we face as a result.
There is a straightforward logical argument: By exposing the bad 
things powerful people do, we pose a threat to their wealth, reputation 
and power. Therefore, it is in their interest to fight back against us. They 
might fight by trying to convince us to retract our stories. Or they might 
try to convince the public and authorities, through some sort of state-
ment or campaign, that we are wrong. They could follow some sort of 
legal process, such as suing us. Or, they might try to hurt or kill us. 
On that last point, I felt I had little to add. But unfortunately my risk 




I am from South Africa, where I worked for eight years for the non-
profit amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism. Our (recently 
deposed) president Jacob Zuma and his cronies had seized control of 
our criminal justice and state intelligence apparatuses, and Zuma 
openly used these to target enemies. Violent organised criminals had 
infiltrated the same structures, and journalists exposed the Zuma 
family’s links to a number of them. Zuma’s people had also captured 
state-owned companies with big spending budgets, and they were 
skimming off the cream. Over many years, we investigated and wrote 
about this. 
Recent developments have demonstrated the level of risk we posed 
to them. The ruling African National Congress pushed Zuma from the 
presi dency in February 2018. He and his cronies’ reputations are now 
mud, and an apparently criminal enterprise that thrived under his rule 
has fallen apart. Many of those involved now face the prospect of going 
to jail.
We do our accountability reporting in a violent context. Our govern-
ment has been openly hostile to dissenters – to the point of gunning them 
down, like the police did at Marikana in 2012. Meanwhile, numerous 
local-level politicians have been killed in political violence throughout 
the country. We also know the South African state, and other Zuma sym-
pathisers, have spied on journalists. And in repressive regimes through-
out our continent, places like Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Somalia 
and Sudan, journalists are often attacked. Zuma sympathised with many 
of these governments.
In sum, powerful people have had both motive and means to repress 
journalism with violence, because this might have seemed close to a 
normal thing to do in the regional and local climate. But physically 
hurting or killing journalists in South Africa? Not quite, I used to 
think. So, I told the journalists in Oslo, it felt to me like we were stand-
ing with our backs to the edge of a cliff while we taunted and threw 
rocks and sticks at thugs. They could easily push us over that edge. Yet 
they did not.
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Clare, the Briton, raised her hand and cautioned me. It happens over-
night, she warned. You have to be vigilant. She was right.
The SABC 8
Wind back to mid-2016: The chief operating officer of the SABC, our state 
broadcaster, had ordered that the SABC not show any videos of attacks 
by protestors on public property. The attacks were part of civil unrest 
brewing in South Africa, fuelled by poverty, corruption and a weak, 
racialised economy. A campaign group took to the streets to protest the 
SABC censorship. Then the SABC banned its journalists from covering 
the protests. Eight of them objected publicly, but they were suspended. 
This group came to be known as the “SABC 8”. Their story was widely 
reported, capturing the public imagination – but in spite of widespread 
support for the Eight, the SABC fired them. 
As it turned out, just a few days after I had said in Oslo that South 
African journalists were not being attacked physically, one of the SABC 8, 
32-year-old Suna Venter, walked out of a Johannesburg restaurant, where 
she was shot in the face with an unidentified weapon. Surgeons later 
removed metal pellets from her face, but she survived.
In fact, for months before that, Venter had received numerous 
threatening messages on her phone. According to her family: “Her flat 
was broken into on numerous occasions, the brake cables of her car 
were cut and her car’s tyres were slashed. She was shot at and abducted 
– tied to a tree at Melville Koppies, while the grass around her was set 
alight.”
She had survived that too, but in June 2017, she died of broken heart 
syndrome, and her family said they believed her heart condition was 
caused by the stress of the intimidation.
“White Monopoly Capital”
On the same day Venter’s body was found, a small mob gathered out-
side the house of Peter Bruce, a well-known news editor and columnist. 
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The mob called itself Black First Land First, or BLF. Their placards read: 
“Peter you murder the truth”, “Peter Bruce wa Hemba [you are lying]”, 
“Land or death” and “Peter Bruce propagandist of WMC”.
This situation and “WMC” need some explaining.
Since about 2010, South African journalists have investigated and 
reported on the brothers Tony, Ajay and Atul Gupta and their relation-
ship with Zuma. This is the Zuma looting project I described earlier. To 
combat negative press, the Guptas hired the UK firm Bell Pottinger to 
redirect public resentment in a campaign against Zuma’s critics. This 
ended spectacularly, when a UK public relations industry group investi-
gated and suspended Bell Pottinger. It said the Gupta campaign “was by 
any reasonable standard of judgement likely to inflame racial discord in 
South Africa and appears to have done exactly that.” Bell Pottinger sub-
sequently went out of business.
Linked to the Gupta campaign was an army of social media accounts 
and websites that attacked named journalists and campaigners. Journal-
ists like Peter Bruce – the one who was targeted in June 2017 – were painted 
as racists seeking to protect “white monopoly capital”, or “WMC”.
On at least one occasion, the Guptas commissioned a leader of the 
BLF – one of the protesters outside Peter’s house – to write an arti-
cle criticising a journalist. BLF promised to stage more protests at the 
homes of other journalists whom it named and branded “askaris”. In 
South Africa, “askari” is an inflammatory term used during apartheid 
to brand liberation fighters who changed sides and joined the oppres-
sive regime.
Had such rhetoric flared up further, it could have led to real violence. 
So, the group of journalists went to court and won an interdict banning 
BLF from further intimidation or harassment.
Ten days later, BLF supporters accosted and threatened my amaBhun-
gane colleague Micah Reddy. He escaped unharmed, but when he tried 
to lay charges at the nearest police station, the officers refused to take 
his statement. Three weeks later, amaBhungane hosted a public meeting 
about a leaked cache of data from the Guptas’ business empire, which 
had become a news sensation. A group of people interrupted the meeting. 
They sang, shouted and physically threatened people.
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The BLF was there again, and another amaBhungane journalist, 
Stefaans Brümmer, later described how a BLF leader “Stood up, grabbed 
me with two hands and tried to shove me to the ground, shouting 
words like ‘You fuck with me’. A second person then threw me to the 
ground.”
The incidents were widely reported on and criticised in the South 
African media. A court also found the BLF mobs to be in contempt of 
the earlier interdict. They were fined and their leader was sentenced to 
three months in jail – although the latter conviction was suspended. The 
judge extended the original court order to protect all journalists from 
BLF harassment.
Whistleblowers
Investigative journalists are just one part of a community of dissenters. 
There are activists, politicians, upstanding officials, journalists’ sources 
and other whistleblowers. I believe the sources and whistleblowers face 
the biggest risk because they are usually anonymous, so it is easy for bad 
people to quietly get rid of a serious threat without public outcry.
Indeed, when I made my comments in Oslo in 2016, I was ignorant of 
earlier attacks on two whistleblowers central to one of the Gupta-Zuma 
scandals. The story involved a fake state dairy project, allegedly used by 
the Guptas’ as a personal ATM.
In one case, the police allegedly opened fire on an outspoken local 
politician as he drove through the gate at his home. The politician also 
claimed he was physically assaulted by “supporters” of the dairy, who 
called him an “enemy of employment”. In the second case, a provincial 
state auditor investigating the dairy was hijacked and then tortured. He 
died after three months in hospital. Five years later, the police had not 
solved the murder.
Journalists whose stories are not picked up by other media also face a 
distinct risk.
In 2016 and 2017, News24 investigative journalist Caryn Dolley wrote 
a string of articles describing an underworld war on the streets of Cape 
Town. Mobsters fought one another to control nightclub security and 
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the right to trade drugs and more. They met in the shadows with senior 
poli ticians and police officers, monitored by layers of competing spy 
groups – unofficial and official.
After Caryn watched and photographed one such meeting, one man 
emailed her: “I don’t think I need to explain to anY ONE who I meet or 
why! I meet lotsa people all the time would you like to no WHO THEY 
ARE ASWELL [sic].” He followed up with a sinister message: “WE HAVE 
EYES EVERY WHR [sic].” This was accompanied by a photograph of 
Caryn as she staked out his meeting with the politician.
As it happens, this man was more recently photographed socialising 
with Zuma’s adult son Duduzane, who has also been on the Guptas’ pay-
roll since Zuma became president.
Among her reports, Caryn described how the organised criminals 
used guns smuggled from police vaults – apparently with the help of 
police officers. Then she received another message, this time anonymous. 
It said: “Ms doley!That. same. guns. that. the. cops. sold. is. going. to. be. 
used. on. your. head. at. work. or. your. house. or. your. mom. house. and. 
your. dog. [sic]”
The incidents generated a little bit of press coverage, but until a recent 
court case, Caryn was alone in her crusade to cover Cape Town’s mob 
war. It would have been so easy for someone to snuff out further reports 
from her. Thankfully, she remains safe.
Overnight
I have had to readjust my risk analysis of the threat to South African jour-
nalists. On the one hand, I maintain that South Africans recognise and 
support their investigative journalists, and this helps keep bad, violent 
people from our door. If I am right, this might be rooted in apartheid, 
when people learned the importance of civic activism supported by jour-
nalists who held a racist, oppressive government to account.
We also have brave people willing to speak out from within govern-
ment and elsewhere, and our courts are independent and strong. We have 
vibrant opposition politics, and by peacefully replacing the Zuma regime, 
the ANC proved our democracy is alive.
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On the other hand, my risk analysis of December 2016 ignored the 
thugs who had already started pushing people over the “cliff edge”, and 
many of the other aggravating factors outlined in this article remain in 
place, even with Zuma gone. Indeed, an opposition party, the Economic 
Freedom Fighters, has since embarked on a verbally and physically vio-
lent campaign against journalists. As we go to print, my amaBhungane 
colleagues did not go to their Johannesburg office after a purported EFF 
member threatened on live radio that party members would invade our 
premises.
I cannot pretend to compare South Africa to Syria, Russia, Mexico or 
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chapter 2
The Coal-Case of Guatemala
Rodrigo Véliz Estrada
Independent journalist
The coal-based power plant battle
At the end of 2013 a state-owned Chinese construction company and a 
small US electric power company started a legal (and in time, physical) 
fight with each other. The conflict was over the property rights to a $900 
million coal-based power plant in southern Guatemala. It represented 
the first big investment of a Chinese company in the country, which has 
a long political and economic tradition of bonds with the US. Panama, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua had all begun to receive Chinese 
investment. Only Honduras and Guatemala had still remained “loyal” to 
the US area of interest in Central America. The coal-based power plant 
case was the first challenge to that historical hegemony. 
In a way, it was a fight between China and the US on Guatemalan ter-
ritory. But the fight was conducted by proxy, in local politics. Parallel 
politics (para-política) is a term coined by the American historian Rob-
ert Paxton to describe organizations or institutions that are “state-like” 
in their practice, but not a part of the government. In the Guatemalan 
case, key parallel networks, civil and military, licit and criminal, have a 
long history of using para-política to make their interests prevail. These 
networks act in the shadows, corrupting state institutions. In this sense 
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para-política in Guatemala links these interest groups with brokers and 
public officials, distorting the public function of state institutions. 
In the December 2011 general election, the Patriot Party (PP), savvy 
regarding this type of politics, made it all the way to the executive branch 
and achieved a majority in the National Congress (and was therefore able 
to appoint the highest positions in the the judiciary system). 
When the crisis between the Chinese construction company and 
the US company exploded, local lawyers representing each side began 
activating their political contacts. Two opposing, opaque and parallel 
networks unfolded in 2014, both looking to displace the other in an esca-
lating confrontation.
In 2007 the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala 
(CICIG), a UN financed body mandated with investigating and prosecut-
ing high-profile and para-política crimes, was created. The CICIG would 
then work hand in hand with the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio 
Público, MP), supporting and enforcing their work. By the end of 2015, 
the CICIG and the MP presented a preliminary case against one of the 
networks, the one supported by the PP government. 
The judicial case has since been stalled, mainly due to the strategy of 
frivolous litigation employed by the defence lawyers, where motions and 
lawsuits are made in bad faith, with the sole goal of prolonging the case 
while they wait for better political conditions. 
In early 2016, with the first phase of the frivolous strategy in place, a 
series of documents containing a significant portion of the evidence (let-
ters, call transcripts, documents, etc.) was leaked to Nómada, the digital 
newspaper where I was working at the time. Equipped with interviews, 
more legal documents and field visits, we could supply details to the case 
in a four-piece newspaper report.
The coal-case showed that judges, lawyers, public prosecutors, immi-
gration officers, an ex US ambassador, high ranking politicians and the 
then president’s son-in-law were involved in complex and illegal schemes 
aimed at inducing institutions into favoring Jaguar Energy, the US elec-
tric power company.
Jaguar Energy was a subsidiary of Ashmore Energy International Ltd. 
(ex-Enron). Enron had a long tradition of bribes and parallel politics in 
the coal-case of  guatemala
33
Latin America and in the US, and an infamous account fraud scandal led 
them to file for bankruptcy in 2001. Ashmore Energy acquired part of 
Enron’s business in 2006. 
How to reveal the “counter-forces”?
After the coal-case, many more cases have piled up against other parts 
of the parallel networks aligned with the PP government, thanks to the 
work of the CICIG-MP. And that is perhaps the most significant result of 
the coal-based power plant case and the other cases that followed: they 
revealed exactly how these networks operate; the level of impunity their 
activities achieve; and how the networks have been able to retain power 
and perfect their strategic criminal schemes through various political 
parties since the democratic transition from military rule in 1985. 
It was no coincidence that the main figures in the criminal networks, 
many now in jail, were key military personnel and businessmen from this 
transition process. They have molded and weakened public institutions 
for the last 30 years. 
The work of the press through journalists’ reports helped to deepen and 
provide a historical framework for the cases presented by the CICIG-MP. 
Both the press and CICIG-MP officials met aggressive responses from 
the political and economic groups they scrutinized. These responses 
included threats, intimidation, spurious demands, physical aggression, 
and in some cases murder. They targeted all the independent and corpo-
rate media and investigative journalists who were striving to reveal the 
nature of the parallel political networks. 
One of the groups reacting aggressively to the UN institution CICIG, 
was a far-right organization which called itself the “Foundation Against 
Terrorism”, formed by retired military officials and sponsored by local 
big business. The organization’s real interests were soon discovered: the 
group’s ties with “illegal structures” were revealed by more CICIG-MP 
cases. It was disclosed, for example, that one of their members had a 
contract in the Supreme Court, attached to a magistrate accused of cor-
ruption; and another one was linked to massacres during the war in Gua-
temala. Other members were recently sent to jail for forming a criminal 
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structure within the prison system, where they managed payments of 
transfers between prisons and benefits inside the prison.
Death threats
One of the far-right politicians, part of the Foundation Against Terror-
ism, used his Facebook profile in May 2017 to accuse me, a journalist, of 
“being behind the attacks” (meaning the reports) against him, and stated 
that a criminal lawsuit would follow. A day later he wrote a column wel-
coming me to the “world of mortals” – an implicit death threat.
This was not the first time a member of Indymedia or Nómada has 
received threats or other kinds of intimidation. Guatemala has a long his-
tory of journalist repression, even though the trend has declined after the 
Peace Accords were signed in December 1996. In any case, that personal 
and collective experience has helped us become more prepared for attacks. 
So we activated a network of support including the UN, key embassies, 
and the Guatemalan ombudsman. All showed us public and private sup-
port, and counseled us, step by step, in how to protect ourselves. Social 
media support from our readers ensued, condemning the threats and 
backing up the work that we do. We received no further threats, and the 
tension did not escalate, thanks to this support.
Some features of the support we received, however, demonstrated that 
we are a fairly privileged part of the journalist community. The key net-
work of support that we have developed was mainly built through years 
of working and living in Guatemala City, the country’s capital, with a 
significant history of centralized resources and urban functions. The 
embassies, key to human rights protection, are all located in Guatemala 
City. The city also, therefore, supports a concentration of rights protec-
tions, mainly for their middle class inhabitants, who are also some of 
the main actors in the recent massive mobilizations against corruption 
scandals. 
In contrast, the rest of the country is mainly impoverished, not con-
trolled directly by the central state but by local or regional groups, some 
linked to narco ringleaders. The position of local journalists, in such a 
situation, is very different from ours. Their relationship to the newspapers 
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in Guatemala City and our defense networks may be crucial to their 
security.
The assassination of three journalists in the southwest city of 
Suchitepéquez, and the subsequent ramifications, is a tragic example of 
what can happen without such defense networks. 
The deepening of the political crisis 
Journalists Luis Juárez Pichillá, Jorge De León Cabrera and Danilo López 
were murdered in April 2015 in Suchitepéquez. The murder case did not 
gain much attention until Guatemala City’s newspapers started rais-
ing questions. A joint group of Guatemala City’s journalists, in which 
Nómada was represented, started an investigation. The published report 
suggested that four mayors of the Patriot Party and LIDER, another party 
linked to criminal groups, were involved in the murders. Soon after the 
report was made public, the hitman and two policemen were captured.
But the case did not attract much attention in public opinion, and the 
four mayors were able to participate as candidates for Congress in the 
2015 elections. The main suspect, Julio Antonio Juárez Ramírez, was in 
the first place for Suchitepéquez on the election list for the LIDER party. 
Besides being a mayor, he was also a local businessman who from 2005 
to 2011 received $15 million in state contracts. That helped him run for 
mayor and then for the National Congress. He was elected Congressman 
in September 2015. 
Soon Juárez switched parties, moving to the official FCN-Nación, of 
President Jimmy Morales Cabrera. President Morales showed support for 
Juárez amid escalating criticism. 
It was not until Donald Trump’s application of the Magnitsky Act 
in December 2017 that the situation changed. Trump named 13 persons 
from around the globe linked to the “severity of human rights abuse and 
corruption”. Among the accused was congressman and ex-mayor Julio 
Juárez. The next month, Juárez was arrested. He is now in jail awaiting 
trial for the murder of the journalists.
The case is important because it reveals, again, how the traditional rela-
tionship with the US can save the lives of journalists or impose pressure 
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to investigate repression cases. Paradoxically this happened parallel to 
their own para-political actions, defending their economic interests 
against the threat of Chinese competition. It was also important because 
of the Guatemalan president’s support for Juárez and the present crisis. 
In contrast, the CICIG has received little support from President 
Jimmy Morales (2016–2019), who has at least twice demanded (in vain) 
the expulsion of its commissioner, Colombian citizen Iván Velásquez. 
Morales is being investigated by the CICIG, accused of money launder-
ing during the 2015 election campaign. His brother and son are part of 
another case and are now awaiting trial. 
The implication of the country’s President accentuates the opposition 
that the CICIG work met from 2015 onwards, as we saw above. Guatemala 
City’s mayor, ex-president of Guatemala Álvaro Arzú Irigoyen, was also 
summoned for a pretrial hearing so the CICIG could investigate him. 
Arzú, more experienced than Morales, had taken over the reins of the 
CICIG opposition: his son was elected President of the National Congress 
(although he is the only elected member of his party) in January of 2018, 
and has made public threats saying that you either “hit or pay the press”, 
to both national and international outcries. That all ended in April of 
2018, when Arzú Irigoyen died of a heart attack while playing golf. 
The present political situation, in which para-política style politicians 
shield themselves while they continue to run important institutions of 
the state, is a reminder that things will not change in an instant. The 
political and economic networks that created the coal-based power plant 
case, as well as many other implicated actors, continue to have power. 
Attacks on journalists, thus, remain a threat to be prepared for. 
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chapter 3
Armenian “Hero” of Panama 
Papers Becomes a Fighter  
Against Corruption
Kristine Aghalaryan
Investigative Journalists of Armenia (Hetq)
Armenia’s Special Investigative Service (SIS) dropped the offshore business 
case against former Chief Compulsory Enforcement Service Officer Mihran 
Poghosyan in January last year. Since then, the Investigative Journalists 
NGO has been struggling to get a copy of the SIS’s decision on dropping the 
case. They want to understand and convey to the public why the scandalous 
disclosure is being covered up by the law enforcement body.
The Chief Compulsory Enforcement Officer is in charge of overseeing 
that all court rulings are properly enforced, a job that requires extensive 
knowledge of the ins and outs of Armenia’s laws, rules and regulations. 
Nonetheless, Major General of Justice Mihran Poghosyan, Armenia’s for-
mer Chief Compulsory Enforcement Officer, was among the country’s 
group of officials who had planted deep roots in offshore economic zones.
Where his companies, which were registered in those zones, operated 
Poghosyan used his position to advance his business interests, all the 
while concealing his income. The SIS says that its investigation into the 
offshore business interests of Poghosyan failed to reveal any incrimina-
tory evidence of wrongdoing.
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A Panama Papers resignation 
The investigative journalist collective wrote in the news outlet, Investi-
gative Journalists of Armenia (Hetq), about Poghosyan’s shady financial 
dealings in Panama and his Swiss bank accounts in April 2016, using data 
uncovered in the Panama Papers. The data was (first) obtained by the 
German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung and shared by the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) with the Organized Crime 
and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and more than 110 media 
partners from 82 countries, including Hetq.
While the Ethics Committee of Armenia is entitled to order an inves-
tigation based on these findings, the body failed to do so, arguing that it 
first needed a third party petition.
On 8 April 2016, Armenia’s Transparency International Anti-Corrup-
tion Center (TIACC) filed such a petition. They requested the Ethics Com-
mittee for High-Level Officials launch a case to investigate the offshore 
business dealings of Major General of Justice Mihran Poghosyan, head of 
the Armenia’s Compulsory Enforcement Service.
Mihran Poghosyan tendered his resignation on 18 April. The Com-
pulsory Enforcement Service issued the following statement on behalf of 
Poghosyan:
My name has recently surfaced in the Armenian and international press regard-
ing the Panama offshore matter. I am saddened that my name is being raised 
alongside the family of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev, who has actually 
privatized billions of dollars. I find it unacceptable that I might be the reason 
for any possible comparison to be drawn between my country and despotic 
Azerbaijan. Thus, I have tendered my resignation. I will publicly respond to the 
offshore reports as a civilian, with no state leverage at my disposal. 
The Ethics Committee of High-Ranking Officials subsequently decided 
to refrain from taking any action regarding Mihran Poghosyan. They 
argued that the General Prosecutor’s office was examining the case and 
would send it to the appropriate law enforcement bodies to proceed. 
On 2 May, the Special Investigative Service of the Republic of Armenia 
instituted a criminal case against the former Chief Compulsory Enforce-
ment Officer. The criminal case was launched under the requirements of 
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Article 310 of the RA Criminal Code (illegal participation in entrepre-
neurial activity). Soon after that, Mihran Poghosyan started to “clean up” 
the offshore traces of his Armenian companies by removing companies 
registered in Panama from the shareholders list.
The SIS told reporters from Hetq that on 11 January 2017 Switzerland 
had turned down its request for legal assistance in the case. No details 
were given. The SIS also alleged that it had not received any word from 
Panama regarding its request for legal assistance in the Poghosyan 
investigation.
The criminal case filed against Poghosyan by the SIS is thus a non-
starter. Soon SIS ended the probe into Mihran Poghosyan’s Panama 
Papers scandal for “lack of evidence”.
“Lack of evidence” or “the request  
had not been fulfilled …”
SIS Press Secretary Marina Ohanjanyan told Hetq that the decision to 
drop the case against Poghosyan was due to the refusal of legal assistance 
by Switzerland and Panama.
However, the Swiss Federal Department of Justice told Hetq and its 
partner OCCRP that they turned down the Armenian request for legal 
assistance on 8 November 2016 because the requirements of the request 
were not fulfilled. However, “The Armenian authorities can at any time 
specify the request,” the email from Ingrid Ryser, a spokesperson for the 
Swiss Federal Department of Justice, added.
In the 2017 parliamentary elections in Armenia Mihran Pogosyan was 
elected a member of Parliament. He was appointed by the Republicans in 
Armenia, the ruling party at that time. As an MP, he then had political 
immunity. This case clearly illustrates that in Armenia, friendly and fam-
ily connections very often prevail over the law.
Mihran Poghosyan got his position in June 2008, after the Republi-
can Party leader Serge Sargsyan became president. The Armenian press 
has written many times that Poghosyan’s two uncles are Serzh Sargsyan’s 




Unable to provide information in  
the public interest
On 4 September, a Yerevan court rejected a suit filed by the Investigative 
Journalists NGO to force the Special Investigative Service (SIS) to hand 
over a copy of its decision to drop a criminal investigation into the off-
shore business interests of Poghosyan.
Last January the SIS, quoting Article 262, Part 1, of Armenia’s Criminal 
Procedure Code, said that copies of a decision to drop or halt criminal 
proceedings are sent to the suspect, the accused, the defense lawyer, the 
injured party or their representative, the civil plaintiff/defendant, or their 
representative. According to the law, a copy is also sent to an individ-
ual or legal entity upon whose statement the criminal investigation was 
launched in the first place. The SIS argued that the Investigative Jour-
nalists NGO (which publishes Hetq) cannot be provided a copy of the 
decision since the news outlet is none of the above. 
The NGO’s lawyers, in their suit, argued that Hetq requested the copy 
in order to carry out its mission to provide information in the public 
interest. Public interest is a priority here, because society should know 
what steps and actions have been taken to resolve this scandalous off-
shore story. It should be considered a democratic right to know how the 
law enforcement body justifies its decision not to punish an official who 
had businesses registered offshore.
The Investigative Journalists appealed this case to the Court of Appeals. 
The appeal was rejected too, on 26 December 2017, with the same argu-
ment that a copy of the decision is sent to an individual or a representative 
of the legal entity upon whose statement the criminal investigation was 
launched. Hetq, as a legal entity, had not submitted any statement, the 
Court of Appeals said. 
The body conducting the criminal proceedings initiated a criminal 
case on its own initiative, based on the materials published by www.hetq.
am. Consequently, the court concluded, the body responsible for the pro-
ceedings, in this case the SIS, has no obligation to provide a copy of the 
decision on dropping the criminal case.
In the past, Hetq has been sent copies of decisions to drop criminal 
proceedings that were launched based on Hetq articles, for example, 
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about violations of law during elections and monkey smuggling. The 
Hetq editorial office was sent copies of these decisions, even though Hetq 
did not report on the crime to the law enforcement agencies and did not 
even ask for these decisions in writing.
In the meantime, Poghosyan continues to affirm that he was not 
involved in any offshore business deals. Furthermore, he frequently gives 
“anticorruption related” interviews to journalists, posing as a fighter 
against corruption. 
Armenia re-opens Panama Papers case  
after the Velvet Revolution
Following the Spring 2018 “Velvet Revolution” in Armenia, Hetq attorney 
Ara Ghazaryan again petitioned the SIS for their decision. This time, they 
complied. 
It has taken almost two years and two legal suits, but Armenia’s Special 
Investigative Service has finally provided Hetq with its decision to drop 
the “offshore” criminal investigation of Mihran Poghosyan, Armenia’s 
former Chief Compulsory Enforcement Officer. The decision document 
confirms Hetq’s original suspicion that the SIS dropped the investigation 
due to political expediency and merely went through the motions of 
conducting an investigation. The SIS questioned only Poghosyan and his 
relatives, taking their denials of any wrongdoing at face value.
Poghosyan testified that in 2011, Eduard Harutyunyan, a distant friend, 
asked for his help in founding international organizations. According to 
Poghosyan, Harutyunyan wanted to set up a company in Armenia with 
international backers. Harutyunyan wanted the Armenian firm to be 
credible. Poghosyan testified that he acceded to the request and contacted 
a man called Richard Varchuk, who had the authority to create offshore 
companies. Poghosyan instructed him to set up companies in Panama 
registered in Harutyunyan’s name. Varchuk did as instructed, but since 
Poghosyan was the applicant, the new companies were mistakenly regis-
tered under his name, not Harutyunyan’s. Poghosyan testified that he 
was never aware of this since the companies were never active. Poghosyan 
claimed he did not even know the names of the companies. Poghosyan 
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testified that he only found out about the registration name mix-up after 
Hetq published its story. Harutyunyan backed up his testimony.
SIS Senior Investigator D. Kostandyan could have gone online to 
research the primary data held by the ICIJ or Hetq to find out how Pogho-
syan’s 100% share ownership certificate was written up and later surfaced 
online. He could have requested that the ICIJ provide him with the rel-
evant emails in order to shed light on correspondence between Mossack 
Fonseca lawyers and Poghosyan and the various documents shipped to 
Armenia.
These documents also include scanned copies of passports belonging 
to the individuals in question. It is highly unlikely that such copies were 
sent to Mossack Fonseca without their knowledge. In addition, money 
was transferred for these legal services. The SIS could have, if it wanted to, 
requested information about these transfers. Senior Investigator Kostan-
dyan did send an inquiry about the offshore companies to Armenia’s 
Central Bank, but his request was rejected. The bank said it did not have 
the authority to provide such secret bank data.
The investigator had started down the wrong path of inquiry from 
the beginning since the SIS had already decided to drop the case against 
Poghosyan. The charges against Poghosyan would have included money 
laundering, and the Central Bank would then have been obligated to pro-
vide the information. The SIS conducted no investigation into this mat-
ter. They believed Poghosyan when he testified that no bank account had 
been opened by him. SIS has since reopened a Panama Papers related case 
after a new government came into office. 
43
Citation: Kristjansson, J. K. (2019). Do Stories from Your Heart. In R. Krøvel & M. Thowsen (Eds.), Making 
Transparency Possible. An Interdisciplinary Dialogue (pp. 43–49). Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk. https://
doi.org/10.23865/noasp.64.ch4
License: CC BY-NC 4.0
chapter 4
Do Stories from Your Heart
Johannes Kr. Kristjansson
Investigative journalist in Iceland
My roots are in the western part of Iceland. Mountains and valleys sur-
round hardworking people, mostly fishermen and farmers. For several 
years I labored on trawlers and farms but failed to find contentment there. 
I already knew I wanted to be a journalist. 
In secondary school, I was the editor, reporter and layout person on my 
school newspaper, eventually creating a news magazine that was distri-
buted to all secondary schools throughout Iceland. It made me feel good 
to see fellow students receive information that was important to them or 
to read interviews that they liked and that maybe inspired them. 
The first scoop
My first professional job was for a small weekly newspaper in the southern 
part of Iceland. I discovered the US army was secretly planning to leave 
the airbase in Keflavik, which would have been a major blow to the local 
economy. The story won me a job offer at the television station Channel 2. 
I quickly recognized how powerful television was in bringing a story to 
life, but I chafed at the meaningless tasks assigned to a junior reporter. 
After pestering my bosses, they allowed me to investigate the growing 
influence of the Hells Angels in Iceland ś drug trade, as long as I did so 
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on my own time. I produced five segments on the subject, prompting a 
debate about the establishment of organized crime in Iceland. 
Taken off air
When Channel 2 decided to launch a weekly news magazine program 
called “Kompás”, they offered me the position of editor. We aired over 
100 episodes and did almost 300 stories. The program quickly earned a 
reputation for hard-hitting investigations. At “Kompás”, I learned how to 
use television to reveal the hidden stories of the vulnerable, as well as the 
immense responsibility that comes with that power. 
The CEO of Channel 2 once said in a speech that “Kompás” was Chan-
nel 2’s most valuable brand. That changed quickly when we did a story 
on tax havens shortly after the banking crisis in Iceland. The piece impli-
cated the owner of Channel 2. Three months after the program aired, my 
coworkers and I were fired. Soon after, the program was taken off the air. 
A personal investigation
In June 2010, my 17-year-old daughter died from an overdose of fentanyl, 
a powerful opioid. I tried to bury my pain in work, writing a book about 
a young Icelander imprisoned in Brazil for drug trafficking. The project 
failed to exorcise my demons. I found my daughteŕ s letters and began to 
piece together the final year of her life. I investigated her 29-year-old boy-
friend who it appears injected her with the fatal dose of drugs but was too 
stoned himself to do more than watch her die. I unearthed new evidence 
that convinced the police to reopen the case, but it was not conclusive 
enough to convict the boyfriend of murder. 
I was in a black hole for months after the police decision. I needed to 
find meaning in my daughter’s death. Through journalism I decided I 
could help others like her. State television in Iceland agreed to back the 
program project I embarked upon. I took my camera deep into the under-
ground drug culture of Icelandic teenagers. Through hidden camera 
(work), Icelanders entered this netherworld with me and saw kids shoot 
up and live in squalor. After all of that, I could no longer simply observe. 
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I helped rescue one girl and get her to treatment. The core of the series 
was my daughter’s story. I spoke on camera, played the 911 call and traced 
the ambulance rushing to her. 
One year after my daughter’s overdose, a six-part series was aired on 
the daily news magazine program on RUV, the state television. It shook 
Iceland, forced the problem of drug abuse into the open and sparked a 
national debate. Afterwards, the Directorate of Health clamped down on 
doctors overprescribing to drug addicts. 
The Panama Papers and cross-border 
journalism
In 2015, I received a call from Marina Walker, deputy director of the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. She told me about 
a massive leak of offshore information. Many Icelanders were involved, 
including the prime minister and his wife, who held a secret offshore 
company called Wintris. The Icelandic public was unaware of Wintris. I 
knew the information would be explosive. 
For almost a year, I worked alone in my apartment on what would 
become the Panama Papers. It was a hard time for me and my family since 
I had no income and was working on stories involving the most powerful 
people in Iceland, both in politics and business. Our filmed interview 
with the prime minister, in which he abruptly ended the conversation 
after being questioned about the company, went viral. When he resigned 
in response to the attention, it became one of the iconic moments of the 
Panama Papers worldwide. 
The former prime minister has tried to degrade the journalists who 
worked on the story including me. In March last year he was interviewed 
by the Icelandic TV program “Viglinan”. He was asked if it would have 
done more for his political career if he had not walked out of that infa-
mous interview.
“I doubt it would have changed much, how a person reacts to one inter-
view,” Sigmundur said. “Especially in light of the fact that the interview 
was staged. They had written everything ahead of time, from begin-
ning to end, had rehearsed it, which is of course without precedent, had 
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rehearsed how to most confuse the interview subject to make him look 
the worst.”
The former prime minister has attacked the reporters and Icelandic 
state television on several occasions, trying to taint their journalism. 
This is a known method that all investigative reporters are familiar 
with – denigrating the journalists instead of answering their legitimate 
questions.
The Directorate of Tax Investigations in Iceland bought information 
based on the Panama Papers from an unknown person for 37 million 
Icelandic krona. After months of investigation the Directorate of Internal 
Revenue has demanded almost half a billion krona in outstanding taxes 
from 16 individuals, based on information in the Panama Papers.
Following the Panama Papers publication, Julius Vifill Ingvarsson, a 
city councilor in Reykjavik, had to resign after it was revealed that he 
owned an offshore company and bank account. The Reykjavik district 
attorney has charged Mr. Ingvarsson with money laundering.
Also an Icelandic fish exporter has been implicated in a possible tax 
fraud. His properties and bank accounts have been seized.
The Directorate of Tax Investigations in Iceland and the district attor-
ney in Reykjavik are still investigating names from the Panama Papers. 
Hopefully they can recover outstanding taxes.
In my opinion cross-border journalism is the most important thing for 
democracy. And the International Consortium of Investigative Journal-
ists is one of the most important organizations for a better world.
I hope we will see many projects with journalists all over the world 
working together on important projects, where everyone leaves their ego 
outside the room. 
Iceland is safe and small
Around 350,000 inhabitants live in Iceland – fewer than in an average 
European city. “In Iceland you know almost everybody,” is a common 
joke among Icelanders. Working as an investigative reporter in Iceland is 
not considered a dangerous job like in some other parts of the world. It is 
very rare that a journalist in Iceland is attacked or is threatened because 
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of a story he or she is working on. The only time I have been threatened 
because of a story I worked on was when I did stories about the drug 
scene in Iceland. Some debt collectors or druglords have made threats 
towards me. 
The Icelandic investigative reporter faces other kinds of obstacles. The 
small size of the population is in itself one of the main obstacles. If a 
journalist is snooping around word will travel fast within the company or 
institution under scrutiny. Someone working there probably knows the 
journalist or at least knows someone who knows the journalist. Maybe 
someone will try to call the journalist and ask about the story and what 
he or she is looking for. So if I get a story tip that involves a relative of 
mine or a friend I will not work on the story but advise the person to find 
another journalist. 
Working with sources
Working with a source on a sensitive story in Iceland can be a problem. 
Under no circumstances can the journalist meet with the source at a café, 
a restaurant or other public place. There is always the danger of some-
one knowing the journalist and the source and people will start to think, 
“What are they doing together?” I usually meet my sources in remote 
places, such as industrial areas. 
The hard ones
Some sources are easy to work with, while others are hard to get. Some-
times you can develop a really good relationship with an important source 
with just one phone call. But some are hard to get. When I need to get to 
a source that I know can give me important information I usually park 
outside their home, call them from there and tell them, “I am in a car 
outside and you do want to talk to me. Trust me!” I do not threaten them 
or anything. I just tell them plainly that it is important for the public to 
know what is going on inside the company, the ministry, the organization 
or the institution. This method has not been effective all the time, but 
sometimes. That is enough for me. 
chapter 4
48
Leaking out bits and pieces
Sometimes when I am stuck in my research and cannot get the informa-
tion I need to fill out the puzzle, I deliberately leak bits and pieces of the 
story to someone that I know will shout it out inside the company or the 
institution. After some time I will get a message, an email or a phone call 
from a staff member who wants to give me the information I need. This 
has worked on several stories I have done.
Protecting the source
I have been interrogated by the police at least a couple of times because of 
my sources. The police have tried to get information about my sources due 
to a leak from some governmental institution. My rule is simple – I do not 
say a word and plead to a section in the Icelandic media law. As a journalist 
the most important things are trust and your sources. Nobody would want 
to talk to a journalist who cannot protect his sources. The trust is gone. So it 
is extremely important to protect your sources by any means. The journal-
ist has to find secure ways of being in contact with their source. 
In my opinion, all journalists should know how to use OpenPGP 
encryption for emails when they are working on a story. This is import-
ant when working on a story involving sources or sensitive information. 
I have an add-on for my email program and I also use Hushmail when I 
need to be in contact with sources who do not know how to set up Open-
PGP. When OpenPGP has been installed it is easy to use and according 
to computer security analysts, it is safe. 
I use Signal for messaging and phone calls. My computer security ana-
lyst tells me it is the safest on the market. It is easy to get as an app. 
The complicated story
After the financial crisis in Iceland in 2008 every news program had sto-
ries about the banking market manipulations. Few knew what that was. 
Even the words are hard to understand. In 2011 I received a leak contain-
ing charges from the Financial Supervisory Authority in Iceland to the 
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special prosecutor. The charges included detailed information about the 
alleged market manipulation within the three biggest banks in Iceland 
during the years before the financial collapse. 
I read through the pages and tried to understand these illegal acts 
myself. It took me some time to understand what was going on inside 
the banks and how they bought shares from themselves to raise the share 
price. I started to figure out how to explain this in a TV documentary so 
the public would understand. It would have been easy to use old footage 
of the banks over my voice explaining alleged market manipulation, but 
I knew I had to do something better. 
I sat down with my graphic designer and we created a picture of a 
machine showing how the banks, the Iceland stock exchange, the traders 
and the buyers were involved. The machine showed how this complicated 
scheme worked, and all of a sudden the public in Iceland understood 
what market manipulation means. (The story about the alleged market 
manipulation of Kaupthing can be seen here: vimeo.com/41317731)
The story was really important for the public to understand, because 
the market manipulation scheme by the Icelandic banks is considered one 
of the main reasons for the financial meltdown in Iceland. In my work as 
a TV reporter I always try to present my stories so everyone understands 
them, and I try to engage the viewer through personal stories or by put-
ting things in context. 
When I am working on a complicated story, especially about some-
thing financial, I put my effort into making it simple. My mentor used 
a good phrase for this. Once when I was working on one of these stories 
he put an A4 paper on the wall in front of my desk with the word KISS – 
Keep It Simple Stupid. Today I always write this word on a piece of paper 
and put it somewhere near me when I am working on a story of this kind. 
Journalism students often come to me for career advice. I always tell 
them the same thing: “Whenever possible, do your own stories from the 
heart – not the stories others find for you”.
With this as my guide I have been incredibly fortunate to be involved 
in work that has had real positive impact. People open up to me on cam-
era because I am genuinely interested. I do not shy away from holding the 
powerful accountable, and I seek the truth wherever it leads me.
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chapter 5
Safety in Journalism in Syria
Lina Chawaf
Rozana Radio
Safety for journalists has never been more significant. Compelling evi-
dence for such a statement can be found in developments all over the 
Middle East, and most of all in Syria.
Syrians started their revolution in 2011 chanting for freedom. They 
demanded the release of political prisoners, the reinstatement of polit-
ical freedoms and freedom of speech. In short, they wanted a demo-
cratic life.
The unprecedented violence meted out by the Syrian regime, the sup-
port and direct intervention of Russia, and the inaction of the interna-
tional community have made Syria the most dangerous country in the 
world for any human to live in. Doubly so for journalists and citizen jour-
nalists: Delivering the truth threatens all those carrying guns on all sides 
of the conflict.
Working in the media sector inside Syria nowadays has a great psycho-
logical impact on journalists, especially when their physical safety and life 
are at risk. To overcome the effects of this psychological impact in high-
risk areas, it is absolutely crucial to have flexible safety procedures and 
emergency plans in place. Rozana Media, like many other independent 
media institutions in Syria, has experienced many incidents affecting its 




Stories from the field
Examples of repression and physical reprisals abound.
Nineteen-year-old Yaser from Hama was arrested and tortured to 
death in prison by the regime. He was working for Rozana as a cor-
respondent, reporting what was happening in his local area, when 
the regime found out about his activities and arrested him. He was 
detained for a couple of months before his body was returned to his 
family. Bashar, an engineering student and resident of Raqqa, worked 
as a correspondent when ISIS took over his city. Bashar unfortu-
nately did not have a viable plan for protecting himself, either physi-
cally or digitally. ISIS raided his home, arrested him and seized 
his camera and laptop in 2014. Bashar’s fate since then remains 
unknown.
Mohammad, another Rozana Media correspondent from Idlib, was 
shot dead by an armed group while covering news in his area.
The assassination of the journalist Naji Al-Jarf in 2015 in Gaziantep, 
Turkey, made it to the headlines. Naji edited a magazine tracking and 
exposing crimes by the regime and ISIS alike. He was hunted down 
through his social media accounts and killed. He was shot in downtown 
Gaziantep in the middle of the day, in a very crowded place, by a teen-
ager on a motorbike. The Turkish authorities arrested his assassin a few 
months later. He was given a life sentence.
Naji did not follow basic safety procedures that he should have, being 
the journalist he was with the profile he had, and working on such sen-
sitive matters in such a high-risk environment. He was very vocal on 
social media and his movements and location were easily traceable. This 
tragic situation could have been prevented if he had been more cautious 
about his movements and his communication with people and on social 
media.
Two citizen reporters who lived in Orpha, Turkey, were slaughtered 
by one of their former friends in their home, because of their work. 
They both fled their hometown of Raqqa when it fell under ISIS con-
trol. Both were open about their work in documenting the crimes of 
ISIS and the regime. Their assassinations were linked to ISIS. They 
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were both tracked through their social media postings, which revealed 
their location.
One local media group received threats from the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) and was forced to withdraw an article it had published containing 
criticism of the armed Syrian opposition.
Safety inside Syria
Saad, who lives in Homs and works as a freelance correspondent for sev-
eral news agencies, opened a malicious link on Skype. His device froze 
and started to do things on its own, his emails and social media accounts 
were hacked.
Mohammad was a reporter working on the frontline in Idlib during a 
major opposition offensive to capture the strategic regime base of Wadi 
Al Dayfe. Mohammad says: “The concept of safety for journalists is a new 
concept for us. We do not have a thorough understanding of the steps to be 
taken to ensure our safety. However, while covering news I wear a helmet 
and a bulletproof vest, although I know these devices do not protect me 
100%, especially under the conditions in which I operate. It is more import-
ant for me to hide my personal views so the fighters won’t cause me harm.”
Omar, who worked for the Union of Revolutionaries in Deirezzour, 
was arrested by ISIS because of a post he published on Facebook. He pub-
lished a picture of a child stoning the bodies of fighters who had killed 
ISIS members. He warned against rising hatred. His intention was to 
raise awareness of the dangers of such incidents. He was released later 
and left for Turkey.
Muhammad al-Hamed was in prison for 5 months. After his release, 
he needed about 50 days to leave the country with his family to escape 
from ISIS. He endured difficult moments that he may not forget in his 
lifetime. Even though he is far away from Syria he has been hesitant about 
recounting his experiences in the ISIS prison, out of fear for his family 
who are still close to ISIS controlled areas. Mohammad lost his archive 




Digital and personal safety policy
It is under these circumstances that numerous safety programs have been 
organized to support Syrian media organizations. Hundreds of journal-
ists and citizen reporters have been trained in personal and digital safety 
by various international organizations.
A safety policy was developed and put into use to provide a modicum 
of security to Syrians working in the media sector. Keeping them abreast 
of real-time news and updates is one way of helping them stay safer. 
They also received training and special courses in personal safety. Syr-
ian media institutions follow international journalistic ethics and place 
great importance on protecting the safety and security of their sources, 
especially those involved in investigative journalism. A special procedure 
is followed by many Syrian media organizations to respond to the arrest/
apprehension of any of their staff.
Marwan lives in Turkey and works for a Syrian media organization. 
He received online threats from ISIS. The messages said they would track 
him down and kill him. Subsequently, a special plan was put in place to 
secure him and ensure his safety.
M.F. lives in Damascus. One day he was arrested by the regime because 
they suspected he was delivering information to an opposition media 
organization abroad. An emergency plan to secure all his online accounts 
was implemented immediately by this organization, so that he would be 
protected from death under torture. The regime thus could not access 
his information to prove that he was working as a correspondent for this 
media organization.
Journalism carries a very high responsibility in the general fight for 
freedom of expression in a place like Syria today. No story in the entire 
world warrants the death of journalists. Destiny, chance or luck play a 
big role in keeping us alive. But sometimes following safety regulations 
diligently can also help journalists survive – and do their job of fighting 
to deliver the truth in the most dangerous fields of all.
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chapter 6
“We, the citizens, can fight against 
corruption.” Open Source Jailing 
of Corrupt Bankers and Politicians 
Device: A Case Study1
Simona Levi
Xnet and 15MpaRato
Like many other normal, ordinary people we, Xnet, participated in the 
Indignados Movement in Spain in 2011. And on the first anniversary of 
this movement in Barcelona, Xnet launched an action called “15MpaRato”.
“15MpaRato” is a play on words difficult to translate from Spanish. 
“Rato” means “quite a while”, so “15MpaRato” implies that the 15M Indig-
nados Movement will last for quite a while. Furthermore, the name sug-
gests an adversary of the Indignados Movement, namely Rodrigo Rato, 
former Minister of the Economy and former head of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). At the time he was also Spain’s top banker – pres-
ident of Bankia – even seen as a probable future prime minister.
1 This chapter is excerpted from the author’s theatre piece “Become a Banker” and from the Intro-







The idea of the 15MpaRato action was thus to show that there are pow-
erful people – specific individuals with proper names are responsible – 
behind what was called the “crisis” (and which we all know is really a 
financial scam). The aim was to bring these scammers to justice, starting 
with Rodrigo Rato and his cronies. 
We singled out Rato for two main reasons:
1) Rodrigo Rato was the president of Caja Madrid Savings Bank and 
merged it with other banks to form the bank BANKIA. They made 
a concerted effort to increase the number of public shareholders 
with a massive campaign visible everywhere: “Become a Banker”. 
However, in less than seven months, Bankia shares plummeted, 
dragging down and ruining 300,000 people who had placed their 
faith in that campaign.
2) With a crisis comes the bailouts, and the usual logic of “too big to 
fail.” Almost half of the bailout money in Spain went to Bankia, 
formerly Caja Madrid Savings Bank. We can deduce from this that 
a seventh of the entire Spanish budget was created by Bankia on its 
own. This was, in other words, very much a self-inflicted “crisis” 
imposed by the scammers themselves.
I want to emphasize that 15MpaRato was not an action led by legal or 
financial experts. Our team consists of normal, ordinary people, not 
bankers, lawyers, economists or attorneys. 15MpaRato deliberately set up 
a device for everybody.
Specifically, 15MpaRato made an appeal for:
- Victims of the scam. We wanted ordinary people themselves to be the 
accusers, in order to file a lawsuit. 44 people who had been swindled 
by Bankia volunteered to prosecute Rodrigo Rato in their names.
- Evidence. Xnet launched an anonymous online service that people 
could contribute to: the Xnet Mailbox for Citizen Leaks. 
- Money for judicial costs. We launched what became the first “polit-
ical crowdfunding” campaign. Now they are quite common, but 
ours was the first. 130% of the campaign target was reached on the 
very first day: almost 20,000 euros. 
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And so the 15MpaRato action resulted in a civil lawsuit in Spain’s Supreme 
Court, which set in motion what became known as the “Bankia Case”. 
This campaign began as an action taken by normal, ordinary people, 
long before political parties jumped on the bandwagon. Later, the gov-
ernment and the press would lead people to believe that the Bankia Case 
was started by a public prosecutor, a judge, a minister, a political party, or 
the press. But no, it was always us. We remain the accusers in this lawsuit.
15MpaRato was never a personal vendetta against Mister Rato. The 
thinking of Xnet was rather that by bringing down first a well-known 
high-profile banker, the rest would follow. As it turned out, this thinking 
was sound: we started with charges against Rato and 33 other high-level 
bankers. Now, seven years later, almost 70 bankers and politicians have 
been sentenced or await trial, from the whole political spectrum – from 
the right to the extreme left. 
Learning to tell our own story
In the course of this adventure, we (Xnet/15MpaRato) found out some-
thing unexpected: it is actually not that hard to file lawsuits against bank-
ers and politicians. What is really hard is to convey the main lesson to the 
public, that all of this was done by normal, ordinary people. People must 
know that anyone can make such a thing happen. 
We soon discovered the difficulty of getting the story right: Xnet 
started receiving first-hand information through the Xnetleaks mailbox 
and from the accusers in the trial at the Supreme Court. We thus noticed 
a discrepancy between this information and the information reaching 
the public through the media. It was totally different from the informa-
tion reaching us. For every ten earnest journalists working with us, there 
were ten media outlets who simply ignored the truth. 
A similar problem arose with the institutionalization of the politics of 
the Indignados. The nominally “new” party – Podemos – made it pain-
fully clear to every genuinely citizen-led or popular representative group 
(and there are some in Spain like Partido X, Barcelona en Comú o Marea): 
“Either you join our ranks and display our brand, or we will wipe you off 
the map and remove you as our possible competitor”.
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Because of the media spin, and because of the monopolization of the 
voice of protest by Podemos, Xnet decided to tell the story of our fight 
against corruption directly, on the stage, in books, in the cinema.
We wrote these “art pieces” starting with one of the most important 
sources of evidence we uncovered.
This happened as we, Xnet, were working on this whole legal process. 
We began receiving anonymous messages in the mailbox for citizen leaks. 
One of many said: “I have a large amount of information that I think 
paints a very clear picture of institutional corruption in Spain.” This 
clear picture came through the “Blesa emails”, emails sent and received 
by Miguel Blesa, president of Caja Madrid Savings Bank before Rodrigo 
Rato took over and transformed it into Bankia.
These emails tell the story of how a “crisis” is manufactured. The Blesa 
emails gave us a view of our “crisis” from within the engine room.
We simply organized the release of this story to be available to many 
more viewers. In order to provide public access to the material, Xnet sifted 
through the original 8,000 emails and ended up with 460 (dating from 
2000 to 2009), which contained information of public relevance, and 
released them on the website and to the press. http://correosdeblesa.com
The “Blesa emails” were published over the course of many days, 
revealing all kinds of unimagined and grotesque things. One example 
was the existence of “Black VISA” credit cards that allowed Caja Madrid 
Savings Bank executives to buy whatever they wanted outside the radar 
of the tax authorities.
With this evidence, the trial against almost a hundred Spanish politi-
cians and bankers is now in its final phase. Our art pieces had found their 
scripts.
The story, revealed in reality and told on stage by the Xnet group and 
through the 15MpaRato action, was the story of how governing elites 
plundered a country. 
But it is also the story of how citizens got together and illuminated 
the truth. And how normal ordinary people, joining forces, learning and 
explaining how things really happen, are changing the usual endings – 
despite the government, the political parties and the mass media. 
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Access to information:  
Transparency and privacy
We have learned an important lesson with this major leak and how the 
status quo tried to react to it. When something stops being an instrument 
for democracy and justice and becomes a ‘value’, a slogan or an end in 
and of itself, we have a new problem. 
Laudable words like ‘transparency’ and ‘privacy’ have become pro-
jectile weapons used very selectively, for propaganda purposes. ‘Trans-
parency’ can be used to trap people who, anonymously, leak useful and 
relevant information. Or it can be used against people who disobey unjust 
laws to effect change. Conversely, ‘privacy’ is often invoked to erase the 
crimes of bankers, politicians and large monopolies. On TV talk shows, 
activists are routinely criminalized, because “We don’t know who they 
are”, whilst the anonymity of institutional gangsters is defended because, 
“Politicians also have a right to privacy”.
In the post-Snowden revelations era, when we are asked about a prin-
cipled position, we digital rights activists must provide a clear and unam-
biguous response: “Transparency for the state. Privacy for all of us”.
On the uneven playing field between the establishment, with all of 
their resources necessary for the perpetuation of abuse, and the rest of 
the population, we must stand up for radical transparency. We must 
demand accountability and accessibility from the government, political 
parties, institutions and those with large family fortunes. As a princi-
ple, both public and private structures, which have an impact on more 
than 10% of the population, should be scrutinized; and this includes 
all of their members while in power. They do not have the right to be 
overlooked. 
At the same time we must preserve, in the same way, a radical respect 
for the privacy, anonymity or right to be seen without being recognized, 
for all of the people or independent citizen groups that come together to 
solve problems [1].
We must stop dead in its tracks the demagogy, expertly disguised as 
sentimental technophobia, which tells us that we should all be identified 
and identifiable online for our own good, and, of course, for our own 
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safety. If we allow this repressive breach of our virtual privacy, repression 
of privacy in the physical world will follow.
Crimes have been and must be prosecuted, of course, but at all times 
and in all places, without undermining fundamental rights [2].
No one in his or her right mind with even a rudimentary idea of his-
tory would demand that we leave our mail open to postal workers, so that 
they can take a peek at what we have written whenever they want and 
without any judicial order, just in case we happen to be terrorists or pae-
dophiles, or we simply express disagreement with an existing law.
Transparency and participation
On the other hand, we do not want to transform the very real legal gains 
of transparency that we have defended for a long time – in a country like 
Spain where a law on the subject is just five years old – into an abstract 
moralistic value. Transparency should not be reduced to mere window 
dressing, something we are familiar with already. The standard-bearers 
of transparency and participation in this day and age like to announce 
collaborative programs, which may not actually be so, or are too few 
and poorly run. They can open lists that are not actually open, or are too 
open or too few; or open accounts that are nominally transparent, but 
in reality impossible to decipher. In the power struggle between propa-
ganda and intelligent awareness the victor is the one who gets to write 
history.
‘Transparency’ and ‘participation’ are the new promises of Demagogy 
3.0, at least in Spain. Transparency and participation become a post-mod-
ern “dictatorship of the proletariat”, slogans inaugurating the false new 
politics – a simple lie. Transparency and participation without a roadmap 
for co-responsibility, empowerment and leadership distributed equally in 
civil society are just playing to the gallery.
Instead, we want transparency to continue as an integral tool of action 
and transformation, thus effectively promoting real democracy.
For this reason, we need to ask ourselves not only how to build the 
frameworks for accessing and liberating information. We must also ask 
what to do with this information and who must do something with it.
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While we fight to create new institutions that would solidly support 
such frameworks, we should not underestimate the importance of dis-
mantling the excesses of the institutions we have inherited from our past. 
The value of citizen leaks in relation to the entire ecosystem of corruption 
that we have seen in Spain is incalculable [3].
The Monopoly of the Truth TM that has been in force until now is the 
trinity of the media, the government and the political parties. Amongst 
them, there is a tacit agreement to ignore anything outside the trinity that 
might have any significant and real effect on history. The15MpaRato 
Device has made opposition from ordinary people manifest, weakening 
the iron character of the trinity. 
Having said that, there are still hundreds of journalists who believe 
in the social role of their profession, who investigate and who know how 
important it is to cooperate with an active citizenry. With these people, 
we must draw up a new collaborative contract that will allow us to write 
history ourselves the way we are making it, together.
By cooperating, we can deconstruct the fairytale that tries to keep us 
passive. It is not only for dignity and historical memory; it is also to give 
wings to the new model, the one that is changing things. The more we 
know, the more we will grow, and the more we are, the more successful 
we will be.
This is why it is so important for us to fight for the protection of 
sources and to fight so that the press, governments, institutions and 
political parties recognize this protection.
Maintaining our privacy and being recognized are not mutually exclu-
sive ideas. The Zapatistas explained it quite well when they said, “We hide 
our faces to be seen”.
What is crucial is establishing an alliance between information profes-
sionals and citizens who have decided to bring to light necessary infor-
mation. This alliance entails a mutual recognition of each other’s efforts 
and common responsibilities, a shared intention of bringing down sur-
veillance and censure laws, and a joint defense of leaks and whistleblow-
ers. At the same time, they must provide each other with the means of 




In the fifth year of the era of the 15M/Indignados movement, we know 
that we are advancing, defending and making collective and implacable 
use of our right to know and to inform, to be seen and to be recognized 
without fear of persecution, and to defend these rights, we are becoming 
organized.
The goal is to become an empowered civil society that can freely 
access information and utilize this information to watch over our own 
institutions. 
Some call this democracy.
Notes:
[1]  STOA - Document commissioned by the European Parliament, 




[2]  The report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
“Invasive surveillance, as well as the collection and storage of per-
sonal data derived from digital communication – if it is part of tar-
geted or massive surveillance programs – not only may it violate 
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EXTRA TRACK
Brief how-to-do-it for citizens fighting against corruption
ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT
1. What should I report? Considering what will be denounced 
requires an objective analysis of both the public impact and the 
legal aspects. As immoral as they may seem, not all acts are pun-
ishable by law, neither are they as simple to prove as they may seem. 
The goal of each action is to open a crack in the wall of impunity 
and for that we must concentrate all our forces on a single project.
  Corruption naturally branches out. Each issue we investigate 
will lead us to further information. To investigate everything is 
highly tempting when you want to serve justice, but unproductive 
when you want to be effective. Let’s focus on the roots and not 
climb the branches. Take a direct approach to tackle the plot of 
political-business collusion. This is how they will fall. 
2.  Where to leak the information? Special precautions must be 
taken at this point. The vast majority of political parties and the 
media have no interest in investigating (it is expensive and com-
plex), they are more interested in the news, even at the cost of 
obstructing the legal process. It is important to keep control over 
the information and your identity to be sure how both will be 
used. Sometimes the anonymous leaks-box of a truly indepen-
dent NGO or media is the best option to reveal information. But 
sometimes we do better to keep it until we can open a court case. 
If we want to get to the root of the problem, we have to keep a 
clear focus and identify from a bird’s eye view the most important 
issues we need to concentrate on. It is important not to get lost 
in information that moves us away from the underlying idea: to 
erase the sense of impunity of the corrupt. And above all, protec-
tion of sources is essential.
3.  Develop the information obtained based on the issue denounced. 
Our job as committed citizens does not end with being in posses-
sion of and filtering certain information. In most cases, the work
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   in itself of collecting evidence and monitoring the evolution of the 
information is essential. Bear in mind that groups of organized 
citizens may not always have the resources to cover all the work 
that filtration entails; the work performed by the sources them-
selves becomes all the more important.
PROTECT YOURSELF
4. Preserve your own safety. You need tools to ensure safety. For 
groups of organized citizens in particular, we consider such tools 
essential. This is not secrecy or conspiracy, it is absolutely neces-
sary in many if not most countries. In countries like the US, Can-
ada, Iceland, Denmark, South Africa or Ireland, there is a degree 
of specific protection legislation. The so-called “whistleblowers” 
are to a degree valued and lauded for their efforts. In other coun-
tries there is no such specific protection, such as China, Turkey 
and, to some extent, Spain. Tools ensuring that communication 
flows in an entirely anonymous way, with all subsequent com-
munications carried out in secure communication environ-
ments (like the Tor network), are vital, and the only way to fully 
protect the source from retaliation so they remain free to con-
tinue their contribution.
ORGANIZE AND CO-OPERATE
5. Get organized, but with caution. As a group of citizens willing 
to unite their efforts and skills with others, organization is a key 
issue. Depending on the case denounced, finding the support that 
ends up shaping an organized group of citizens has to be carried 
out with caution in order to preserve your safety and that of oth-
ers, as well as not to expose the information. Remember, it is not 
a question of just revealing the information but of how to reveal 
it. If it is not done at the right time, we risk tipping off those we 
want to implicate.
6. Cooperation. On many occasions the information gathered by 
sources may be beyond their area of expertise; this is where col-
laboration between citizens and journalists or NGOs acquires
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   special relevance. Citizen collaboration is not only the best mech-
anism for denouncing corruption, but also for data analysis.
7. Power. Once work is completed and the proof of the corrupt plot 
is published, it is time to be aware that this is only half of the 
work that needs to be done in order to achieve success. To believe 
that merely exposing the evidence will end political collusion and 
corruption is in itself a mistaken belief, not backed up by much 
evidence. The exposure needs power behind it, if it is not to fall 
into oblivion. The political, communicational or judicial goals of 
an exposure need to be backed up by two elements:
  –  A networked campaign that succeeds in spreading like wild-
fire until everyone who was unpunished is hit. The good news is 
that the second part of an exposure is the most stimulating and 
empowering part of the work.
  –  A legal action, whenever possible.
The corrupt will not end corruption; only organized citizens can, 
and everybody can do it. 

67
Citation: Bourdon, W., & Lefebvre, A. (2019). A Long Way to Go for Whistleblowers. In R. Krøvel & M. 
Thowsen (Eds.), Making Transparency Possible. An Interdisciplinary Dialogue (pp. 67–79). Oslo: Cappelen 
Damm Akademisk. https://doi.org/10.23865/noasp.64.ch7
License: CC BY-NC 4.0
chapter 7
A Long Way to Go for 
Whistleblowers
William Bourdon
Founding partner, Bourdon & Associés
Amélie Lefebvre
Partner, Bourdon & Associés
William Bourdon has defended whistleblowers in France and abroad for 
more than fifteen years, sometimes from very different perspectives and 
under very different circumstances. This has led him to draw many les-
sons that he has tried to share in the Petit manuel de désobéissance civile 
published in 2016 by Editions Lattès. In this text, Amélie Lefebvre and 
William Bourdon sum up some of the key battles. Some have proved to be 
extremely difficult, and demonstrate that the anxiety of whistleblowers 
and their protection are in many ways complex issues. Some notable cases 
ended in victory, although much remains before a full societal recogni-
tion of the democratic significance of whistleblowers is in place.
The recognition of whistleblowers is primarily a question of protection. 
Whether outsiders see them as courageous informers or not is second-
ary. If the status of being a whistleblower does not afford them protec-
tion, they will be vulnerable. Hence it is crucial to define and provide 
demarcation criteria for whistleblowers. They need access to a very spe-
cific regime. Their right to a modicum of irresponsibility towards special 
interests (oftentimes those of their own employers), and their protection 
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against retaliations that never fail to arise, must be part and parcel of the 
recognition of the responsibility whistleblowers have accepted to protect 
the general interest.
Put simply, the whistleblower is a person who has identified a danger 
and reports it to others. This signal must mechanically trigger decision 
processes and actions to face this danger, annihilate it and protect the 
community. The problem is to clarify the notions of danger, of reporting, 
and of general interest. Such terms, needless to say, are not objects of a 
spontaneous and unanimous common understanding.
However much the terms can be disputed, it bears repetition: a whis-
tleblower must be protected, because the protection of the general inter-
est is at stake. This key argument is not always heard, even in the most 
(in)famous cases in the media.
To mention only a handful of them from the United States: Chelsea 
Manning, Edward Snowden and his predecessor, William Binney, or 
Daniel Ellsberg, the original whistleblower for the Pentagon papers in 
1971, are all iconic examples of watchmen who have suffered sacrifices, 
but who have also exposed the need to elevate the status of whistleblower 
protection. Their revelations have created shockwaves beyond the public 
sphere, in the minds of millions of citizens throughout the world.
Notwithstanding their celebrity, to define and outline the concept of 
whistleblower within a legal framework has required arduous but neces-
sary work. The experience one of the authors of this article has as a lawyer 
may help elucidate the nature of this work.
The first encounters with whistleblowers  
and their defense
The first whistleblowers came to William Bourdon’s law firm in the 
2000s. Back then, the expression “whistleblower” may have been used in 
different forums and by various researchers who had denounced some 
public health scandals, but it was definitively not popularized in France 
or anywhere else in the world as it is today.
We must bear in mind the vertiginous speed with which this term has 
not only imposed itself, but also how fast the perception has grown, year 
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after year, of whistleblowers as the avant-garde of a formidable global citi-
zen movement, which no longer accepts that public and private actors 
multiply promises and ethical commitments while organizing irrespon-
sibly, or refusing liability when questioned.
One of the first whistleblowers who met up with William Bourdon, was 
the commander Philippe Pichon. He was a brave French judicial police offi-
cer in charge of checking the regularity of the operation of the file called at 
the time “STIC” (the police’s file containing data sheets concerning thirty 
million French individuals). Disgusted by the apathy of police hierarchy, he 
believed that it was his duty to reveal the irregularities in this file.
He did this at a time when whistleblowers were very poorly protected. 
Pichon could scarcely have known the considerable risk he was taking. He 
was identified by the press as the person behind the disclosure of two data 
sheets of important personalities containing totally inaccurate remarks. 
Very quickly, the administrative machine was set in motion and crushed 
him. He was promptly sent into early retirement, which thus eradicated 
his ambitions for a great career in the national police. The judicial battle 
against him continues, even today.
He was prosecuted before the Criminal Court of Paris in particular for 
having breached professional confidentiality. Still, William Bourdon was 
able to obtain a relatively benevolent verdict which, for the first time, took 
into consideration what has become today the common protective shield 
for all whistleblowers: the recognition of an objective public interest. He 
provoked a public debate, having no other choice than to transgress the law.
Though Philippe Pichon has moved on in other directions in his per-
sonal life, the general lesson remains a tragic one: without full legal pro-
tection, or at least without very strong support from public opinion, the 
media, unions or specialised NGOs, the professional and social death of 
the whistleblower is certain.
An aggravating factor for Philippe Pichon at the time was the fact 
that he was a civil servant. In administrations around the world, some-
thing close to an omerta1 always exists. This omerta often results from 
1 A rule or code that prohibits speaking or divulging information about certain activities, espe-
cially the activities of a criminal organization (The Free Dictionary).
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manipulating the obligation of discretion, an otherwise laudable prin-
ciple. Such manipulation often involves the intimidation of officials in 
order to dissuade them from revealing serious dysfunctions encountered 
in the course of their civic duties.
By the same token, it is the very commitment to civic duty, instilled in 
William Bourdon’s practice as a lawyer, that has made the dialogue with 
whistleblowers so natural for one of the authors of this article. All the 
actions Bourdon has piloted come from this sense of commitment. As 
President of the Association SHERPA, founded in the 2000s and more 
recently PPLAAF, founded in 2017, he has tried to find cures for the new 
forms of impunity stemming from globalization, especially in the fight 
against corruption.
The case of Hervé Falciani
One whistleblower who came to Bourdon for help was a young computer 
scientist by the name of Hervé Falciani. He worked at HSBC in Geneva, 
and he revealed the conditions under which the bank had opened thou-
sands of foreigners’ accounts, not out of love for Switzerland, but to escape 
the scrutiny of their respective tax administrations.
Hervé Falciani’s courageous revelations caused a huge scandal, which 
led to the opening of a criminal procedure in France against HSBC. The 
bank was charged, as well as its Swiss subsidiary and some of its top man-
agers, with having knowingly, in a tax fraud laundering context, offered 
its clients services and means to organize the concealment of their assets 
from the tax authorities, and also for going further by having actively 
dissuaded some clients to regularize their tax situation, enabling them 
instead to reinforce the opacity of their assets and reduce the risk of being 
discovered by the tax administration. HSBC accepted a public interest 
court agreement to pay a fine of € 300,000,000. This type of agreement 
was only made possible in France in 2017.
Thus there will not be any public trial of HSBC. And if the size of the 
fine is exceptional according to French standards, it is a far cry from 
international standards, particularly those applied in the United States 
and Great Britain.
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Overall, this agreement is a positive outcome in relation to the respon-
sibility of the bank, but Switzerland still refuses to disclose the identities 
of French citizens holding accounts on its soil. The justification of this 
refusal is that the French administration has not proven that the localiza-
tion of these accounts in Switzerland was motivated by morally or legally 
questionable reasons …
Notwithstanding the legal steps in the right direction, we have a long 
way to go before countries like Switzerland and others offer effective and 
sincere cooperation in the fight against tax evasion.
Hervé Falciani certainly paid a high price for his action. He was arrested 
and detained in Spain on the basis of a Swiss arrest warrant. William Bour-
don had the honor of defending him before the Audiencia Nacional in 
Madrid several years ago, and pleaded for the rejection of this extradition 
request. Besides strong legal reasons, the Prosecutor General also argued 
for the same rejection by stating, rightly so, that it would be paradoxical to 
extradite Hervé Falciani to Switzerland for prosecution and trial, given the 
immeasurable services he had rendered to European taxpayers …
He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment by the Swiss court and is 
still subject to an international arrest warrant. He was arrested again in 
Spain as late as April 2018, and in a judicial merry-go-round was released 
again pending trial. It is likely that, again, the Spanish court system 
will refuse to uphold the senseless judicial harassment from the Swiss 
authorities.
The fate of Hervé Falciani was not, however, the unluckiest one. Other 
whistleblowers fell much further, because they were early visionaries who 
launched themselves without preparation and without anticipation, into 
a public battle that crushed them. We should not forget these anonymous 
and unsung heroes, because they were precursors of a dynamic that has 
today become visible on a global scale.
Antoine Deltour and the  
shockwaves of Lux Leaks
The stage was now set for Antoine Deltour, a formidable French and 
European citizen. His revelations dealt a blow to the mechanism of tax 
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rulings by which Luxembourg managed to siphon off billions of euros 
from public purses.
With these secret agreements, large multinational companies were 
invited to locate their headquarters in Luxembourg. In exchange, they 
got tax agreements with extremely low rates, thus unfairly depriving the 
multinationals’ home countries from receiving public resources.
The revelations of Antoine Deltour were welcomed and his action praised 
by a large majority of European parliamentarians, officials of the European 
Commission and politicians of diverse stripes and colors. Thanks to whis-
tleblowers, but also to the actions of civil society actors, public officials 
increasingly understand and measure the value of seizing upon such rev-
elations. In recent years, due to the financial crisis throughout Europe, an 
effective fight against tax evasion can be turned into political capital.
The exasperation of citizens and the awareness of public officials have 
mutually reinforced the need to recover billions of lost euros. The unfair 
and immoral behavior associated with tax evasion is deemed unaccept-
able, perhaps because it erodes the trust that democracy needs to exist, 
and the trust citizens need to have towards their elected officials. It also, 
dangerously, feeds all manner of populism.
Without Antoine Deltour, the scandal of Lux Leaks would not have 
caused the shockwave that has led to the creation of parliamentary 
committees or the adoption of new European directives. Of particular 
importance, when we now return to the arduous work of securing legal 
protection for whistleblowers, is the role of regional courts, and in partic-
ular the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 
ECHR: “The interest which the public may have in particular informa-
tion can sometimes be so strong as to override even a legally imposed duty 
of confidence.”
William Bourdon, with his Luxembourg colleague and friend Philippe 
Penning, was able to defend Antoine Deltour through a long judicial pro-
cedure. He has now been finally acquitted, in conformity with the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence. 
According to the ECHR, the protection of whistleblowers is subject to 
several conditions. It is not sufficient that the object of the revelation be 
of general interest.
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In its first judgment on this issue, Guja v. Moldova (ECHR, 12 February 
2008, Req., No. 14277/04), the ECHR held that Moldova had violated Arti-
cle 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which also applies 
to the professional sphere.
Following the dropping of criminal prosecution against policemen 
suspected of assaulting individuals in the course of an investigation, 
Jacob Guja, Director of the Press Service of the Moldovan General Pros-
ecutor’s Office, sent two letters of judicial origin to the press concerning 
the conduct of the Vice-President of the Parliament and the inaction of 
the General Prosecutor. He was dismissed on the grounds that the letters 
were covered by confidentiality.
The Court had considered “The importance of the right to freedom of 
expression on matters of general interest; the right of civil servants and 
other employees to report illegal conduct and wrongdoing at their place of 
work; the duties and responsibilities of employees towards their employers; 
and the right of employers to manage their staff,” and ruled that “The inter-
est which the public may have in particular information can sometimes be 
so strong as to override even a legally imposed duty of confidence”.
From this case onwards, the now well-known six criteria for whistle-
blower protection were set out and defined (whether or not the applicant 
had other means of making the disclosure, the public interest in the infor-
mation disclosed, the authenticity of the information, the harm caused to 
the entity involved in the disclosure, the good faith of the whistleblower, 
and the severity of the sanction).
The ECHR subsequently has gone even further, applying these criteria 
to the case of revelations of irregularities related to secret telephone tap-
pings in the context of the prevention and repression of offenses affecting 
state security (ECHR, 8 January 2013, Bucur & Toma v. Romania, appli-
cation No. 40238/02).
The ECHR also utilized these criteria in Heinisch v. Germany (ECHR, 
21 July 2011, Req No. 28274/08) and in Görmüs v. Turkey, recalling that 
“The disclosure of information in the hands of the state plays a vital role 
in a democratic society, since it allows civil society to control the activities 
of the government to which it has entrusted the protection of its interests 
“(ECHR, 19 January 2016, Req. §48).
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Thus, it emerges from this jurisprudence that the lawfulness or unlaw-
fulness of the information disclosed is not a criterion for the application of 
the protective status of the whistleblower, nor is the respect or the violation 
by the whistleblower of his obligation of confidentiality a decisive factor.
In the case of Antoine Deltour, it is through such reasoning, broadly 
outlined here, that justification was granted to him as he fulfilled all the 
conditions: disinterestedness, dissemination of exact information, defence 
of the public interest, proof that it was impossible to act otherwise, and 
proof that the harm suffered by the civil party PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
was not equivalent to the benefits resulting from these revelations.
It must be recalled here that PricewaterhouseCoopers claimed it had 
suffered a loss limited to € 1, a symbolic amount. However, such a low 
amount was an implicit recognition by PricewaterhouseCoopers of its 
own turpitude since, as had been demonstrated during the trial, the com-
pany’s profits had actually never been as high as they had since Antoine 
Deltour’s revelations. This shows again, there is still a long way to go.
The glaring paradox is that Antoine Deltour received the European 
Citizen Medal and was at the same time unfairly criminalized, ultimately 
without success, but not without enduring a difficult and lengthy legal 
procedure.
This paradox speaks volumes in terms of the hybrid perception of 
whistleblowers. They are becoming saints and heroes to a large major-
ity of the population, while simultaneously being seen as enemies and 
threats by parts of a worldwide oligarchy. Driven by greed, this oligar-
chy persists in maintaining its impunity by any means, and in taking 
many liberties with morality, if not the law. They can also thrive on the 
philosophical ambiguities of the term “general interest”, to which we 
now turn.
Why whistleblowers need to be protected,  
a philosophical elaboration
The general interest is traditionally defined in its “utilitarian” conception 
as the sum of particular interests, and in its “voluntarist” conception as 
the expression of the general will.
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Taken in its “utilitarian” conception, it prioritizes the concerns of an 
individual. The difficulty is to arbitrate between two individual interests. 
In its broader “voluntarist” conception, general interest offers the possibil-
ity of going beyond the differences between singular individuals to satisfy, 
in principle, the greatest number of people possible. The risk inherent in 
such a concept is that agency is placed into the hands of those who govern.
A mistake that is too often made is the attempt to balance the individ-
ual interest of the whistleblower against the interest of the company or 
administration where the revealed behavior has occurred. The equilib-
rium should rather be sought outside of this relationship and apart from 
any consideration related to the personal interest of the whistleblower. He 
or she should instead be seen as the mouthpiece of a societal warning, a 
warning that tends to serve and protect the general interest abused by the 
practice or situation described.
It is easy to pin down the meaning of the general interest in cases 
of crime against a person, property or against public confidence in an 
administration’s probity, such as crimes of corruption or tax fraud. It is 
also fairly straightforward when the revelation concerns the violation of 
an international commitment related to human rights, or the protection 
of the environment, for instance.
In France, the object of the warning is broadly understood. It covers all 
crimes and offenses without restriction, as well as the notions of “serious 
and manifest violation of an international commitment” and “threat or 
harm to the general interest”, which covers a large number of hypotheses 
and thus widens the scope of the warning.
Quite traditionally, the text excludes several types of information or 
documents from the whistleblower’s protection, such as those covered by 
national defence secrecy, medical secrecy or the confidentiality of rela-
tions between a lawyer and his client.
The understanding of the term general interest becomes more complex 
when it concerns not unlawful behavior that has already occurred, but 
the threat that it could occur. Furthermore, even behavior that is not ille-
gal stricto sensu, meaning it is not specifically prohibited by the law, may 
still be harmful to the general interest, immoral or contrary to ethics – as 
was the case with the Lux Leaks scandal.
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Blowing the whistle in such cases is not impossible. On the contrary, 
and perhaps more so than in clear-cut legal cases, it is necessary. But the 
burden then falls onto the whistleblower. He or she must assess whether 
revealing the immoral but not illegal behavior is in the general interest. 
He or she must decide what exactly should be revealed, while making 
sure he or she can claim protective status.
The complexity and burden of this assessment and its heavy potential 
consequences could and still can dissuade the whistleblower from speak-
ing out.
The lessons learnt for the future:  
Know thy enemies
It can never be said often enough that even if there is a protective law in 
the country where the whistleblower wants to disclose his information, 
it is necessary to assess the civil strength of his or her supporters. When 
a citizen prepares to go from ordinary to extraordinary, it is decisive for 
him or her to consult with a technician such as a lawyer, in order to mea-
sure possible support from unions, associations or from the media.
Journalists can support those who are about to blow the whistle by 
invoking the right to protect their sources. But experience has shown that 
journalists can be under extremely strong pressure – or exert pressure 
on themselves – in ways that endanger the professional and social life of 
a whistleblower. Contacting journalists can in some cases run the risk of 
exposing whistleblowers to legal proceedings.
Since the outbreak of the first whistleblowers fifteen years ago, large 
movements of solidarity and support for whistleblowers have sprung 
up around the world. A “house for alerts” has been created in Paris and 
others are burgeoning throughout Europe. This movement is currently 
becoming universal, slowly and with some difficulty, but still moving in 
the right direction.
This new solidarity also requires new responsibilities that must not be 
underestimated. It is not enough to be indignant, to be competent, and 
to have the necessary expertise to anticipate political struggles, which are 
sometimes very complex to decipher and to thwart.
a long way to go for whistleblowers
77
The underlying paradox is that the better the whistleblowers are pro-
tected by law, the less they will need to disobey …
The new law issued in France on 15 September 2017, without being 
exemplary, offers reasonable protection to whistleblowers in France 
against their enemies.
There are two types of enemies of the “true” whistleblowers.
The first is obviously the “bad faith” whistleblower, the ones who use 
virtuous goals to actually conduct vendettas or enact personal revenge. 
French law will firmly punish such behavior as it is necessary to be 
extremely vigilant and rigorous, to avoid providing arguments for those 
who see in the emergence of whistleblowers a society of weasels and 
back-stabbers.
Good faith is “the belief that one is exercising a right legitimately, under 
legal conditions.” It is important, but not necessarily easy, to distinguish 
“good” muckrakers – pursuing a salutary goal, from bad ones – content 
with satisfying the curiosity of the public. The legitimate aim is, and can 
only be, the protection of the general interest.
This understanding corresponds to the factual reality of the situations 
whistleblowers encounter as they are rarely all completely “white”. The 
public alert is often given after several attempts at internal alerts. These 
may in turn have triggered retaliatory measures or pressures, against 
which the whistleblower has tried to protect himself with the means – 
often poor – at his disposal. Attempts to create a balance of power by the 
whistleblower may be neither prudent nor very effective, given his or her 
isolation and lack of the means to pursue a complaint, compared with 
those available to employers or administrations.
The need for protection rather than ill intention often explains the 
errors of individuals trying to sound the alarm internally. Such errors 
or missteps alone cannot suffice to obliterate the legitimacy of the goal 
pursued by the would-be whistleblower.
Anchoring the legitimacy of intention prompts new questions. 
Does this test require that the whistleblower, at the time of the reve-
lation of the information, is motivated by the intention to act as whis-




In other words, is it possible to condition the protection of the whis-
tleblower to the possibility of probing his soul and heart a posteriori, to 
discover his intentions at the precise moment of the revelation?
Without going as far as answering a definitive yes to these questions, 
experience shows that it is possible to use a series of external indicators, 
such as the use of a proportionate means to reveal the information in 
his possession, to identify whether the whistleblower was acting in good 
faith or at least, to verify that he was not motivated by bad faith.
In France, the law provides the whistleblower with the benefit of pro-
tection only if he has followed a defined procedure. The “alert” must go 
through various stages and channels of internal denunciation, then to the 
judicial authorities and finally, as a last resort, through the media.
Although this law has failed to simplify the process for whistleblowers 
in France, one must admit that it has set up a legal frame of protection 
that meets the best existing standards, like those applied in Great Britain 
or in other European countries. Only practice will show how effective 
this law is.
The judges will have their word to say and their role to play. The defi-
nitions of some of the terms in the law are broad and prone to various 
interpretations. Not everything rests in the hands of the legislator. It is 
also up to judges to strengthen this move in the right direction and make 
modern applications of these provisions.
The second enemy of whistleblowers, in the sense laid out in this chap-
ter, is the one who only sees in a revelation an act of nature shedding light 
on his crime.
Even the best protective law in the world will never prevent major 
financial players from staying ahead of the game. New technologies, espe-
cially digital ones, offer new ways of hiding their activities. It is therefore 
from the depths of darkness at the heart of the activity of a bank, for 
instance, that a whistleblower’s action will be decisive.
These opponents of whistleblowers are mobilizing today in Brussels, 
Washington and elsewhere, as extremely active lobbyists. They are the ones 
who are behind the attempt, partly defeated, to get European authorities to 
criminalize the violation of trade secrets and business confidentiality.
Whistleblowers have, in effect, started a much longer battle.
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What they have started is nothing less than trying to delay, limit and 
contain a terrible countdown to the explosive effects of the short-term 
logic that still feeds the strategy of major financial and economic actors 
around the world, whatever ethical commitments they espouse on the 
record.
In this battle, whistleblowers are the indispensable avant-garde of a 
global citizen movement that refuses to allow those in charge of making 
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The Lux Leaks case is the name given by the International Consortium 
of Investigative Journalism (ICIJ) to the revelation, by dozens of media 
outlets around the world, of tax agreements, implemented by Luxembourg, 
with major audit firms on behalf of their clients. This case brought to light 
the extent of aggressive tax optimization at the heart of the European 
Union. Its media coverage has resulted in strong public outcry and 
therefore political pressure. The scandal has thus had several repercussions 
on legal and regulatory frameworks, in particular by speeding up the 
tax reform agenda in Europe. The case also resulted in legal proceedings 
in Luxembourg against the two whistleblowers and the journalist who 
initiated the revelations.
In this article, I will tell the story of this case by showing on the one 
hand how it questions the opacity of the tax practices of multinationals, 
and on the other hand by analyzing the conditions for citizens’ access to 
information, which is absolutely necessary for the exercise of democratic 
control.
The Lux Leaks affair can be understood as a narrow problem, that of 
the issue, at a given time and by the Luxembourg tax administration, of 
advance tax agreements (or tax rulings) that are a little too permissive 
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and a little too opaque. The case would boil down to the narrative of an 
administrative practice that has gradually developed under pressure from 
tax advisors, and with the complicity of policymakers. I will, of course, 
explain the problems posed by these tax agreements. However, it must 
be borne in mind that this Luxembourg system is only one illustration, 
among others, of what can be achieved in an international context that is 
unfortunately still relevant today.
In a globalized economy, each territory competes with others to attract 
investment. This competition also includes taxation, since each nation is 
sovereign in this matter. This leads to a race to the bottom in the name 
of fiscal attractiveness, and the Luxembourg “tax rulings” are only one 
manifestation of this. This context benefits mobile taxpayers, multina-
tionals and high net worth individuals to the detriment of others, small 
businesses and the middle class. In addition to this blatant injustice, the 
limited capacity of the latter to take on additional burdens also leads to a 
de facto limitation of the possible scope of public policies. 
This contextual reminder being made, we can return in more detail to 
the practice of tax rulings. This practice has a certain legitimacy because 
it gives the applicant company legal certainty as to how its often complex 
operations will be taxed in the future. The administration merely makes 
an agreement: “Yes, according to the way you present your transactions, 
we believe that you correctly interpret the tax legislation in force”. To this 
end, each tax ruling contains very rich and highly confidential informa-
tion: it presents in detail all the tax optimization mechanisms used by 
the company. The problem with this arises when the interpretation of the 
regulatory framework results in a virtual absence of taxation, which is 
very common in Luxembourg. As an auditor, I worked for a client with 
an effective tax rate of about 3%. And journalists who surveyed the other 
documents calculated an effective rate of 0.0156 per cent, or zero. 
Another problematic aspect of such rulings is the quasi-industrial 
scale of this practice. Luxembourg granted several dozen tax rulings per 
day, all validated by a single civil servant. Most multinationals operat-
ing in Europe therefore have a Luxembourg tax ruling. A company that 
agrees to pay 33% of its income taxes would be at a significant disadvan-
tage compared to competitors who pay virtually nothing by exploiting 
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all the regulatory loopholes. In addition, a large number of tax-friendly 
jurisdictions are mentioned in the rulings. The systemic nature of this 
situation stems from the tax competition environment described above. 
If the ruling is not in Luxembourg, it is Dutch; if the holding company is 
not located in the Grand Duchy, it is in Malta or in Ireland, etc. 
Finally, the third problem with advance tax rulings is their very high 
opacity. These documents interpret tax regulations in a creative way, 
which makes them potentially contentious. The European Commission 
has opened proceedings against the Luxembourg rulings for Fiat, Ama-
zon, Engie and Mc Donald’s. In order to limit litigation risks, the circu-
lation of tax rulings is extremely restricted and regulated. The Lux Leaks 
trial revealed that PwC, the main audit firm involved in this case, was 
itself responsible for archiving the rulings, and refused to send a complete 
copy to the beneficiary clients. The auditors were also instructed not to 
cooperate with customs authorities in the event of checks being carried 
out while they were on the move. All these elements are likely to lead 
employees to question the legitimacy of their employer’s activities.
This led me, when I resigned, to extract hundreds of advance tax agree-
ments from my firm in the hope of starting a debate on these practices. A 
flaw in the firm’s otherwise very strict computer procedures made these 
documents easy to access: I could simply copy/paste. However, the log-
ging of everything that happens on the computer network allowed the 
company to find traces of my copying two years after the events. I then 
had to step out of anonymity and take my actions before the courts. The 
numerous lawsuits and appeals concluded with the recognition by the 
Luxembourg Supreme Court of the right to whistleblow according to 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. This is an undeni-
able victory for the right to information, but it is feared that the length of 
the legal battle may deter other potential whistleblowers, still employed 
and having scruples about their professional practices. Self-censorship 
is probably a more powerful barrier to information access than all tech-
nical barriers. 
The Lux Leaks have had several political repercussions, including 
an early agreement by all EU member states to automatically exchange 
information on advance tax rulings. This is a step forward, but the 
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only tax rulings made public so far are those revealed by the ICIJ. Even 
the European Commission does not have access to the information 
exchanged, although it is the only institution that has launched proceed-
ings against these tax practices. Moreover, the effectiveness of this rela-
tive transparency depends on the assumption of peer pressure: member 
states would refrain from undermining their partners’ tax revenues too 
much, since they are informed of this. First, we can doubt the effective-
ness of this pressure, since automatic exchange does not really prohibit 
any tax practice, and each state remains sovereign in tax matters. Sec-
ond, the very existence of this peer pressure is questionable. Prior to 
the automatic exchange, the member states already had a fairly general 
knowledge of the tax practices of their European partners, and a certain 
hypocrisy can be suspected in their declared willingness to tackle the 
most damaging practices. The advantageous tax arrangements also ben-
efit their national champions. For example, is Sweden really determined 
to end the tax systems beneficial to Ikea in the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Luxembourg?
Fortunately, the tax reform agenda has not yet been exhausted. Par-
ticularly worth mentioning is the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base. This provision could be effective in combating harmful tax prac-
tices in Europe, as it would make it possible to break out of the frame-
work of tax competition between sovereign states. But that is precisely 
what makes some states still too reluctant. Moreover, such a measure 
could only be effective for increasing tax revenue if it is accompanied by a 
framework of tax rates. Here again, political agreement seems far away. In 
fact, the proposal was made to remove taxation from the unanimity rule, 
but in order to decide on it, we would need … a unanimous agreement. 
Concerning access to information, the protection granted to whistle-
blowers can play an important role. This is a very important democratic 
issue, because without information the people and their representatives 
cannot exercise their power properly. The protection offered by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights is only indirect. Retaliation and exhaus-
tion of all national remedies are often the first steps before being able to 
gain access to this supranational court. A European directive is therefore 
needed to strengthen this protection.
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In addition, ensuring public access to information would also avoid 
the risk of whistleblowers endangering themselves. An important mea-
sure for transparency, public country-by-country reporting continues to 
make progress. The text currently in force does not yet make it public, but 
the European Parliament, which unfortunately does not have the power 
of initiative, has expressed its support. This measure would make it pos-
sible to quickly identify companies and countries that do not play by the 
rules. However, this would require considerable resources to be able to 
process very large volumes of information. And it would only be a first 
step in highlighting the practices that should then be banned or regu-
lated. Public reporting on a country-by-country basis could also have a 
favorable impact on reputation risk management. Some companies may 
adopt virtuous practices on their own for fear of scandal. But this is only 
true for those who have a brand image to preserve, i.e. mainly “B to C” 
companies that target consumers directly.
In conclusion, the succession of tax scandals involving whistleblowers 
and journalists has the great merit of fueling public debate and increas-
ing the pressure on political and economic leaders. But there is also the 
danger of creating a feeling of weariness or even despair. The repetitive 
nature of the scandals shows that none of them have given rise to an 
adequate response. And this inertia to implement effective solutions can 
eventually turn into a misdirected revolt and, for example, into populist 
votes. The lack of ambition in the responses to Lux Leaks, the slowness of 
European reforms and the complexity of the OECD’s plans, whose lim-
its have been shown by the Paradise Papers, raise doubts that interna-
tional cooperation is really putting an end to harmful tax practices. The 
fundamental problem is that of an inequitable scale: economic actors are 
global, but no political body is large enough to impose rules and limits. I 
interpret the Lux Leaks case as only one example of the threat that liberal 
globalization poses to democratic sovereignty. I believe that the best solu-
tion is to develop a more local economy, whose scale makes it possible to 
understand all the consequences, and which would also have the merit of 
being more resilient to future shocks.
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This is one of the biggest financial scandals Europe has ever known. A 
gigantic system of tax evasion was set up by powerful multinationals with 
the complicity of audit firms and the Luxembourg state. Hundreds of bil-
lions of euros have for years escaped the coffers of dozens of countries, 
including France. 
The Lux Leaks affair broke out in 2012 thanks to a whistleblower who 
sent the French press the famous “tax rulings”, the tax agreements made 
between Luxembourg and giant companies like Apple, Amazon or Arce-
lor. But two years later, the scandal took on another dimension. 
Thanks to new leaks, Lux Leaks are in the headlines of all major inter-
national media. Luxembourg is under intense pressure, and Jean-Claude 
Junker, prime minister at the time of the agreements, is forced to justify 
himself. The eyes of the whole world are focused on the Grand Duchy. 
Because of the scale of the revelations, Europe goes as far as to introduce 
measures to reduce the tax avoidance techniques that some multination-
als have until now benefited from.
Behind this rebound, a new whistleblower: my name is Raphaël Halet. 
Unlike the first whistleblower, I have never made the headlines. Unlike 
him, I did not benefit from any support movement or any major financial 
assistance. And finally, unlike him, I received no public recognition, no 
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citizen’s prize for having sacrificed my personal welfare for the common 
good … 
Yet for two years I have lived a real thriller, a story worthy of a spy 
novel. It was the tale of a simple employee who chooses to stand up to 
his company, one of the most powerful in the world, despite threats 
and intimidation. The story of a father trapped in a hellish machinery, 
and who risks losing everything, his wife and two children, his job, his 
home … I was a man alone, without means, faced with the errors and 
iniquities of French and Luxembourg justice. Fired by my employer, sen-
tenced thrice despite my status as whistleblower, I today deliver my testi-
mony: that of an ordinary citizen who, against all odds, has become “an 
extraordinary whistleblower”, as one lawyer called me.
Initially, nothing predisposed me to become a symbol of the fight 
against tax evasion. As an adult, I made a living by doing odd jobs, until 
the day when luck finally seemed to smile. PwC, the world’s leading con-
sulting firm, a multinational company with more than 200,000 employ-
ees, well known to governments and major corporations, offered me an 
administrative position. The job was not really prestigious, but it carried 
an unlimited contract. Another world, a new life. I seized the opportunity 
and became a model employee. Although I only had a junior position, I 
worked in a strategic department where I could see all the tax documents 
established by PwC for their clients. 
This is ultra-sensitive data that I will understand the scope of in May 
2012, during a broadcast of the report “Cash Investigation” devoted to 
revelations. It’s the day when everything changes. The documents pre-
sented as proof of tax evasion are the documents I handle every day. Now 
they are like fire in my hands. If I do nothing, I am complicit in this sys-
tem of tax evasion; if I react, I put my future, and especially that of my 
family, at risk. I cannot continue without doing anything. 
After a few months, they unmask me. Thus the nightmare begins. A 
bailiff, HRD and Price’s legal director, a locksmith, an IT expert and 
policemen come to my home. The bailiff explains that they are there on 
the order of the French court to seize all my computer equipment. But 
how could Justice leave the audit firm, a private company acting as a pub-
lic service? Why does she not protect me against my employer? 
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In studying the complaint against X filed by PwC, the French judge in 
charge of examining the file actually makes a serious mistake: she forgets 
to consider me a whistleblower. If she had done so, I could have benefited 
from the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the ECHR 
jurisprudence concerning the secrecy of sources and their protection. But 
without official recognition of this status, I am a mere employee who has 
stolen and made public confidential documents. This is an inexplicable 
mistake that will cost me a lot, because now I (and my family) am in the 
hands of my employer, alone before a foreign multinational willing to do 
anything to quash the scandal. 
After several intimidation attempts, I must agree to sign a confiden-
tiality agreement in exchange for the promise of not being sued. But 
if I breach this agreement, I will have to pay 10 million euros, give my 
house to PwC and be sued by PwC. From this day on, my wife and I must 
remain in complete silence. 
Two years later, it is time for the trial before the Luxembourg courts. 
On the dock are the first whistleblower, as well as the journalist Edouard 
Perrin, and more surprising still, me. During the investigation a few 
months earlier, the other whistleblower had denounced me as the other 
employee of PwC who transmitted confidential documents to the press. 
Though I had hoped to escape unscathed, I was finally summoned by 
the judges and indicted. However, everyone is still unaware that I am sub-
ject to a confidentiality agreement. If I speak, I lose everything. In order 
to escape, I will have to change my story. During the investigation, I did 
indeed tell the judges that it was actually Edouard Perrin who contacted 
me to try to extract confidential documents from me against my will. So, 
on the first day of the trial, the entire hearing depends on what some call 
“this very mysterious accused”. 
That day, in front of the judges, in front the representatives of PwC who 
threatened me, in front of their lawyers and hundreds of journalists, I will 
change everything. And cause an earthquake without equivalent in the 
opaque universe of tax evasion.
I was sentenced in the first instance to a six-month suspended prison 
sentence and €1000 fine, then only €1000 on appeal, a verdict which the 
Luxembourg Court of Cassation has just confirmed. I am preparing an 
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appeal to the ECHR to sue Luxembourg. The support around me is essen-
tially composed of anonymous citizens who made donations online and 
on www.luxleaks.fr to finance our legal fees. 
I have had to sell my car and borrow a lot of money. Some NGOs helped 
me towards specific public interventions (debates, conferences, etc.). The 
vast majority of politicians, NGOs, political parties, etc. have not gone 
beyond statements of public support at the time of the trial, without ever 
taking concrete action. In short, I am almost alone in this fight. 
In its judgment, the Court of Appeal writes: “The tax returns submit-
ted by Raphaël Halet only confirm the result of the journalistic inves-
tigation conducted by the team of Edouard Perrin. They were certainly 
useful to the journalist, but they do not provide any cardinal information 
previously unknown to revive or feed the debate on tax evasion.” In a 
peremptory manner, the judges minimized the value of the information 
transmitted during the second investigation. In their view, the public 
debate was launched and the information and documents submitted were 
not relevant for the continuation of this debate. Nevertheless, the ECHR 
and the European Commission affirmed the contrary: it was absolutely 
necessary … 
Thanks to my revelations, the European Commission found that Lux-
embourg gave illegal tax benefits to Amazon worth around €250 million. 
Apple (€13 billion), Ikea (€1billion) and dozens of companies are also being 
sued by Margrethe Vestager. Pressure from public opinion on European 
politicians is also still there as people do not understand their austerity 
politics despite the mountains of money tax-exempted by multinationals. 
There remains much needed information that is still not available, for 
example other tax rulings granted to multinationals by Luxembourg and 
other European countries. 
From now on information is exchanged between national tax admin-
istrations but not made public. States must take responsibility and tackle 
the black holes in global finance, which are tax havens. For this, nothing 
is more effective than a blacklist: provided it is credible, on the one hand, 
and accompanied by really dissuasive sanctions, on the other. The first 
condition can only be met by establishing objective and relevant crite-
ria, such as proposing ridiculously low effective tax rates or providing 
being a  whistleblower
91
tax benefits to non-residents. A share of foreign capital disproportionate 
to the size of the national economy must also be a determining factor. 
In addition, it is essential that the country’s assessment process is fully 
transparent – otherwise suspicion of political-diplomatic arrangements 
cannot be ruled out. Finally, all countries must be evaluated in the same 
way, including the member states of the European Union. 
The current blacklist of the EU, including only nine countries, without 
Luxembourg or Ireland or any of the notorious tax havens like Qatar or 
Singapore, is a joke. The second condition requires effective and com-
mon sanctions at the European level. Tax havens have been stealing our 
public finances for too long already. Possible sanctions include the pro-
hibition for banks to operate in these jurisdictions, the suspension of 
any program of aid or subsidy to these countries, or the prohibition for 
companies operating there to access public markets. Let us also take the 
necessary steps to tax the profits that escape. Greater transparency and 
better exchange of information are essential. 
Intermediaries such as banks or law firms must be forced to disclose 
to the authorities the tax arrangements they establish on behalf of their 
clients. We must adopt “country-by-country public reporting”, obliging 
the multinationals to publish the taxes they pay in each of the countries 
in which they operate – a proposal unfortunately blocked by the Euro-
pean governments. This is essential to facilitate prosecution and increase 
the resources dedicated to the fight against this scourge. The decline in 
specialized police and legal staffing is inexplicable. 
Becoming a whistleblower disrupts your life: your family, your profes-
sional life, your finances, your health. The fight is long and difficult. The 
early supporters move away over time, the media moves on. Only suffer-
ing and daily difficulties remain. When we launch an alert we must first 
prepare for what will follow next, hence the need for long-term national 
or official European support. Finally, it is necessary for the courts, the 
French government and European public opinion to recognize that an 
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chapter 10
What Tools Can States Use  
When Faced with Systematic  
Tax Avoidance?
Frian Aarsnes
State Authorized Public Accountant, Norway 
The time has come 
The tools are there – it is only a question  
of starting to use them
Tax avoidance arises where national tax law meets multinational compa-
nies. National tax law is designed for national companies. For that very 
reason, and for a long time, national states have seemed unable to handle 
the issues arising from the behavior of multinational companies. Today, 
however, the time for excuses has come to an end. This chapter presents 
some of the key tools, informed by research, that can be used unilater-
ally by states to reduce tax avoidance to a minimum. Put simply, if states 
individually or collectively use the toolbox, they can handle almost all the 
issues in international taxation identified today. 
The corporate veil
The corporate veil is a legal expression for the concept that a shareholder 
cannot be held accountable for what a corporation does. The shareholder 
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cannot see through that veil, and hence cannot be held responsible for 
the actions of the corporation. This has penetrated legal thinking to such 
a degree that the actions of subsidiaries are in most cases viewed as sep-
arate from their parent affiliation, which is taking the corporate veil into 
the absurd. This would compare to viewing the actions of an octopus arm 
as separate from the octopus itself. When Company A is shareholder in 
Company B, and the management of Company A has done something 
to, in or through Company B, it is the management of Company A and 
Company A itself that needs to accept the consequences of what was done 
to, in or through Company B. 
The undertaking
My own research on the tools that states can use to unveil tax avoidance 
and capital flight started in 2007, was formalized in 2011 and completed 
in 2018. The findings suggest that more than 95% of the loss of tax base 
that countries experience is covered by 6 areas of tax abuse, 2 areas of 
criminal activity, and 1 area of lack of competence. The results are sum-
marized graphically below. 
The results
The 6+2+1 areas can be split into 3 segments with overlapping measures:
Source: Frian Aarsnes, 2018.
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The 6+2+1 areas can, as I will show in my subsequent explanation of the 
results, be seen as the main causes of capital flight. The take home message 
from the reports summarizing my research is that it is actually fairly easy 
to fix most of the problems, if states only use the tools they have at their dis-
posal. But heavy lobbying deliberately confuses the matter, by redirecting 
the focus of governments in the direction of mechanisms that are obvi-
ously difficult, obviously unfair or obviously demand collective actions by 
a large number of countries. The goal of the lobbying is equally obvious – 
to keep attention away from the easy fixes that work as long as lobbying 
does not succeed in destroying them. Somebody is bound to want to dull 
the tools in the toolbox for fighting the battle against capital flight. 
The results explained: Lack of competence
Lack of competence is a major cause of capital flight. As an example, 
many of the largest natural resources are found early in the opening up 
and early exploration phase in a region. This is the period when coun-
tries are most vulnerable. Officials negotiating deals with the extractive 
industry companies often lack information and competence relating to 
the resources in question, in the early stages. Most of the relevant legisla-
tion is missing or is massively inadequate. The outcome is almost always 
that the country in question does not get its fair share, the contracts are 
non-renegotiable and the normal control mechanisms with respect to the 
right of the government to control physical production and conduct tax 
audits, environmental audits and human rights audits are not in place. In 
a negotiation, which can be compared to a fight between a heavyweight 
and a lightweight, industry often “wins” over government and the result 
is, by default, very weak contracts. 
Three measures can greatly enhance countries’ ability to turn the odds 
in their favor:
- Extended country-by-country reporting, i.e. reporting of taxes in 
their natural context of revenues, cost, employees and other key 
numbers, will give governments the necessary information about 
the companies they are about to engage in negotiations.
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- Contract transparency will mean that governments will have insight 
into similar contracts which will greatly help the government avoid 
bad deals.
- Increasing the knowledge and the competence of the negotiation 
team pre-negotiation is vital, including hiring experienced external 
negotiators and legal and economic resources as part of the negoti-
ation team, either directly or as back office.
The results explained: Corruption  
and criminal practices
Corruption and criminal practices is another major cause of capital 
flight. In addition to the obvious laws against these criminal activities, it 
is also necessary to limit the ability to engage in corruption and criminal 
practices. Information in the public domain is key here.
Three measures would greatly enhance the work against corruption 
and criminal practices, two of them overlap with measures against lack 
of competence and two of them overlap with measures against tax abuse:
- Extended country-by-country reporting allows insight into how 
revenues, costs and taxes are distributed across countries within 
multinational corporations, and thus provides the necessary infor-
mation as to whether companies are desirable partners in opening 
up new extractive sectors in a country. 
- Contract transparency pre-signature would make it much more 
difficult to corrupt members of the negotiation team, members of 
ministerial decision processes and key public and political figures.
- Many of the corruption and criminal practices are opportunity- 
driven, i.e. circumstances allow these actions to be done with little 
probability of being caught, often in areas where the law is unclear. 
Unambiguous legislation is – in addition to transparency – therefore 
a must in order to limit the opportunity for corruption and criminal 
practices. Many companies and people say that they have followed 
the letter of the law. This often means that they have interpreted the 
laws in their favor. Reducing the room for interpretation by creating 
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clear and unambiguous laws would greatly limit the opportunity and 
willingness to circumvent the legislation of a country.
There are of course many other actions that can and should be taken 
against corruption and criminal practices, but it is important to emphasize 
that the three measures suggested above will work as part of a complete 
system that limits the opportunity for embarking upon such practices.
The results explained: Abuse of taxation
Abuse of taxation is the third major cause of capital flight. Whether one 
is talking about illegal tax evasion or supposedly legal tax avoidance is 
mostly academic. The point is that tax laws are made with national com-
panies in mind, while the multinational companies operate in a room 
where several sets of legislation meet. Hence, we have large, unregulated 
areas, areas which overlap and fixes that do not solve the underlying 
problem of a complete, fully orchestrated and optimally calibrated tax-
ation of multinational companies on a par with national companies, so 
that the competition among companies is as much as possible unaffected 
by the taxes in any particular country.
Here too information, through extended country-by-country report-
ing, is a sine qua non in order to see what is going on within each multi-
national company. Without knowing what is going on, it is also difficult 
to see whether measures introduced effectively change the capital flight 
picture or not. This is also important in order to avoid taxation of mul-
tinational companies over and beyond taxation of national companies.
While unambiguity is a must in any law, it is absolutely critical in tax 
law. Without unambiguous legislation the tax field is wide open to inter-
pretation, complicated tax cases and unequal treatment of companies.
In addition, along with transparency and unambiguous legislation, 
there are three measures that are very important to curb the capital flight 
resulting from tax abuse:
- It is absolutely critical to move derivatives and derivative elements 
into a separate tax base in order to reduce the complexity of taxation. 
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Moving derivatives into a separate tax base will allow companies 
to do hedging, as the economic expectation of hedging is zero or 
slightly positive over longer periods of time, but it will not be possi-
ble to utilize a country’s tax system for speculative use of derivatives 
where losses are placed in a country in order to create tax deduc-
tions while revenues are placed in low- or no-tax jurisdictions.
- In order to ensure that national companies and subsidiaries of 
multinational companies are competitive on the same level, i.e. 
unaffected by any differences in taxation between countries, it is 
important to negate the effect multinational companies have by 
organizing part of their activities in low- or no-tax jurisdictions. 
This can be done by utilizing the same principle that is used to avoid 
double taxation – tax credits. By reversing the tax credit principle, 
the deductibility of internal cross-border cost transactions can be 
reduced, so that the taxation of the subsidiary of the multinational 
company is returned to what it would have been if it were a national 
company. This mechanism follows the OECD’s suggestion of regu-
lating cost deductions in the internal law of each country. 
- Last but not least, it is important to make sure that companies 
organized so that revenues are collected in another country than 
where the buyer is (including digital business models), do not 
gain a competitive advantage in comparison with the taxation of 
profits of national companies and subsidiaries of multinational 
companies (when reverse credit is used on the subsidiary’s inter-
nal cross-border cost transactions). It is therefore necessary to tax 
cross-border revenue transactions on a par with the taxation that 
companies would have had if they had a sales operation inside 
the country in question. Because the main taxation of the national 
company and the multinational subsidiary is the VAT towards 
end-user and profit taxes, it is important that the taxation emu-
lates this taxation. With VAT it is easy; you only have to put VAT 
on the cross-border revenue transaction. The easiest way to emu-
late the profit taxes is to put withholding tax on the cross-border 
revenue transaction. These two taxes are very precise as they are 
only put on the actual transactions, instead of trying to tax the 
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corporation. The organization of the collection of these taxes is 
that it is the end-user/buyer in Norway that pays both of these 
tax elements; if the buyer is an end-user, he or she pays both the 
withholding tax and the VAT, if the buyer is a company there is no 
VAT as that would have been deductible anyway so the payment is 
only the withholding tax. This can in today’s digital society easily 
be regulated by having the bank or credit card company deduct 
from the account or credit card the withholding tax and the VAT 
when a payment goes abroad. 
As almost all capital flight is connected to derivatives, cross-border cost 
transactions or cross-border revenue transactions, it is expected that 
these measures – extended country-by-country reporting, unambiguous 
legislation and the outlined tax measures – will capture and tax 95% or 
more of the capital flight. It will also ensure that today’s negative spiral of 
tax competition between countries will effectively end, and countries will 
be able to reduce taxes due to a broader tax base.
How the measures work in combination 
There is no single silver bullet to kill capital flight. An orchestrated and 
coordinated effort is needed in order to achieve any desired goals in 
restricting capital flight and protecting the tax base of each country.
The background for identifying the measures, or policy recommen-
dations, is a careful weighing of existing fiscal mechanisms up against 
each other in order see which mechanisms will likely result in the greatest 
reduction in untaxed capital flight (once the capital flight is taxed, it is not 
capital flight anymore, but rather the equivalent of moving taxed funds 
cross-border between affiliated entities). 
Weighing up the evidence, the analysis identified the following mea-
sures against untaxed capital flight on top:
(1) transparency, 
(2) competence building, 
(3) unambiguous legislation and 
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(4) three simple, but extremely efficient fiscal mechanisms: i. separate 
the taxation of derivatives from the regular tax base of businesses 
in order to reduce complexity; ii. utilize reverse tax credit against 
cost transactions across borders (into the country); and iii. utilize 
withholding tax and VAT against revenue transactions across bor-
ders (out of the country) in order to level the playing field between 
national and multinational companies.
Again, it is important to emphasize that the policy measures recom-
mended create an orchestrated system, which should be introduced as a 
comprehensive package in order to avoid loopholes that can be utilized to 
keep the untaxed capital flights from flowing.
Transparency: Extended country-by-country 
reporting (ECBCR)
Extended country-by-country reporting should report key financial num-
bers in addition to the publishing of taxes paid country-by-country. It is 
fully possible to demand more, but reporting less than the key financial 
numbers below for all countries will result in some sort of information 
failure (depending on which key financial number(s) is/are not reported):
Employees should be reported in order to measure the human capital going into 
the operations in a country, in addition to the financial capital employed. Em-
ployees should be reported as FTE’s (full time employee conversion) in order to 
secure parity among all countries, and that the cumulative number of employ-
ees should match the employees reported for the group in FTE’s.
Investments are the financial capital employed for the operations. Together with 
the human capital, they represent a measure of the effort put into the country. The 
investments should be reported, as all key financial numbers, in the company’s 
functional currency, so that it can be aggregated immediately across the reported 
countries and compared to the investments reported in the financial statements.
Production is a key number by which it is possible to greatly improve global 
production and origin statistics. Production should be reported for each bulk 
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commodity produced. By bulk commodity we understand every commodity 
that is sold based on volumetric standards only (tons, barrels, cubic meters, cu-
bic feet, kilos, ounces, grams, etc.). A unified standard should be agreed upon, 
so that companies always report the same commodity in the same units.
Revenues and costs are vital in order to know the economic outcome of yearly 
operations. Without both these numbers it is difficult to assess the operations 
in conjunction with employees, investments and production. It is very import-
ant that all key financial numbers (investments, revenues, costs) are reported 
pre-elimination, i.e. as the numbers are for each country. Eliminations should 
be reported as a separate “country” in order to be able to arrive at the reported 
financial numbers when aggregating the country-by-country numbers.
Accrued taxes in the profit and loss statement and payable taxes 1.1 and 31.12 
in the balance sheet show the connection between the financial statement num-
bers and the taxes paid reported under the country-by-country reporting of 
taxes: payable taxes 1.1. + accrued taxes for the year – payable taxes 31.12 = 
taxes paid.
It is possible that companies will have to combine several accounts to 
arrive at accrued taxes in the profit and loss statement and likewise to 
arrive at payable taxes 1.1 and 31.12. The important thing is to show how 
financial numbers agree with paid taxes.
Transparency: Contract transparency
Contract confidentiality only benefits the companies, which have the 
most information to begin with. Contract transparency will transfer 
a lot of knowledge from companies to governments, thus ensuring 
that governments start negotiations with less of a disadvantage. Fur-
thermore, it is important that each country in a negotiation with an 
extractive company or a large multinational company engage compe-
tent personnel, particularly when it comes to negotiating skills, legal 
and economic skills. Without such support, and being at an informa-





Countries with non-renewable or renewable resources need to ensure 
that they have the necessary skill sets to engage in broad scale petroleum 
or mining activities. Such activities nowadays are high-tech and capital 
intensive. It is very important that the country is able to match the com-
panies with enough technical and economic resources, and in advance of 
developing new sectors one should seek to initiate education programs at 
the universities(y) of the countries(y) in question.
Unambiguous legislation
It is not only tax law that needs to be unambiguous; the same is the case 
with competition law, accounting law, business law, bank laws, etc. If one 
discovers that the country’s legislative system may not be up to the task 
of handling extractive industries, the whole judicial framework should 
be reassessed. 
Taxation: Derivatives in a separate tax base
Many companies have internal contracts similar to derivative contracts or 
which at least include derivative elements. These elements should be seen 
as a separate business with its own contract clauses, its own accountants 
and its own decision-making processes, and it is thus important to treat 
them distinctly from the rest of the business. This is because derivatives 
can be combined with any other type of transaction or other derivative 
to create virtually anything. Segregating them into a separate tax base 
ensures that the company only engages in healthy derivative activities. If 
not, the desire to use derivatives to “save” taxes may become irresistible.
Taxation: Reverse tax credit
The reverse tax credit method can be enacted unilaterally in a country’s 
tax system, the same way as the tax credit method is enacted in a coun-
try’s tax system, or agreed upon in a tax treaty. The reverse tax credit 
method does not need to be included in tax treaties, though, and does not 
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affect existing tax treaties as it only applies to the deductibility of costs 
according to the internal tax code in a country. The method also applies 
on globally available information, and is thus not dependent on lifting 
the corporate veil.
The reverse tax credit method is a method which unilaterally takes care 
of adjusting the effects of a cost base that is disproportionate to the rev-
enue base in a country. The reverse tax credit method is an alternative to 
adjusting the revenue up to match actual sales to the market in-country. 
However, adjusting the revenue would be in potential conflict with tax 
treaties on the taxation of revenues between countries. Today tax author-
ities have very little information about what goes on in the various parts 
of multinational companies. Most of the information that tax authorities 
collect or are given through automatic information exchange agreements 
is about individual citizens, not multinational companies. The reverse 
tax credit method allows tax authorities to perform a theoretically cor-
rect taxation of a multinational company/subsidiary without having to 
speculate on what is happening in low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions. The 
multinational company/subsidiary is given the benefit of the average tax 
rate that the multinational company already has. A company that is thus 
more aggressive in their approach to reducing taxes, is then simultane-
ously and automatically reducing the tax rate applied to cross-border 
cost transactions and non-transactional cash flows. The reverse tax credit 
principle would utilize an auditor approved, globally consolidated finan-
cial statement, but in case of the lack of such, it is possible to set the tax as 
low as zero until the corporation provides the necessary documentation 
needed to secure the correct tax deduction for internal cross-border cost 
transactions.
Taxation: Withholding taxes and VAT
It is important that the withholding tax is set at a level which creates 
equal competitive conditions between national companies/subsidiaries of 
international companies and companies that have their entire business 
outside the borders of the country in question. The reason for this is that 
the withholding tax level is not set for purely tax purposes as is the case 
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for internal tax law, but rather to secure level competition between all 
companies. This is thus a method by which transactions cross-border are 
made on a par with transactions in-country. It is thus important that the 
withholding tax and VAT are paid by the buyer in-country, and are not 
deducted from the amount paid to the seller outside the country. This 
ensures that the withholding tax and VAT do not introduce price distor-
tions between countries and helps promote equal competition in-country.
Calibration of taxes 
It is important to calibrate the taxes in a tax system to avoid situations 
with taxes too high for a company when conditions are challenging for 
the company, or situations which produce less than intended taxes when 
conditions are favorable for the company. 
It is of particular importance to ensure that one chooses the correct 
withholding tax mechanism and that it is graded to ensure equal treat-
ment of companies depending on the taxation in the opposite country. 
Just do it!
Countries need to know that mechanisms to curb capital flight and ero-
sion of the tax base exist. The good thing is that none of these mechanisms 
need agreement among a large group of nations in order to be imple-
mented. All of them can be implemented unilaterally, and if implemented 
by all countries, the result would be almost equal to unitary taxation, 
only more precise as both the reverse tax credit and the withholding tax/
VAT approach to taxation of cross-border transactions are surgically cor-
rect as they only address the transactions that cross the national border. 
References and Reading Guide 
The background for identifying the problem areas of capital flight comes 
from nearly 30 years of experience in auditing, extractive industries, as 
well as international consulting. 
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The background for identifying the measures, or policy recommen-
dations, is a careful weighing of existing fiscal mechanisms up against 
each other in order see which mechanisms would result in the greatest 
reduction of capital flight.
The policy recommendations and the reasoning behind these are sum-
marized in the following reports published on the webpages of Publish 
What You Pay Norway (http://www.publishwhatyoupay.no/nb/publica-
tions). The interested reader will also find all the references to the relevant 
literature underpinning this article:
TRANSPARENCY: 
o Murphy, R. (2013, November). An extended country-by-country 
reporting standard. A policy proposal to the EU. Volume 2, F. Aarsnes 
(Ed.), Publish What You Pay Norway. 
 The report explains the full reasoning behind why country-by-coun-
try reporting of paid taxes alone is not enough. Paid taxes need 
to be reported together with key financial numbers – employees, 
investments, production, revenues, costs, accrued taxes and payable 
taxes 1.1 and 31.12 – that put the paid taxes into the correct context. 
o Aarsnes, F. (2014, December). Transparency agreement: A tool for 
multinational transactions. Publish What You Pay Norway.
 The report gives a clear picture of the 4 main transparency mecha-
nisms for the 3 main levels needed:
 Level 1: Industry vs. government  EITI and contract transparency
 Level 2: Company vs. investor and society  extended CBCR and 
contract transparency
 Level 3: Company vs. tax authority  transparency agreement
TAXATION:
o Aarsnes, F. (2011, December). Protection from derivative abuse. 
Publish What You Pay Norway.
 The report shows how important it is to split derivatives and similar 
transactions into a separate tax base, separate from ordinary busi-
ness profits. The report discusses the separation method (simple) 
versus the substitution method (complex).
chapter 10
106
o Aarsnes, F. (2017, May). Taking away the tax effect of tax havens. 
Cross-border taxation methods and reverse tax credit. Publish What 
You Pay Norway.
 The report gives the main reasoning behind both reverse tax credit 
for use on cost transactions cross-border (into the country) and the 
use of withholding tax and VAT on revenue transactions cross-bor-
der (out of the country).
o Aarsnes, F. (2017, December). The roller-coaster mechanism in the 
world economy. Mark-to-Market and transactions outside the mar-
ket. Publish What You Pay Norway.
 The report, particularly chapter 5, explains why one needs different 
taxation models for the following situations:
	  Fully national companies
	   Partly national companies – subsidiaries of multinational 
companies
	  Only employees nationally
	  No national elements
	  Special attention: derivative contracts
 The report also describes how making fair value adjustments under 
IFRS part of a segregated part of the equity, which cannot be used 
for dividends, would protect companies against future financial cri-
ses in the world economy.
o Aarsnes, F. (2013, November). A guide to optimal resource taxation. 
The case for windfall taxes. Publish What You Pay Norway.
 The report introduces the Quadrant-Cross, an instrument that can 
be used to analyze the efficiency and optimal calibration of taxation 
systems, particularly in extractive industries. However, many of the 
principles can also be fruitfully used in analyzing other production 
industries.
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Abstract: Around the world, journalists uncover corruption, abuse of power, and 
financial misdealing – often at the risk of serious consequences or under finan-
cial constraints. These are also important issues in economic research. Economists 
address similar problems from a different perspective, and offer logical explana-
tions for the factors that enable a risk of corruption, its harmful impact on society, 
and why governments fail to enforce their anti-corruption laws. Below we discuss 
some of the problems of corruption and how investigative journalism contributes 
to controlling it. We are interested in what the disciplines of journalism and eco-
nomics can learn from each other. The more authoritarian leaders weaken integrity 
standards in governance, the more financial secrecy providers facilitate grand scale 
crime; and the more barriers there are for journalists who seek to disclose misdeal-
ing, the more important it is to join forces across countries and across disciplines. 
Keywords: corruption, economics, law enforcement, democracy 
Introduction
While one indicator of a country’s democratic performance is how it 
treats its media and journalists, one indicator of the quality of the media 
and journalists is their ability to investigate and reveal wrongdoing and 
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its consequences for society. In this chapter, we address the role and 
impact of journalism in exposing and curbing cases of corruption, abuse 
of power and financial misdealing, and discuss what journalists and 
economists can learn from each other. 
Journalists are on the frontlines of combating corruption. Although 
acting against corruption and fraud does not always require public expo-
sure of the misconduct, it often does: cases must be discovered, and facts 
must be brought out in the open. People involved in corruption must be 
induced to tell what they know – and what they know can then be used to 
induce others to provide further information. The investigative methods 
of journalists, and their ability to publicize the findings of an ongoing 
investigation, are well suited to this task. 
When other integrity mechanisms fail, journalists can often bring to 
light misconduct rooted in greed and political deceit. Sometimes their 
investigations uncover fraud in places where it is not expected – as when 
journalist Siri Gedde-Dahl and her colleagues documented systematic 
fraud in the Water Administration of Ringerike outside Oslo in low-cor-
ruption Norway. In other cases, journalists investigate wrongdoing in 
places where it might be expected, but where it is considered difficult 
or dangerous to probe too deeply – for example, because powerful play-
ers profit from misdealing and protect corrupt practices by all available 
means. For instance, it is a well-established fact that corruption is rampant 
in some resource-rich and conflict-ridden countries. To hold perpetrators 
accountable, however, we need more than general patterns of corruption 
and allegations that are probably true. We need the facts – about who is 
involved, how they commit crime, and who condones the practice – to 
enable and encourage stakeholders on the national and international lev-
els to act.
Tom Burgis, a former Africa correspondent for the Financial Times, 
has done exactly that, exploring how corrupt elites together with power-
ful international corporations – from the biggest mining company, BHP 
Billiton, to one of the largest oil companies, Royal Dutch Shell – exploit 
resource-rich countries throughout the African continent. His 2016 book, 
The Looting Machine, shows that legitimate businesses cannot thrive 
when political elites are corrupt, and likewise that honest elites cannot 
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thrive when international corporations are willing to pay bribes.1 Corrupt 
politicians and corporations, which are willing to be part of the schemes, 
crowd out the accountable and honest ones, with grave consequences for 
the great majority of citizens. 
Misconduct is also rampant in conflict-ridden countries such as 
Colombia. To hold wrongdoers accountable, somebody has to tell the 
truth about the many-sided confrontations that involve governments, 
landowners, urban elites, leftist guerillas, and rightist paramilitaries. 
Whom do you trust when politicians and governments are so corrupt 
that they even corrupt drug deals? To whom can you report corruption 
when the media are dominated by the interests of the urban elites and 
become part of the conflict? A few independent investigative journalists 
in Colombia have been almost alone in providing impartial reporting 
that seeks to make sense of the chaos of violence, kidnappings, drugs, and 
corruption. Among them is Juanita León, who was a reporter for the Wall 
Street Journal before returning to her native Colombia in 1998. Much of 
her work is summed up in the book Country of Bullets: Chronicles of War,2 
which spares no one in its coverage of misdeeds by the paramilitaries, the 
government, and the guerrillas. It shows how the drug trade, illegal min-
ing and kidnappings financed the civil war in Colombia, and describes 
the consequences for ordinary citizens who are victims of brute violence, 
and who nevertheless contribute to civic resistance against the brutality. 
Investigative journalism has also played a key role in disclosing 
rampant corruption in the global arms trade. In fact, while trade in 
weapons constitutes only one-half of one percent of the total value of 
international trade, there are reasons to believe that a much larger share 
of corrupt transactions takes place in this sector.3 Therefore, the need to 
document the “who and how” of corruption in the arms trade is par-
ticularly pressing. Such work is complicated by the secrecy surrounding 
many deals in the defense sector – they are exempt from laws on access to 
1 Burgis (2016). Shaxson (2007) also documents grave cases of corruption and power abuse in the 
international oil sector. 
2 León (2009). First published in Spanish in 2005, translated to English in 2009.
3 Joe Roeber (2005) suggests that 40 percent of corruption in international trade stems from the 
arms trade. Such estimates are of course highly uncertain. 
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information – and by mixtures of politics and commercial interests that 
blur the line between the legal and the illegal or unethical. Andrew Fein-
stein shows in his book The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade 
that this kind of research is nevertheless possible.4 The book documents 
many corrupt deals in the international arms business and explains who 
is involved – including, for example, Europe’s largest defense sector cor-
poration, BAE Systems, and the United Kingdom’s former prime minis-
ter, Tony Blair. 
These stories are noteworthy because they cannot be taken for granted, 
a fact highlighted by Dean Starkman’s book from 2014 The Watchdog That 
Didn’t Bark. The title refers to the recent shortcomings of the business 
press in the United States – and perhaps everywhere – in critically cov-
ering the fraud that caused the financial crisis. Starkman explains how 
the number of investigative journalists in finance was in free fall prior to 
the crisis, and how business journalists were driven by misplaced empha-
sis ‘’tilted toward personality-driven stories, not deconstructing balance 
sheets or figuring out risks. Stocks were the focus, when problems were 
brewing in derivatives’’ (p. 251). 
When journalists do carry out critical investigations, however, they 
exercise what we might call obstructive power aimed at power abuse 
and crime. Detecting fraud through journalistic research is one part of 
this power, and shaping public opinion by exposing the wrongdoing is 
another. Journalists play a key role in generating the moral shame asso-
ciated with involvement in corruption and wrongdoing. Hence, present 
campaigns by some public officials against the press in the United States 
and other countries, casting aspersions such as “fake news,” are intended 
in part to undermine the media’s role in exposing wrongdoing, and to 
curb the pressure for political accountability. 
In this chapter, we consider investigative journalism through the lens 
of our own discipline – economics. We highlight the complementarity 
of the two. From our perspective, investigative journalism has a healthy 
priority of case-based presentation. Economic research in academia, by 




inferences based on theory and statistical evidence. Both fields might be 
strengthened by learning from each other. 
We focus the chapter on the problem of corruption, which we define 
as the misuse of power for personal gain. Corruption deserves special 
attention because it implies collusion among the powerful at the expense 
of society – and often it is the root cause of fraud, income inequality, vio-
lence and even war. Many cases uncovered by journalists have involved 
decision makers in government or other sectors who take bribes; yet jour-
nalists have also investigated higher level and complex forms of collu-
sion that go far beyond simple definitions of bribery. Coverage of such 
cases is more than the documentation of rule violation: in many cases, it 
means the exposure of structural challenges that allow power abuse and 
threaten democratic institutions.
Corruption is important because of its consequences, not because 
of legal definitions or because famous individuals are involved. Eco-
nomics offers logical explanations for the factors that enable a risk of 
corruption, its harmful impact on society, and why governments fail to 
enforce their anti-corruption laws. While cases presented by journal-
ists inspire and enrich economic research, we also believe that learning 
across disciplines might strengthen journalists’ coverage of struc-
tural and other complex challenges, and make these accounts appeal-
ing regardless of the names and drama that are normally believed to 
attract readers. 
In their daily work, many journalists face serious constraints, includ-
ing attempts to intimidate or silence reporters and their sources, as well 
as the effects of economic pressure on the news media industry. As var-
ious forms of authoritarian government take hold around the globe and 
curtail freedom of the press, promoting and protecting journalists’ ability 
to investigate corruption and publish their findings becomes ever more 
important and in need of support. 
The risk and consequences of corruption 
In 1996, in a landmark speech, World Bank President James Wolfensohn 
referred to the “cancer of corruption” and the threat it poses to society 
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and development.5 Is this a reasonable metaphor? Why is corruption a 
cancer, when favors for friends, aggressive marketing or lobbying seem 
acceptable in most cases? What factors affect the risk of corruption, and 
why are anti-corruption laws, regulations, and institutions not sufficient 
to eliminate corrupt practices?
Corruption is important because of  
its consequences 
Many of those who write about corruption do so without much discussion 
of the consequences, as if they were obvious. In reality, the consequences 
are far from straightforward. Different forms of corruption have different 
effects on society, and the effects depend on the context in complex ways.6 
Nevertheless, some general mechanisms are quite clear. 
Citizens who are forced to pay bribes bear extra costs. Markets where 
companies win contracts through bribery fail to promote value for money. 
Productive companies that lose contracts because competitors pay bribes 
may leave the market or start offering bribes themselves. Bribing diverts 
resources away from innovation and improvements. Where corruption is 
rampant, some of the best and honest companies lose out in domestic and 
international competition.
Similarly, in government, corrupt decision makers may misallocate 
funding to areas where politicians and bureaucrats can grab personal 
rents rather than to areas that meet social needs. For instance, when bribe 
revenue trumps value for money, we can get “corruption-driven con-
struction”: politicians and bureaucrats allocate revenues to infrastructure 
and defense at the expense of health and education, areas where there is 
typically less scope for rent-seeking. Even with large allocations to infra-
structure, the quality of buildings, roads, and utility provision suffers, 
and there may be numerous instances in which services are contracted 
and paid for but not delivered. Projects are planned and described as if 
5 Mallaby (2005). 
6 For a review of the literature on the consequences of corruption, see OECD (2015). 
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they were genuine, while in reality they are tools for stealing state reve-
nues or creating opportunities for bribery. 
Construction projects that have been started for no purpose other than 
corruption often end up as useless “white elephants.”7 In Zambia in the 
1990s, with political considerations driving decisions by the country’s 
industrial development corporation, “multi-million dollar brick factories 
were set up under an official directive in the rural areas of Kalalushi and 
Nega Nega, but transporting the bricks long distances to the construction 
sites raised their costs to uneconomic levels, with the result that the con-
struction industry increasingly switched to the use of concrete blocks.”8 
In such cases, one must ask whether the project is just the result of bad 
planning and incompetence or whether there is some corrupt purpose 
– such as creating opportunities for rent-seeking, or to divert money 
to a specific area to cement the loyalty of local voters to the incumbent 
regime. In their article “White Elephants,” James Robinson and Ragnar 
Torvik argue that such inefficient and unproductive projects may in fact 
have large political payoffs, in essence buying votes for incumbent politi-
cians and helping them remain in power.9 
Corruption in electoral politics affects the selection of office holders, a 
topic beyond the scope of this essay. Once in power, corrupt leaders fre-
quently enrich themselves while blocking social and economic change, as 
in Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe – to mention 
a few. 
Corruption also harms development through the venal practices of 
lower-level civil servants and functionaries, such as health workers, cus-
toms officials, police officers, or teachers. When bribes are the stimuli for 
service provision, the public sector allocates benefits unfairly and ineffi-
ciently. Those in need have to wait longer for services than those who pay 
bribes, and honest citizens may turn to expensive private markets to buy 
what they were supposed to get for free. Bribing distorts critical informa-
tion when those who pay bribes receive unduly favorable assessments of 
7 Estache (2004). 
8 Tangri (1999). 
9 Robinson and Torvik (2009).
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their performance. Law enforcement suffers when law-breakers can pay 
bribes to go free.
Where bribery of civil servants is common, citizens lose trust in public 
institutions. Why should they obey society’s rules if those who are sup-
posed to enforce the rules break them consistently? With benefits allo-
cated unfairly and private sector profits skewed towards corrupt actors, 
income differences increase between dishonest insiders and honest 
outsiders. 
Petty corruption, bribery for contracts, crony capitalism, and grand 
corruption will not have equally harmful consequences. Some forms 
of corruption are more damaging than others. While it makes sense to 
expect more serious consequences when the crime happens higher up in 
government and politics, there is no obvious way to predict the severity 
of effects. Low-level corruption could in some cases have more damag-
ing consequences than high-level corruption: for example, a low-ranking 
customs official might take bribes to allow terrorists to smuggle weapons, 
while a high-ranking politician who takes a bribe might end up having 
less influence on decision making than the bribers expect. 
Various factors affect corruption risk 
A useful starting point for considering the expected risk of corruption – if 
we define risk as “probability X consequence” – is to think of corruption 
as a trade in decisions that should not be for sale.10 Through this perspec-
tive, the element of a deal becomes immediately clear. Without someone 
willing to pay, there will be no deal. The more values are controlled by 
the decision maker, the higher the payment. The consequences obviously 
depend on the counterfactual, that is, on what would have happened had 
the deal not been made. 
Important in this connection is the allocation of bargaining powers. A 
very asymmetric allocation of bargaining powers implies that the briber 
is, in fact, subject to extortion – like the regulator who demands a bribe 




falsely claims they have been speeding and owe a fine. A bribe might be 
paid, but the briber dislikes it and may well report the incident after-
wards. By contrast, when both players have similar bargaining positions, 
as in cases of crony capitalism, both of them may have an interest in the 
deal and in keeping the crime hidden. 
The risk of corruption depends not only on the willingness to pay a 
bribe, but also on public officials’ authority to control values that bribers 
are willing to pay for. This authority depends primarily on two factors: 
the degree of scarcity of the desired public benefit and the extent of discre-
tion in the allocation of benefits.11 When public benefits are available to 
all, it is hard for officials to demand bribes. When decisions are steered 
by rules and monitored in detail, there is little room for deviation. Thus, 
building permits and procurement contracts, for example, are associated 
with far more corruption risk than is the provision of electricity, since in 
the latter case public officials have too little authority and too low bar-
gaining power to demand large bribes. Normally, the risk of corruption 
is higher when higher values are at stake, as is the case with defense con-
tracts, construction projects, and so on. 
Democracy, which in theory allows corrupt leaders to be voted out, can 
be a factor but provides no easy way out of the problems. Voters typically 
have insufficient information, or misleading information, about hidden 
forms of corruption, and in any case, they have many concerns and pri-
orities beyond anti-corruption to consider when they go to the polls. The 
charisma and populist appeal of even the most corrupt politicians may 
charm voters.12 Other factors that may add to the risk of corruption under 
democratic rule include the importance of securing revenues for political 
campaigns and the share of lame duck politicians (politicians who cannot 
be reelected may be tempted to grab opportunities for self-enrichment 
while they exist).
Democracy may, however, be an important means to curb corruption, 
especially in contexts where political competition is strong. Political 
corruption thrives with impunity when the incumbent is either certain 




to remain in power no matter what, or, alternatively, has no chance of 
remaining in power through reelection. But when incumbents believe 
they have a good chance but no assurance of being returned to office – let 
us say, a fifty-fifty chance of being reelected – they may be more care-
ful.13 Under such circumstances, even minor fraud or a small scandal may 
lead to a politician’s downfall or even a change of government, and the 
incumbents’ incentives to take a long view on their political prospects are 
stronger.
The letter of the law is an insufficient indicator  
of harm to society 
Corruption as trade in decisions regarding the allocation of public bene-
fits may skew decisions to serve the interests of those involved, regardless 
of how government formulates its rules about corruption. As mentioned, 
corruption is a problem because of its consequences, not because crimi-
nal law defines it as a crime. 
Politicians in a position to influence the definition of crime and the 
enforcement of the law might also misuse their authority to secure per-
sonal benefits. By keeping legal loopholes open, preventing investiga-
tions, and exerting pressure on courts for biased verdicts, they help to 
secure a soft regime for the corrupt – and possibly impunity.14 Even hon-
est legislators will not be able to write laws that cover all contingencies in 
a complex financial or international market. Clever lawyers can quickly 
identify loopholes that exist for tax avoidance, bribery, market concen-
tration, exemption from public procurement rules, and more. If no regu-
latory agency objects, market players may well adhere to the letter of the 
law while totally ignoring the spirit of the law.15 
For these reasons, journalistic research that focuses only on those 
who violate the letter of the law, and on accusations likely to hold up 
in court, may fail to uncover misconduct with potentially damaging 
13 Rose-Ackerman (1999). 
14 See Søreide 2016, Chapter 3 for examples from OECD countries. 
15 Pollack and Allern (2018) point out this concern with reference to the telecom sector. For cases 
of financial secrecy, see Shaxson (2011), and Schjelderup (2016). 
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consequences. In all societies, there are elements of collusion between 
private interests and public sector decision makers, no matter what 
formal definitions are applied. The most effective journalists research 
and document such cases regardless of the letter of the law – or the 
expected outcome of a possible court case.16 They avoid making false 
allegations by documenting their facts and by using broad termino-
logy to describe existing practices that resemble corruption, even if the 
legality or illegality of specific actions is in doubt.17 Unclear legal classi-
fication of practices should not prevent journalists from covering cases 
of collusion, grabbing, and exploitation, and explaining their harmful 
consequences to society.
Governments fail to enforce their  
anti-corruption legislation 
Most societies have laws, regulations, and institutions of some kind that 
promote integrity in governance and fair competition in markets. This 
is in part the result of impressive international collaboration for better 
and more harmonized legislation, more efficient oversight institutions, 
and improved legal assistance across borders. In practice, however, these 
laws and institutions vary in their rigor, and enforcement also varies 
widely across countries and cases. In particular, governments often fail 
to enforce their laws on economic crime when the alleged offenders are 
large corporate actors that operate internationally.18
Broadly speaking, there are at least two reasons why presumably legiti-
mate governments fail to enforce the intention of the law.19 First, the form 
of regulation most common today, namely criminal law, developed for 
the regulation of individuals guilty of crimes, is ill suited for the reg-
ulation of corporate or institutional misconduct, where it may appear 
impossible to single out a few guilty individuals.20 Not only do corporate 
16 Ron (2016) explains how the challenges play out in Ecuador. 
17 For relevant terminology, see Søreide (2015, pp. 2–3). 
18 Garrett (2014) and Feinstein (2011).
19 Søreide (2019).
20 Søreide and Rose-Ackerman (2018).
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offenders navigate around the risk of detection and enforcement actions, 
as mentioned above, but the prosecutors’ burden of proof is too high for 
crimes committed within organizations. Cases of suspected crime often 
end with some negotiated settlement at the pre-trial stage – or no charge 
at all.21 
Second, in many countries, the rules and agencies responsible for 
market oversight have evolved with a mandate that is too narrow to 
embrace complex forms of economic crime. The tax authority can 
accuse a player of tax evasion only, even though the case might very well 
involve several forms of crime. Competition authorities address viola-
tions of competition law, with few incentives to investigate whether cor-
ruption facilitated the practice. Complex forms of market-related crime 
and corruption require consistent regulations and the facilitation of an 
exchange of information among regulatory agencies, on national and 
international levels. Across European countries, such regulations and 
exchanges are rarely in place.22 
The role of investigative journalists in 
controlling corruption 
Misuse of authority for personal benefit is often difficult to detect. Col-
lusion between powerful players happens in secret. They hide bribes and 
other illicit monies in trusts and tax havens, and make use of apparently 
legitimate transactions across corporate structures. The more authority 
officials have, the more discretion they normally exert for personal judg-
ment. The more factors office holders are expected to consider in making 
decisions – from employment to national security to the environment – 
the harder it is to accuse them of biased decision making. Fortunately 
for society, these sorts of difficulties motivate many journalists to deploy 
their investigative skills. 
21 OECD (2014); Arlen and Kahan (2017); Makinwa and Søreide (2018). 
22 Auriol, Hjelmeng and Søreide (2017).
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Journalists uncover hidden wrongdoing, but 
audience response is mixed 
Investigative journalists can carry out detective work that describes fraud 
or other malfeasance in action. Who is involved? How much did they 
loot? How did they do it? Is it continuing? Washington Post reporters 
Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, who uncovered the Watergate scan-
dal in the Nixon White House, spent almost two years developing leads 
and sources, including the mysterious Deep Throat. More recently, the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) worked with 
journalists around the world to analyze a huge cache of leaked financial 
documents, known as the Panama Papers, that revealed international 
financial scandals entangling many prominent government officials and 
other public figures. Less widely known, but just as important, are the 
many local journalists who have investigated corruption on the local or 
national level, producing findings that gained scant international atten-
tion but that were consequential in the societies concerned. The German 
journalist Günter Wallraff went undercover in various guises to reveal 
profit-motivated abuse of power and exploitation of the less influential 
segments of society in Germany. British journalist Michela Wrong pro-
vided a penetrating account of corruption in Kenya, linking it both to 
their colonial heritage and to post-independence politicians. There are 
countless other examples – including stories presented in other chapters 
of this book.23 
Investigative journalism is similar to other types of research in that 
only a minor fraction of it turns out to be important at the end of the day. 
No one knows, however, which part of the total amount of investigative 
activity will yield significant findings, and this is especially hard to predict 
when it comes to investigations of corruption and fraud, where it is so dif-
ficult to document suspected wrongdoing. The total sum of investigative 
23 On the Watergate scandal, see Emery (1995) and “The Watergate Story” on the Washington Post 
website, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/watergate/part1.html. On the 
Panama Papers, see “Leaders, Criminals, Celebrities” on the ICIJ website, https://www.icij.org/




journalistic activity is therefore important even if a given inquiry fails to 
produce useful evidence and thus may appear to be wasted effort.
In countries all over the world, journalists uncover abuse of power, 
fraud and corruption that might otherwise be left to continue. They fol-
low threads that lead them to crime; they are approached by whistleblow-
ers who find it unsafe to contact public authorities; and they are contacted 
by employees of regulatory agencies who are frustrated with their own 
agency’s shortcomings. Most journalists work for news media outlets, but 
some operate independently or are employed by nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs).24
The lower the trust in public institutions and politics, the more a soci-
ety will depend on journalists to uncover wrongdoing for the sake of 
holding perpetrators to account through media attention – if nothing 
else. Even powerful individuals often fear negative front-page coverage of 
their misconduct. Owners worry about how share prices may drop when 
profit-motivated crime is uncovered. 
The reaction of society is difficult to predict, however, and costly news 
coverage will not necessarily receive the attention it deserves. Readers 
want identified individual victims rather than broad social patterns. The 
demand for revelations of collusion and corruption is also limited. The 
demand itself is hard to meet: identify serious corruption, find a dramatic 
twist, and write in a way that piques the public interest. 
Investigative journalism can help deter  
corrupt actors
Journalists’ coverage of collusion and corruption may be more than after-
the-fact reporting: it can help prevent corruption or affect the trajectory 
of corruption as it unfolds, since corruption corrupts or, more generally, 
wrongdoing is contagious.25 
24 OECD (2018). Some excellent investigative reporting, especially of transnational corruption 
schemes, has been sponsored by NGOs – for example, Global Witness. See https://www.theguard-
ian.com/sustainable-business/2015/aug/21/global-witness-media-dependent-on-ngo-to-investi-
gate-corruption. 
25 Andvig and Moene (1990). 
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Consider a potentially corruptible public official – say, the manager of 
an agency with regulatory oversight. A multinational corporation wants 
to establish a branch in her country. Our manager is in a position to pro-
vide exactly the licenses or connections needed, and the company has 
offered a bribe to secure successful entry into the market. Should our 
manager accept the bribe and offer the illegal benefit? Of course not. In 
order to understand corruption, however, we must consider whether, and 
under what conditions, the expected personal benefit of the corrupt act 
might outweigh the costs. Awareness of the circumstances under which 
such an individual is inclined to take (or offer) a bribe makes it easier to 
understand the problem at an aggregate level. 
If our public official rejects the offer of a bribe, she declines extra rev-
enue. However, she keeps her job and her prestigious position in society. 
If she accepts the offer, there is more uncertainty: if she gets away with it, 
she keeps the bribe revenue and her job (including future possibilities of 
bribe taking), yet she has to live with the uncertainty that the case may 
be disclosed at some later stage. If her offense is detected, the outcome 
depends in part on who detects it. If a dishonest supervisor uncovers the 
bribe, the manager might bribe her way out of the situation, but if an hon-
est detector is involved – and particularly if the matter is aired publicly – 
the incident may lead to investigation and possibly criminal law action. 
In this scenario, the manager may lose her job, her future salary, and her 
future opportunity to take bribes. 
In addition, the manager may face moral costs, insofar as she considers 
it a personal burden to violate official rules or norms. Some individu-
als would never be tempted, whatever the potential benefits of the bribe, 
while others have no scruples. The higher the moral costs, the higher the 
bribe must be to compensate for the burden of violating her principles. 
The prospect of facing public shame and reputational damage if her deeds 
are uncovered and publicized – for example, by journalists – may weigh 
heavily in her thinking.
The personal net benefit of corruption thus depends on the probability 
of being caught, as well as on the size of costs and benefits. Considering 
the determinants of these variables, we find that each of them depends 
on the individual’s perception of the magnitude of corruption already 
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present in the society.26 The likelihood of a bribery attempt depends in 
part on the briber’s expectation that he or she will be dealing with a cor-
rupt (or corruptible) and therefore “trustworthy” counterpart. The briber 
will be careful not to propose a corrupt deal to someone who might report 
the incident to a law enforcement agency. In a society with pervasive cor-
ruption, the estimated risk of being detected by an honest, non-bribable 
colleague is lower than in a society where corruption is not widespread. 
Moreover, the moral cost of corruption will be higher in a society where 
few are corrupt. Hence, the temptation to accept a bribe depends on 
the perceived extent of corruption, among other factors. These percep-
tions may matter more than the rigor of the laws or the law enforcement 
system.27 
If the extent of corruption in society grows or shrinks along with the 
assumed extent of the problem, societies with similar rules and enforce-
ment systems may develop in very different ways, depending on how 
domestic and foreign players perceive the extent of corruption. In some 
societies, the factors that steer bribery decisions all seem to motivate 
corruption. When corruption is systemic, a society may find itself in a 
high-corruption equilibrium from which it is difficult to escape. 
Other countries may experience low levels of corruption. With little 
effort, it seems, they manage to keep the problem under control. Citizens 
and firms do not usually consider bribery an option. A low level of cor-
ruption makes monitoring and supervision more effective, and honesty 
more valuable. Both aspects demotivate bribery. Such countries enjoy a 
low-corruption equilibrium that effectively deters some individuals from 
becoming corrupt. 
Somewhere between the low-corruption equilibrium and the high-cor-
ruption equilibrium, there must be a critical threshold, a tipping point. As 
long as corruption does not exceed this threshold, the country remains 
in the low-corruption state. But once the threshold is crossed from 
below, corruption approaches the level associated with a high-corrup-
tion equilibrium. What might trigger a development toward more or less 
26 Andvig and Moene (1990).
27 Moene and Søreide (2016). 
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corruption – or shake a society to bring it out of an otherwise sustainable 
equilibrium situation – could be a scandal or a huge rise in bribes paid 
by multinationals. A comprehensive government anti-corruption strat-
egy initiated by a new government might trigger movement toward lower 
levels of corruption. 
If these arguments about how corruption corrupts are correct, then it 
matters what various players believe about the extent of corruption in a 
society and the extent to which the society condemns it and enforces laws 
against it. Journalists and the media in general can play a key role in this, 
not only by uncovering corruption, but also through the impact of their 
coverage in shaping public perceptions. 
Disclosures in the press may raise the public’s awareness of wrong-
doing and thus the moral cost of being corrupt. Cases in the news bring 
shame on those allegedly involved. In addition, investigative journalism 
provides information about corrupt deals to honest actors within the state 
apparatus, who may lead enforcement agencies to act. Foreign journalists 
are important, too, if their coverage of bribery abroad curbs multination-
als’ inclination to offer bribes. However, there are also circumstances in 
which journalists’ coverage could make things worse. More coverage of 
fraud and corruption in a society might lead the public to think that cor-
ruption is so pervasive as to be inevitable. Transparency International 
ranks countries according to their perceived levels of corruption. With 
more stories about wrongdoing in the news, the perceived extent of cor-
ruption will increase, and this may trigger the spiral effects discussed 
above. Hence, a poor ranking may not just reflect but also encourage bad 
behavior.28
Investigative journalists face many constraints
A recent report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) details some of the obstacles to reporting corrup-
tion, ranging from limits on freedom of the press, to punitive lawsuits, 
28 This is why, for many governments, it is most important to improve factors that strengthen the 
ranking regardless of the underlying challenges (Høyland et al., 2012). 
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to violence or threats of violence against journalists and their sources.29 
These are set against a backdrop of economic contraction in the news 
industry that has affected its ability to fund complex investigations.
Authoritarian politics – often sold to voters by means of populist 
arguments around immigration or nationalism – serves to secure power 
for incumbent leaders and their allies while undermining opposition in 
non-democratic and often unconstitutional ways.30 Authoritarian lead-
ers may attack journalists who criticize their performance, attacks that 
are meticulously tracked by Reporters Without Borders.31 This leads to 
a weakening of accountability mechanisms that in turn allows leaders 
to misuse authority for personal benefit with little risk of facing conse-
quences. Journalists who work under authoritarian regimes contribute 
to the fight against corruption if they make citizens and voters aware of 
the blurred connections between populism and corruption.32 Their cir-
cumstances highlight the importance of international journalistic net-
works in supporting journalists working in countries where freedom of 
the press is curtailed.33 
Particularly in developing countries, it is often hard for journalistic 
coverage to trigger a process leading to more integrity. This is in part 
because the value of bribes relative to other sources of income might be 
higher in poor countries than in wealthier ones, and thus it takes more to 
change the behavior of those involved in such lucrative dealings. In addi-
tion, the more corruption there is in governance, the more challenges and 
dangers journalists may face in doing their jobs. Many of the journal-
ists who carry out investigations of the powerful do so under conditions 
of low security and frequent violations of human rights. Pressures are 
brought to bear on reporters and news executives and on their sources, 
especially where whistleblower protections are absent or not enforced.34 
29 OECD (2018).
30 Snyder (2018).
31 Reporters Without Borders 2018: https://rsf.org/en/ranking#.
32 Snyder (2017).
33 In this respect, UNESCO and the Safety of Journalists project plays a pivotal role internationally. 
https://en.unesco.org/themes/safety-journalists. Another arena for establishing networks is the 
annual Safety of Journalists Conference at OsloMet: https://blogg.hioa.no/mekk/.
34 For legal discussion of the Lux Leaks case, see Swhanke (2016). 
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These pressures may include “threatened or actual legal action in the 
form of civil suits for libel, or criminal prosecution for defamation or 
publishing classified information.”35
Violence and threats of violence have had a chilling effect on jour-
nalistic coverage of corruption in countries around the world. A nota-
ble example is Mexico, which, according to Reporters Without Borders, 
“continues to be one of the western hemisphere’s deadliest countries for 
the media. When journalists cover subjects linked to organized crime or 
political corruption (especially on the local level), they are the targets of 
intimidation and physical violence and are often executed in cold blood. 
Many simply disappear. Others are forced to flee the country in order to 
survive. Impunity, which is the result of Mexico’s pervasive corruption, 
has reached record levels and feeds the vicious cycle of violence.”36 Article 
19, a civil society organization working for the protection of free speech, 
has documented security threats against journalists in a number of coun-
tries, including Uganda, Venezuela and Bangladesh, among others.37
As noted by the OECD, limitations on the access to information con-
stitute a formidable bar to reporting corruption, particularly in countries 
without effective freedom of information (FOI) laws. “Journalists con-
sidered inadequate FOI legislation to be one of the two main obstacles to 
investigating and reporting on corruption cases, the other one being con-
fidentiality of law enforcement proceedings.”38 The OECD has stressed 
the importance of open data frameworks in countering these problems.
The news media at times may be subject to the very problems that jour-
nalists seek to disclose and combat in other arenas – ownership concen-
tration, to be sure, but also corruption, fraud, and tax evasion in some 
instances. News organizations control scarce benefits insofar as they 
can decide how to portray people and firms. Around the world, there 
are numerous examples of journalists who have taken bribes or subtler 
benefits in exchange for favorable coverage, for coverage aimed at harm-
ing others, or for no coverage at all. However, since decisions about what 
35 OECD (2018).
36 Reporters Without Borders 2018: https://rsf.org/en/mexico.




stories to cover are generally made (or at least approved) on the higher 
levels of a news organization, it is especially useful to look at the forces 
that come into play on those levels.
Crony capitalism among owners of media companies and their finan-
cial, political, and/or social ties to government figures may lead to pres-
sure on reporters and news executives to skew stories toward a favorable 
presentation of the incumbents.39 As a result, society may receive half-
true stories or silence when scandals deserve attention. In exchange 
for such favorable coverage, governments may allow cooperative media 
companies unfair market advantages, while the advice from competition 
authorities – such as warnings against acquisitions or mergers – is effec-
tively ignored. 
Nonetheless, the relationship between market concentration and news 
coverage is far from obvious. On the one hand, concentration in the news 
media industry could make it easier for powerful players to succeed in 
their attempt to exert pressure or offer bribes for the sake of controlling 
the presentation of a case. With fewer market players to control, it may be 
easier to exert control. With fewer individuals to bribe, the lower the total 
bribe expenses. On the other hand, one could argue that with concentra-
tion of media ownership, individual media titans become more powerful 
and thus more able to withstand political pressure if they choose to do 
so. Moreover, simple bribery is not necessarily the way that governments 
or powerful figures exert pressure on news executives. The incumbent 
regime or a large corporation can also withhold its advertising from 
media outlets to starve them of revenues and force them out of business. 
In the digital age, economic forces are devastating the news media 
industry, especially newspapers, as consumers turn to the internet to get 
information for free. Advertising and subscription revenues have fallen 
precipitously, shuttering some media outlets and forcing others to cur-
tail their operations. In this environment, generally speaking, only the 
largest and most financially stable news organizations remain able and 
39 Dean Starkman (2014) argues that in many cases US investigative journalists’ silence regarding 
the financial crisis in 2008–2010 was linked to their media companies’ market and ownership 
situation. Noam Chomsky (2002) suggests that there are subtle forms of collusion between me-
dia company owners and decision-makers in government, which affect the presentation of news. 
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willing to fund expensive and sometimes risky investigative journalism. 
Nevertheless, even as their industry is buffeted by market forces, many 
dedicated journalists in countries around the world continue to do their 
jobs and produce high-quality investigative coverage. 
Economic approaches and learning  
across disciplines 
While investigative journalists uncover and deter wrongdoing often 
under severe constraints, economists interested in similar problems try to 
explore patterns of wrongdoing, normally under less severe constraints. 
Economists explore the mechanisms at play, often derived from math-
ematical models of rather complicated interactions between the actors 
involved. Next, they seek to test inferred actions and behaviors empiri-
cally in order to see whether data support the theoretical results with 
general validity. At this stage, ambitions go beyond attempts of merely 
demonstrating correlations. The gold standard of empirical research is to 
make causal inferences between two variables, in the sense that a factor 
A causes another factor B. In studies of corruption, for example, A could 
be the entry of foreign players into an emerging market economy, while 
B could be the extent of corruption. The economic analysis of how for-
eign players affect corruption in emerging markets might have general 
relevance, and can also add context and the recognition of what sort of 
problem it really is when a Norwegian multinational company, such as 
Yara, pays bribes when entering new markets, such as Libya or India.40 
Or, we could turn it around, and let A be political corruption while B is 
productive investments. The ensuing economic analysis of how political 
corruption attracts foreign bribers or deters honest foreign firms would 
40 The newspaper Dagens Næringsliv played an important role in uncovering the Norwegian 
multinational fertilizer producer Yara’s involvement in corruption in India and Libya (for a 
summary in English that confirms this fact, see News in English, 18 January 2017: “Yara’s night-
mare draws to an end”. (http://www.newsinenglish.no/2017/01/18/yaras-nightmare-draws-to-
an-end/). Eriksen and Søreide (2017) confirm journalists’ role in uncovering foreign bribery 
cases more generally. 
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make it easier to understand and explain why, for example, the corrup-
tion in South Africa has been so damaging to the economy.41 
For the researchers involved, causal inferences with general validity are 
difficult to establish. They test a range of possible hypotheses and search for 
variations in the data that might support their assumptions. At each step 
of the process, information from investigative journalism could feed into 
their work. Cases in the press inspire new ideas of ‘how and what’ and pro-
vide examples that justify abstract assumptions. Over the last two decades, 
economic research has become more oriented toward empirical testing 
and results,42 and thus, directly or indirectly, the discipline relies more on 
empirical information, including what journalists produce and uncover.
There is also a danger of relying too much on journalists’ case-based 
coverage of the problem. A case presented in the media is just one case, 
and given the lack of information about the problem, it may inspire 
assumptions about the problem’s general features, which might be false. 
The lack of facts about the true extent of corruption tempts researchers 
to develop theories based on too little empirical information. And while 
researchers depend on survey information about the phenomenon, the 
survey respondents’ perceptions are easily colored by what they learn 
from a few media cases (where else do they get their ‘knowledge’ about 
hidden forms of crime?), and their ‘learning’ shapes what they feed into 
the data available to researchers, such as corruption perception indices.43 
One may wonder, for instance, why Kenya is ranked as more corrupt than 
Tanzania on Transparency International’s index. Is it simply because the 
press is freer in Kenya?
The very press coverage needed to highlight corruption problems thus 
distorts the data sources of corruption most commonly used in research. 
Of course, the resulting distortion of arguments and conclusions is not 
the journalists’ fault. It just reflects the difficulty of collecting informa-
tion about the extent of corruption. For journalists it is important to be 
41 Although as is often the case, Craig McKune explains in chapter 1 of this volume the hazards for 
those who seek to explain corruption in South Africa. 
42 The trend is confirmed by the American Economic Association, see Chart of the Week (June 
26 20179. “An empirical turn in economics research” (https://www.aeaweb.org/research/charts/
an-empirical-turn-in-economics-research).
43 Andersson and Heywood (2009).
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aware of this problem when they read and cite research-based evidence 
for corruption. With more cross-disciplinary discussions journalists will 
become better trained to distinguish reliable results from the less reliable. 
With more exchange across the disciplines, journalists would also 
become better equipped to report the consequences of corruption and 
its structural causal factors, thereby increasing the value of their stories 
vis-à-vis the sort of readers they strive to attract. Based on our personal 
experiences, however, we think journalists could build important stories 
by bringing economists or other researchers into their work at an early 
stage, for the sake of understanding a problem, rather than later, when 
they appear to seek primarily a citation that supports their angle. In this 
respect, we agree with Richard Sambrook’s conclusion in his 2018 edited 
volume about collaboration in investigative journalism – on page 95 – 
when he says: journalists “should stop thinking they can always ‘go it 
alone’. International accountability is an issue for lawyers, economists, 
politicians and lobbyists, scientists, health care professionals, academics, 
accountancy, business and finance professionals, and more. In a modern 
approach to accountability journalism, newsrooms should seek to part-
ner and collaborate outside their profession as widely as possible, being 
open to the expertise of others.” 
As for economists, if they have the courage, there might be much to 
gain in presenting their hypotheses as well as their results to experienced 
journalists. 
Conclusion: Investigative journalism  
needs society’s support
Investigative journalism can be a bulwark against corruption, uncover-
ing hidden wrongdoing and exposing it in a public forum where it can 
no longer be ignored. From petty bribery to grand larceny to corporate 
collusion on the highest levels, malfeasance and misconduct of all sorts 
have been exposed by courageous journalists, often resulting in actions to 
curb the wrongdoing and hold the perpetrators accountable.44
44 Hamilton (2016). 
chapter 1 1
132
For journalists and owners of media companies, however, investiga-
tive journalism represents a risky, costly, long-term investment. It takes 
time and money to build up journalistic expertise on corruption issues, 
and a network of sources who are able and willing to provide informa-
tion. Uncovering venal practices is difficult and time consuming, with 
no certainty that enough evidence will be found in any given case to 
publish a story. Wrongdoing can stay hidden, in tax havens or behind 
complex corporate transactions; or the alleged misconduct may fall into 
a gray zone, leaving journalists and sources exposed to repercussions 
while the perpetrators remain unscathed. Given threats to journal-
ists around the world, journalists and media owners must walk a fine 
line in deciding how boldly to pursue their inquiries and how much 
to risk.
Journalists can count themselves successful when their stories become 
too important for governments to ignore, so that citizens, regulatory 
institutions, and officials are attentive to their reporting and respond by 
taking action to curb unethical practices. Toward this end, investigative 
journalists need society’s support – and in some cases international sup-
port, especially for journalists operating in risky environments. Journal-
ists need to have their access to information and their rights to report 
and publish respected and protected by law. They and their sources need 
physical security, including effective whistleblower protections. With 
the rise of authoritarianism around the world, these ideals must be safe-
guarded more than ever.
The authors wish to thank Cathy Sunshine for useful comments.
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Independent media development specialist
Abstract: Journalists around the world now use big data and data visualization to 
report and write powerful stories about the effects of resource extraction. They use 
mobile and social media platforms to disseminate their work. Much of this coverage 
was driven by foundations and Google who believed in data journalism and funded 
training and tools to promote it. It’s not clear, however, whether the journalism has 
an impact and if it can develop an enthusiastic audience and help generate revenue 
for the outlets that report and publish data-driven journalism. 
Keywords: African media, global muckraking journalism, investigative journalism, 
extractives, data journalism, sustainability, donors, foundations
Journalists all over the world are taking risks to expose corruption and 
wrongdoing by powerful companies and governments who were thought 
to be untouchable. Thanks in part to social media, big data and an array 
of online tools, investigative reporting on oil, mining and tax avoidance 
is thriving. 
Over the years we have examined coverage of the extractive sector in 
order to see whether our initial optimistic forecasts about the powerful 
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role of digital technology had come true. We hoped that the internet 
would help solve the problem of power and information asymmetries 
inherent in extractive sector reporting, and help level the playing field 
between journalists and powerful companies and governments.
We predicted that digital technology would foster cross-border col-
laboration and give isolated journalists in under-resourced newsrooms a 
way to find new sources and new data, and disseminate their work. We 
hoped that once and for all, journalists and non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) would be able to collaborate and make information more 
transparent, expose the misdoings of oil and mining companies, and help 
keep governments accountable. 
This chapter has given us a chance to survey the field and assess whether 
our original forecasts were too optimistic. The use of digital tools and 
data-driven reporting has helped journalists do a better job of holding 
governments and corporations to account. Of course, not all that we had 
hoped for has happened, but around the world we have seen more in-depth 
reporting and powerful investigative journalism on the extractives. Jour-
nalists are using big data and data visualization to report and write power-
ful stories, and then use mobile and social media platforms to disseminate 
their work. Such examples can now be found in Africa, Latin America and 
Asia, as well as in the traditional strongholds of the US and Europe. This 
reporting does not necessarily have an impact – and it certainly does not 
address the perennial problem of financial sustainability – but it is there 
and the quality is better than ever. For this chapter we interviewed many 
of the funders and people who taught journalists how to use data and 
digital technology in their reporting. We also include case studies from 
around the world in order to provide a taste of what is being done.
People who teach data reporting believe in it and say there is no turning 
back. “Everyone knows that using data is how you get a real story that cuts 
through the crap. It’s a battle you don’t have to fight anymore. It doesn’t 
mean the story is always useful and that we’ve won the battle of moving 
away from anecdotal and societal investigation. It’s always tempting to go 
for the low hanging fruit of going to a community and interviewing five 
people, but it’s understood that data is an important mindset to have as 
well,” said Will Fitzgibbon, a reporter with the International Consortium 
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of Investigative Journalists who has worked with teams of journalists to 
produce the Panama Papers, Paradise Papers and Fatal Extraction series.
Digital tools help data gathering,  
presentation and dissemination
When we refer to digital we mean the use of online tools and platforms 
that help journalists gather information, present it and disseminate it. 
Online tools allow journalists to work collaboratively across newsrooms 
or borders to produce series like Fatal Extraction, the Panama Papers and 
the West Africa Leaks. 
Tools are often case specific and range from communication meth-
ods and visualization to easy document analysis and data liberation. For 
example, the Panama Papers leak developed Global I-Hub, a commu-
nications platform derived from the open-source software Oxwall, that 
enables communication and file sharing with two-step authentication. 
For cross-border projects documents must be readable and so journalists 
use tools like Tabula,1 which allow users to copy and paste data out of 
PDFs into Excel. Further, tools like Tableau Public and Flourish Studio 
enable journalists to make attractive and compelling videos and maps, as 
well as charts, from complicated data in order to tell public interest sto-
ries. Other visualization software helpful for collaborative investigative 
journalism projects include Linkurious2 and Piktochart. 
Journalists also take advantage of journalism-specific online networks 
and open forums. In 2018 the collaborative digital platform Hostwriter, 
an online network of hosts and tools for professional advice for freelance 
journalists engaging in cross-border reporting, was injected with EUR 
500,000 from a Google Impact Challenge Award3.
After the work is done, social platforms help journalists and citizen 
journalists spread their work quickly around the world. Bloggers and 
1 Tabula, https://tabula.technology/.
2 Linkurious, https://linkurio.us/.
3 Smolentceva, Natalia (2018). For journalists interested in cross-border collaborations, Hostwrit-




journalists in many countries, including Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania, 
depend on social media to disseminate their work. Especially in Africa, 
news and comments are growing amongst the internet-connected, through 
blog conversations and SMSs that reflect, and reflect upon, mainstream 
news (Paterson, 2013). These forms of digital engagement help audiences 
express themselves and circulate public opinion (Moyo, 2009). 
“Social media demonstrate an unprecedented ability for the politically 
engaged both to bypass and influence traditional information flows, but 
social media use faces unique challenges throughout much of Africa, due 
to underdeveloped telecommunications infrastructure, limited (though 
rapidly increasing) extra-urban mobile access, and bandwidth limita-
tions in many areas” (Paterson, 2013).
Trends in digital news consumption vary within regions. “Tanzani-
ans are increasingly becoming voracious social media consumers. With 
nearly half a million monthly users on Instagram and 10 million users 
on WhatsApp, the audience is moving online. To put that in perspective 
… Tanzanian YouTube viewers often outnumbered Nigerians, despite 
the latter being a larger population with – on the whole – better internet 
access,”4 writer Mwegelo Kpinga said in a 2017 Medium post. 
Incorporating data into journalism products has also been trans-
formed by the digital era. As Alexander Howard, of the Tow Center for 
Digital Journalism says, “Data journalism is telling stories with numbers, 
or finding stories in them. It’s treating data as a source to complement 
human witnesses, officials, and experts. Data journalism combines: (1) 
the treatment of data as a source to be gathered and validated; (2) the 
application of statistics to interrogate it; and (3) visualizations to present 
it, as in a comparison of batting averages or prices” (Howard, 2014). For 
example, statistics can be portrayed more clearly through visualizations 
such as mapping tools. In some cases, journalists also benefit from access 
to information and easy-to-use data analysis tools online. 
4 Mwegelo Kapinga, “How journalists can use social media to build an audience”. Medium, August 
17, 2017. Accessed: https://medium.com/hacks-hackers-africa/how-journalists-can-use-social-
media-to-build-an-audience-69bcc4f3ff80.
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Foundation funding spreads digital  
tools and data journalism
The spread of digital tools and data journalism among journalists cov-
ering extractives and/or doing investigative journalism during the last 
ten years is a case study of donor-driven innovation. Foundations like 
the Gates Foundation and the Omidyar Network deliberately decided to 
develop and spread these tools, and worked with the World Bank, which 
was pushing data transparency as a solution in developing countries. 
They funded fellowships and training around the world. In Africa alone, 
training in data reporting has been supported by Code for Africa, Oxfam, 
the Natural Resource Governance Institute, the West African Media 
Initiative, and the Thomson Reuters Institute. Internews was also heav-
ily involved. As the foundations and media development organizations 
pushed data journalism and digital tools they became more invested by 
doing so.
Funding was given by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the 
Omidyar Network and the World Bank to the International Center for 
Journalists for its Knight Fellowships Program and to Code for Africa, 
led by South African data journalist Justin Arenstein. They organized 
capacity building, mentorships and conferences. “[W]e employ a vari-
ety of measures to help journalists, media managers, entrepreneurs and 
executives embrace new forms of reporting and storytelling, audience 
engagement and business development. This includes building new 
teams at news organizations, introducing new models of collabora-
tion that improved workflows across newsrooms, launching contests to 
fund experiments, developing digital tools designed around the needs 
of local newsrooms, helping newsroom leaders identify new hires and 
roles that would make their editorial teams more innovative and work-
ing with them to find new ways to generate revenue to support quality 
journalism,” said Ben Colmery director of the ICFJ’s Knight Fellow-
ships Program.
Knight and Code for Africa also funded product development and 
trained journalists in the use of a range of tools including Document 
Cloud (Knight Foundation), WaziMap in South Africa (Code for South 
Africa now known as OpenUp), and OpenAfrica (Code for Africa).
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For Colmery who, as director of the ICFJ’s Knight Fellowships Pro-
gram, made a huge effort to promote digital tools in Latin American 
newsrooms, the purpose of the program was not just to change the news-
rooms where they worked but to spread innovation regionally. 
“What we want is to instill a culture of innovation in the newsroom 
and break down barriers so people can try new things in new ways and 
overcome cultures of bureaucracy, stagnation, lack of training and lack of 
internal resources. We try to make a dent in how journalism is done in a 
country or a region and change the landscape. The best way to do that is 
to work with a few newsrooms and make a change there, and then you see 
it cropping up in other newsrooms,” Colmery said.
According to an analysis of the Knight News Challenge, successful 
projects imbued modes of participation and distributed knowledge on 
such phenomena as crowdsourcing, alongside innovative features not 
typically practiced by journalists, such as engineering and software 
development (Lewis, 2011). 
It’s not clear how much funding has been used on developing digital tools 
for journalists and promoting innovations (including data journalism), but 
we estimate it is approximately twenty million dollars over the past 10 years. 
For instance, Code for Africa5, via the International Center for Journalists 
(ICFJ), received a donation6 of $4.7 million from the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation in 2015, and in 2017 the Omidyar Network and Open Society 
Foundation provided7 $4 million to the South Africa Media Innovation 
Program. The website of the Omidyar Network claims it has committed 
$220 million over the last ten years on a “Governance & Citizen Engage-
ment initiative to drive accountability and transparency of government”, 
but did not provide data for Africa or for data journalism. Ory Okolloh did 
confirm in an email that the Network supports Code for Africa, Publish 
5 Code for Africa, a civic technology and data journalism initiative that develops dozens of digital 
media tools (including openAFRICA), https://codeforafrica.org/. 
6 Arenstein, Justin (2015). $4.7 million data journalism initiative launched in Africa, Medium. 
https://medium.com/code-for-africa/4-7-million-data-journalism-initiative-launched-in-afri-
ca-189856fa68d4.
7 Omidyar Network (2017). South Africa Media Innovation Program (SAMIP) launched by 
Open Society Foundation of South Africa (OSF-SA), Omidyar Network and Media Develop-
ment Investment Fund. https://www.omidyar.com/news/south-africa-media-innovation-pro-
gram-samip-launched-open-society-foundation-south-africa-osf.
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What You Pay and the Natural Resource Governance Institute, as well as 
“funding for innovation/experimentation – Code for Africa, SAMIP”.
This donor-driven intervention had a huge effect. It spread ideas around 
the conference circuit, and Knight Fellows embedded in newsrooms pro-
vided follow-up. In the process there was plenty of good publicity for 
Google, which helped fund many of the efforts and sent emissaries to jour-
nalism conferences all over the world. Some started to feel that data jour-
nalism was the way of the future and that the possibilities were limitless. 
“In the last five-ten years there has been a buzz around data journal-
ism. Any journalist who has gone to an international conference or had a 
training or is connected to an international Fellow knows about it now,” 
said Will Fitzgibbon, a reporter with the International Center for Investi-
gative Journalism, who has worked with many journalists on how to use 
tech, “There is always that moment at a training session when the jaws in 
the room drop as journalists see what is possible with documents they 
have at their disposal but hadn’t known how to use.” 
No evidence that tech helps newsrooms 
generate revenues
However despite all the funding and the buzz it is not clear that using 
digital tools to gather and disseminate information will address what 
has always been the major problem of journalists in Africa and other 
low-income countries: lack of revenue and the difficulties in becoming 
financially self-sustainable. Nor is it clear that funding multiple startups 
will help the media ecosystem as a whole become financially self-sustain-
able. In fact, the different outlets may start to compete for audiences and 
advertising revenue in places where these are limited.
Prue Clarke has been working with New Narratives in Liberia for the 
past ten years, helping media houses and reporters there break news and 
win awards. She thinks donors should focus their support, in each market, 
on one or a few outlets that have shown themselves to be free of political 
interests and serious about developing an independent business model. By 
helping it become a standard setter for the whole media ecosystem, they 
show what is possible, attract readers, advertisers and the best journalists, 
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and raise the bar for everyone in an ethical direction. “Training individual 
journalists is just creating a stepping stone for a brain drain directly to a 
job in government or the World Bank or the aid world.”
The best pedagogical practices, knowing which individuals to target for 
training, capacity building and education continue to be unresolved ques-
tions. The standard problems of development are also present in media 
development. It may be a misallocation of scarce resources to do massive 
training in advanced digital tools. However, until many people have been 
exposed, it is not clear who will embrace and use the new technology. 
“Success often hinges on one really talented person who loves data, 
gets data and stays up till 2 am and makes a genius discovery. It’s less 
clear to me that newsroom-wide investment in basic data training where 
you encourage everyone to learn pivot tables, for example, helps produce 
strong investigations – at least in the short term. Data journalism is a lot 
about ‘use it or lose it.’ And I’ve seen lots of training events where it is 
quickly evident that few reporters will have the opportunity to use skills 
they have just spent hours or even days learning,” says Will Fitzgibbon. 
Critics of the donor push for data journalism argue that it in fact has 
not really spread organically or been embedded in newsrooms. While the 
training is fun and interesting, reporters go back to the newsroom and 
are unable to continue the work on their own. 
Indeed, newsroom training is usually a push effort. Editors identify 
the skill gaps in a particular team, an outside trainer prescribes a cur-
riculum, and human resources makes it mandatory to attend. The struc-
ture is very much like a class, with a few exercises and maybe even a 
graded test at the end.
Embedding innovation in larger media houses may be more effective 
than training at conferences with many journalists, as large media houses 
can use their money and clout to take risks and pursue stories and agen-
das that small, budget-conscious media outlets are unable to do (Schiffrin 
et al., 2015, p. 20). For example, Eyewitness News in South Africa says it 
was the first media house in the country to use WhatsApp to communi-
cate with its audience (ibid., p. 21). The Star in Kenya is another example 
of a large outlet where management and editors sought to mainstream 
data-driven reporting. 
investigative  journalism on oil ,  gas and mining 
145
NGOs provide non-financial support  
to journalists too 
Apart from funding, there are other ways that NGOs support transpar-
ency and public interest journalism. Believing that accountability and 
investigative journalism are public goods, many NGOs try to provide 
information and how-to guides to journalists that they cannot get on their 
own. NGOs can also support data availability. They use their expertise to 
prepare and present data in ways that are easy for time-strapped journal-
ists to plug into their own reporting. Indeed, given that many journalists 
lack the skills to handle complex data-sets, it is a time-honored tradition 
for NGOs to do some of the research for them.
Some NGOS also have journalism-specific initiatives to promote inves-
tigations, and assist reporters by developing data portals or dashboards to 
provide easily accessible information. Open contracting and open govern-
ment campaigns have unearthed a host of data and document resources for 
journalists to triangulate their stories, while drone technology has enabled 
new visuals and access to new angles and resources. However, tools (data 
dashboards and web applications) do not solve the problem of cultivat-
ing good quality data journalism alone. Training also needs to reflect 
the country’s reality. Observed good media development practice means 
working with newsrooms as a whole for extended periods of time – up 
to two years – to develop data journalism and technical skills. This has 
the added value of being sustainable, in cases where newsroom cultures 
adapt to these new practices. Such media development initiatives are often 
unconnected to initiatives that build tools and make data usable/available. 
Below, we present and analyze some examples of data and digital tech 
initiatives as examples of innovative journalism projects in the extractive 
sector. 
Broken links, data dumps, out-of-date 
information
There are now a number of topic-specific repositories, databases, anno-
tated document archives and toolkits that can help journalists investigate 
good governance concerns pertaining to extractive industries, such as 
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illicit finance and tax avoidance. One problem is that many do not pro-
vide much data and the data becomes obsolete very quickly. A cursory 
search online finds a number of sites that, in principle, sound useful but 
in fact are full of broken links and out-of-date information. 
Another revenue management problem that could be helped by having 
good data and an informed citizenry, is that caused by countries with large 
resource projects that take resource-backed loans without a guarantee of real-
izing these projects. Economists Jim Cust and David Mihalyi identified this 
trend in their research on the “Presource Curse”. “The oil discovery and the 
financial windfall it promised appeared to usher in an era of economic impru-
dence: heavy borrowing, profligate spending, and exposure of the economy 
to the oil price crash of 2014” (Cust & Mihalyi, 2017). In the case of Ghana, 
this led to borrowing over $4.5 billion in international markets (ibid.). 
Data initiatives are one way to provide tools to oversight actors like 
journalists, and to set standards for open data. “Resource Projects” was 
created in 2017 by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) 
(disclosure: with which the authors are affiliated). This project provides 
easily visualized and exported financial figures divulged from stock 
exchanges in Canada and the EU to the public around the world. To help 
societies discuss the cost and benefits of oil, gas and mining projects, this 
web application uses data released as a result of “disclosures mandated by 
recent regulations to provide data on project and government entity level 
payments. This data is intended to allow governments, citizens and civil 
society actors to better model resource revenues and forecast budgets.”8 
Journalists can use data from the portal to corroborate other sources in 
their stories. For example, if portions of contract information are unavail-
able through traditional disclosures such as the relevant ministries in 
each country, this data set provides granular data points for journalists 
to then be able to flesh out how much money is paid by extractive sector 
companies to different government entities around the world. The extent 
to which this has been or will be used by journalists is unclear. 
Some data initiatives are region-specific. SourceAFRICA uses the tech-
nology developed by DocumentCloud to provide annotations and easy 
8 Resource Projects, Natural Resource Governance Institute, https://resourceprojects.org/about.
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access to different documents relevant to investigations on the continent. 
SourceAFRICA is a service provided by the African Network of Centers 
for Investigative Reporting with funding from Code for Africa. The plat-
form is Africa’s largest repository of leaked/investigative documents9. The 
platform leverages different online tools to collate and annotate docu-
ments for journalists to access and add sources of information to their 
stories. OpenAFRICA is the companion open data portal currently used 
by 48 organizations like Quartz10 for building charts, GotToVote!11 to help 
citizens register to vote, government agencies such as the Department 
of Justice and Constitutional Development12 in South Africa, and the 
fact-checking initiative PesaCheck in East Africa.13 
Tools and data are not everything. We do not yet have information 
on how these projects have affected journalism. Supporting media inno-
vations in response to the demands of local audiences and newsrooms 
seems the most effective method. Making data available may complement 
these processes. Still, there are challenges to traditional media develop-
ment practices in newsrooms. NGOs must carefully consider the role 
of journalism in target countries (Do they function as a public service 
watchdog?), and be aware that technical training in data-use may seem 
irrelevant and intimidating for a media house to commit to14. 
Using innovation to cover the  
extractives sector
Below are some examples of noteworthy coverage of the extractive sector. 
Some involved innovative data collection, storytelling and dissemination 
and/or found new ways to bring different groups of reporters together. Others 
benefited from diverse forms of mentorship and journalist capacity-building 
9 SourceAFRICA, https://sourceafrica.net/.
10 Quartz Atlas for Africa, https://blog.qz.com/tagged/atlas-for-africa.
11 GotToVote!, https://gottovote.cc/. 
12 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Republic of South Africa, http://www.
justice.gov.za/master/trust.html.
13 PesaCheck, https://pesacheck.org/.





which helped expand the network of reporters. They used diverse revenue 
streams and audience outreach strategies including regional competitions, 
exhibitions and events, direct philanthropy and aid, and tried to bridge tra-
ditional and experimental forms of storytelling to target relevant audiences.
1. #minealert – helping trackmining licenses in Southern Africa
One initiative highlighting extractive sector abuses is Oxpeckers’ 
#minealert mine-tracking mobile website and app. Oxpeckers15 is a 
South Africa-based small investigative media outlet that covers envi-
ronmental issues, especially developments in the extractive sector, 
with data mapping tools. Oxpeckers was begun through the African 
News Innovation Challenge (ANIC) and later received support from 
Code for Africa, and is able to innovate quickly because of its modest 
size (ibid., p. 99). 
Oxpeckers established #minealert, a tool for tracking and sharing 
mining applications and licensing processes. This shows how niche 
models like Oxpeckers leverage big headings for diverse products. 
#minealert supported investigations into the social, economic and 
climactic legacy of coal mining in South Africa using long-term data 
investigation16, the environmental costs of phosphate mining17, and 
balanced appraisals of ongoing mining prospecting18. 
2.  The Gecko Project – an NGO uses multimedia to expose the dark side of 
palm oil in Indonesia
“Indonesia for Sale” is a series of three gorgeously produced multime-
dia reports unearthing corruption and environmental devastation in 
Indonesia’s palm oil industry. The package was reported and published 
by the Gecko Project, an investigative reporting site founded in 2017 by 
15 Oxpeckers, https://oxpeckers.org/.
16 Olalde, Mark (2017). Coal mines leave a legacy of ruin, Oxpeckers, https://oxpeckers.org/2017/04/
coal-mines-legacy/. 
17 Olalde, Mark (2016). Seabed prospecting undermines blue economy, Oxpeckers, https://oxpeck-
ers.org/2016/11/3345/.
18 Thomas, Julia (2018). Is Mabola open for mining? Oxpeckers, https://oxpeckers.org/2018/05/is-
mabola-open-for-mining/.
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U.K.-based environmental NGO Earthsight and based in London. The 
series was produced and published in collaboration with the environ-
mental news website Mongabay. The Gecko Project was the brainchild 
of journalist Tom Johnson, who had previously worked for the Envi-
ronmental Investigation Agency in London. Johnson wanted to bring 
together advocacy, investigative journalism and multimedia into one 
big package of reporting, in the hope that investigative journalism and 
high-quality multimedia would make a difference.
“Digital has been vital in our ability to get the outputs in front of an 
Indonesian audience. Facebook penetration is high, and Indonesians 
are really engaged on Facebook. Using targeted promotions, we’ve 
been able to drill stories right back into the districts that are the sub-
ject of the stories. These are remote places that barely have any form 
of reporting on the issues that are affecting them deeply, and why. A 
second aspect relates to our reporting methods. We relied extensively 
on Facebook to track down individuals, to make connections between 
them and sometimes to contact them. We’ve also used LinkedIn to 
expose companies that are using their employees as proxies, to disguise 
their ownership of their subsidiaries – what are effectively shadow 
companies. That said, once we’ve made such connections, it’s back to 
gumshoe reporting. The internet has allowed us to find out things we 
simply couldn’t without it, but it only takes us so far, and then it’s back 
to knocking on doors,” said Johnson.
The lengthy series tells it all: sordid land-grabs, a web of corruption 
that spread from powerful local families to the political elites of Jakarta 
and abroad, shell companies and environmental destruction. The writ-
ten text alone is more than 40,000 words – including explainers and 
analysis – and is accompanied by powerful images and videos. Dozens 
of people were interviewed for the project including fixers, middlemen, 
environmental activists, villagers who were affected, politicians, cor-
porate lawyers and employees of plantation firms. 
“I was inspired by the AP series on fishing and the emergence of 
single issue campaigning journalism organizations like the Marshall 
project and dedicated investigative outlets like ProPublica, which mar-
ried together a lot of the things I wanted to do. I thought about what 
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would be the stories I would want to read,” Johnson said about the 
project, which began early in 2017 and involved two full-time reporters 
as well as freelancers and freelance filmmakers and photographers. 
Launched in October 2017, the project has led to a growing recog-
nition of the role of multinational and Indonesian plantation firms 
in undermining Indonesia’s democracy. The Corruption Eradication 
Commission, Indonesia’s anti-graft agency, has used the findings to 
inform its work, their investigators and senior officers have said. In 
total the project cost about $150,000 to do, and was funded by the 
Waterloo Foundation and a major US foundation that asked to remain 
anonymous for fear of antagonizing the Indonesian government.
The reports have been published on the California environmen-
tal-based news site Mongabay as well as its sister site in Indonesia and 
distributed on social media platforms. They have also been co-pub-
lished with Tempo, Indonesia’s leading investigative magazine, and 
syndicated by numerous other sites and blogs under a Creative Com-
mons license. Low-tech means were used too: photocopies were made 
and distributed by motorbike messengers on the island of Sulawesi. An 
estimated 500,000 people have seen the stories on Mongabay and the 
Gecko Project sites, Johnson said, and 10% have finished reading them. 
The completion percentage is higher in Indonesia where the story res-
onates locally. The final investigation in the series was published as the 
cover-story in Tempo magazine in November 2018, reaching more than 
one million readers.
“It’s probably too long but to tell the story properly, it needed to be 
that long. It really tells the story of modern Indonesia from autocracy 
to democracy,” Johnson said, adding that the videos on Facebook have 
attracted close to one million views, boosted engagement and sent peo-
ple to read the reporting. “We’re confident that the stories will have an 
impact, and this is only the start of the project,” said Johnson. “We’re 
at the start of exploring a very rich and deep vein of corruption, and 
the further we go the greater the chances there will be some form of 
meaningful response – from government, enforcement agencies, or 
galvanising civil society to address the specifics of the problem in a 
more effective way.”
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3. #WestAfricaLeaks – coordinated reporting on corruption in West Africa
#WestAfricaLeaks (published in May 2018) was the first time journal-
ists across West Africa collaborated on a series of incisive investigative 
journalism unearthing corruption. Supported by Cenozo and ICIJ, 
#WestAfricaLeaks coordinated 13 journalists from 11 West African 
countries to use the data and resources available from bigger leaks for 
targeted reporting in West Africa. 
The initiative responded to the dearth of investigations in the region 
inspired by cross-border investigations like the Panama Papers and 
Paradise Papers. “#WestAfricaLeaks was meant to be explosive. Pan-
ama Papers didn’t go viral in Africa. $700 million was retrieved in the 
United States and Europe, and a Pakistani politician will go to jail for 
ten years, but nothing happened in African countries,” according to 
participating journalist Emmanuel Dogbevi from Ghana.
Dogbevi’s piece unveiled violations of the Vienna Convention by the 
then Ambassador of Ghana to the United States. The ambassador held 
a 3.5 percent stake in an offshore oil block in Ghana and sold his stake 
while in office, without declaring his political affiliation, making $350 
million on the sale. 
An Al Jazeera documentary raised the important question of how 
much impact the investigative journalism series achieved. “One of the 
group of journalists’ greatest challenges was getting their readers, their 
governments, and in some cases even the media outlets they work for, 
to care … What set #WestAfricaLeaks apart is the media landscape. 
The conditions in which journalists work.”19
4. Chai Khana – cross-border reporting in the South Caucasus
“Chai Khana is what you read after the news: a documentary that you sit and 
watch, that dives into the characters. Chai Khana shadows a different cross- 
border topic every two months” in the South Caucasus. “It focuses 





and analysis, but we want to highlight these issues through charac-
ter-driven stories,” according to founder Caroline Sutcliffe. 
The outlet is funded by the British Embassy’s Conflict Stability and 
Security Fund. In a region that is traditionally conflict-ridden and with 
a young culture for investigative journalism, the outlet surmounts 
challenges by developing the reporting community through capacity 
building and mentorship, and emphasizing locally-rooted stories. They 
have around 200 freelancers across the region often reporting stories 
they pitch individually, said Sutcliffe. 
The outlet’s audience is diverse, reaching rural, affected communi-
ties as well as individuals throughout the region. To reach their target 
audiences, Chai Khana experiments with different forms of storytell-
ing. “80 percent of our audience is between 18 and 35 years old,” said 
Sutcliffe. These storytelling forms include an emphasis on visuals in 
the form of animations and documentaries, with current experiments 
employing drones and virtual reality. To engage rural audiences, they 
publish and advertise content via Facebook. To engage different audi-
ences and build the site’s reputation, they employ unique outreach 
strategies. These includes community engagement activities in the 
form of exhibitions, and film screenings specific to their published 
content. 
In its first year, Chai Khana published investigations on environ-
mental degradation and pollution caused by copper mining in Arme-
nia. A recent cross-border multimedia piece, “Shared Waters”, covers 
the effects of overusing and contaminating the Kura River that passes 
through Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Iran through 
personal narratives and visuals, thus illuminating a shared regional 
resource in an area prone to cross-border conflict. 
5.  100Reporters – seasoned reporters train journalists on extractive sector 
investigations 
Impact through hard-hitting investigations by local reporters is prior-
ity number one for 100Reporters. This non-profit news outfit and set of 
mentors seeks to promote transparency and good governance through 
investigative journalism. 100Reporters publishes stories on its outlet 
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and in cooperation with the likes of Salon and Foreign Affairs. The 
journalists they support target the deleterious sides of opaque indus-
tries, like corruption and attributed deaths in mining sites, with fresh-
ness and precision. 
“Journalists are getting training, but where do they publish and 
who’s working to bridge this gap? We bring guidance into the system to 
get reporters on the ground to better understand and identify report-
ing partners.” According to its executive editor and co-founder Diana 
Schemo, 100Reporters “works with reporters on the ground, to then 
help them fill in the outlines of the story”.
They deliberately avoid large training environments, preferring to 
build teams and support them by running through drafts, discussing 
digital and physical security, and where to look for documents. 
Journalists they work with have uncovered a host of hard-hitting 
extractive sector stories. Recently in Cameroon, “a two-year investi-
gation by 100Reporters has found that the project, though managed 
by President Biya, has failed to pay royalties, training fees and taxes 
to the Cameroonian treasury, even as it made payments to investors 
totaling millions of dollars.”20 In 2016, 100Reporters published a story 
by Estacio Valoi in Mozambique investigating the mislabeling of blood 
diamonds by officials in charge of verification.21
Is there any impact? Does tech and data  
reporting help financial sustainability?
The replication of innovations is a sign of success for donor-funded proj-
ects in the media (Robinson et al., 2015, p. 14), but it is not clear whether 
any of the innovations discussed in this chapter help solve the main 
20 Locka, Christian (2018). Cameroon: Gas project brings royalties for shareholders, but few ben-
efits for locals or national coffers, 100Reporters (February). Accessed: https://100r.org/2018/02/
cursed/. 
21 Valoi, Estacio (2016). The blood rubies of Montepuez: Troubling pattern of violence and death 




problem journalism faces globally: lack of funding. Nor is it clear what 
sort of impact the stories have had.
Even the funders of data journalism admit that measuring impact is 
hard. Tracking the effects of capacity-building is hard. It can also be dif-
ficult to follow the reporting of the journalists who have had the train-
ing, since many of them do not write much afterwards, or their work is 
not available online, while others leave the profession. Once investigative 
articles are published it is difficult to know whether it is exposure jour-
nalism or other factors that lead to changes in government policies or 
corporate behavior. For example, if street protests follow media coverage 
of a corruption scandal in Nigeria, it is difficult to know what exactly 
caused the protests. 
“It’s very hard to demonstrate attribution or even articulate how jour-
nalism’s contribution to change has happened,” says Miguel Castro from 
the Gates Foundation. “In a complex ecosystem like African media for 
example, we can’t tell beyond the anecdotal what was the result of the 
work of Code for Africa and other partners of the challenge funds created 
over the last few years, or Omidyar’s and others’ work. But definitely there 
has been a significant contribution to growth in newsroom understand-
ing of digital and data storytelling.”
Proponents of data journalism and innovation argue that the result-
ing reporting will attract audiences, boost engagement and help media 
outlets carve out a niche for themselves, as well as help raise the outlets’ 
profile in a crowded media market. They also argue that journalists need 
to develop an entrepreneurial spirit, and that embracing innovation can 
help. 
Indeed the Media Development Investment Fund, which has spent 
years trying to nurture new business models for media outlets around 
the world, provides “funding for new approaches such as app-based news 
providers or mobile-targeted content, regional expansion efforts for com-
panies with a proven business model, as well as traditional distribution 
mechanisms in markets where they are still relevant.”
Innovation diffusion may also occur through a large media house that 
is able to support and incubate new ideas. Or it can occur through entre-
preneurs who decide to try something new (Robinson et al., 2015, p. 169). 
investigative  journalism on oil ,  gas and mining 
155
Others, such as Animal Politico in Mexico, focus strictly on web content 
and audience outreach through social media. This model allows Animal 
Politico both to engage with digitally-based and young audiences, and to 
avoid a dependence on government advertising22.
Supporters say tech training helps  
develop local entrepreneurs
Craig Hammer, who is secretary of the World Bank's Development Data 
Council and leads the World Bank’s Global Media Development pro-
gram, noted that capacity building and the development of new skills 
has helped local journalists get extra work as data editors and graphic 
designers, and so it has supported local entrepreneurship. Or as he put it, 
“As robust data analysis in news media becomes ever more mainstream 
across regions, so, too, are new models for organizing the work of data 
journalism taking root, including a growing subcontracting, or entrepre-
neurship, approach. Data journalism training is helping to contribute to 
the growing pool of technical professionals who may avail themselves of 
associated new opportunities.”
Data may contribute to how media outlets distinguish themselves and 
thus help their position in the media market. However, a direct relation-
ship between profitability and the use of technology and data reporting 
is hard to pinpoint. 
Hammer points to an uptick in public consumption of data-driven 
news content in Kenya, which is a result of capacity-building support in 
the country by a few key organizations. One example is Internews’ sup-
port for The Nation Newsplex23, the public interest data team of the Daily 
Nation, which disseminates data-driven analyses both through the Daily 
Nation – the largest circulation daily newspaper in Kenya – and through 
NTV, which is one of the country’s largest television stations.
22 Animal Politico, Nieman Journalism Lab, last updated: June 12, 2014, http://www.niemanlab.org/
encyclo/animal-politico/.
23 The Nation Newsplex, www.nation.co.ke/newsplex/.
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Critics say tech/data reporting is  
not helping profitability
In designing their tech/data push, funders had hoped that a “build it and 
they will come” approach would work. They did not try to first look at 
whether the innovations would be effective or make any money or what 
other impact the journalism would have. The consensus now is that the 
impact has not been proven and that benefits have not yet appeared on 
the bottom line. 
“We believe we need to develop even further a business case for data 
journalism and digital storytelling. The assumption that ‘if you build it 
they will come’ is not working, as newsrooms are under so much pressure 
that they have not prioritized data journalism with its relatively high costs 
and substantial skills required,” says Castro, from the Gates Foundation. 
“In donors’ excitement to embrace the open government and open data 
movement, they have pumped lots of money into the quickest, cheapest 
and flashiest path to data journalism: boot camps, hackathons and con-
ferences. Yet these approaches boil down the barrier to data journalism 
into one simple problem: technology. These boot camps are designed to 
provide technology solutions, with the tacit assumption that the rest will 
follow, but they have misdiagnosed the essential root problem. It’s not the 
tools, at least not primarily.”24 
Will funders turn away from funding data journalism and its tools? 
The supporters of these innovations hope not. “There is a groundswell 
of data journalism but I do get concerned that funders aren’t willing to 
give it enough time for it to take hold. There is something fundamentally 
important about getting these stories out there because they are not get-
ting told otherwise,” said Ben Colmery, former director of the Interna-
tional Center for Journalists’ Knight Fellowships Program.
At a time when the limits to naming and shaming are all too clear, it 
is simply not certain whether the reporting described above will have 
a clear impact on government policy or corporate behavior. Even so, 
24 Constantaras, Eva (2016). OpenGov voices: Why data journalism tries, and fails, to go global, 
Sunlight Foundation. https://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/02/10/opengov-voices-why-data-
journalism-tries-and-fails-to-go-global/.
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the new tools and new methods of data and digital reporting are now 
better understood and used more frequently than they were before. 
Indeed, looking back at ten years of donor-driven attempts to promote 
tech and data reporting in newsrooms of the global South, it is clear 
that the tools are being used and that some elegant and sophisticated 
reporting has been the result. What has not been proved is whether 
these kinds of data-driven stories create more impact than any other 
kind of investigative reporting, produce lasting audience interest or 
engagement, or will help with the biggest problem of all: funding for 
quality reporting. 
We gratefully acknowledge Chloe Oldham for her research and thank our 
interviewees for taking time to speak to us.
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Abstract: Transparency through disclosure of beneficial ownership and the resulting 
accountability have the potential to transform governance structures in the extractive 
industries, particularly in natural resource rich developing countries. Benefits from 
the disclosure of beneficial ownership accrue to the public sector, since increased 
transparency allows the state to reduce various points of natural resource revenue 
leakages, and thereby retain more precious financial resources required to invest in 
education, healthcare, and infrastructure, as well as other public priorities. The pri-
vate corporate sector too benefits from such disclosures, as this helps minimize legal 
and reputational risks that might arise through association with business partners or 
suppliers having opaque ownership structures. In addition the ensuing transparency 
helps foster competition, reduce corruption and promote fair business practices.
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Legal practitioners often encounter the repercussions of ignoring or failing 
to procure beneficial ownership information on companies involved in oil, 
gas and mining industries in resource rich countries. Beneficial ownership 
information entails the disclosure of real or ultimate owners of a company, 
namely the natural persons who own or control such a company, no mat-
ter how many intervening layers of other companies and/or legal entities 
may exist in between such a company and its natural person owners. 
As such, when beneficial ownership of oil, gas or mining companies 
is opaque, transfer of both information and profits to companies regis-
tered in so-called “tax havens” such as the British Virgin Islands and 
Mauritius,1 which do not yet require ownership registration or beneficial 
ownership disclosure, likely leads to loss of natural resource revenue for 
resource rich countries (“host countries”), located mainly in the deve-
loping world. Often host countries are offered relatively small amounts of 
taxes and other compensation for the operation of an oil, gas or mining 
project, with further profits invariably distributed to unknown or hid-
den persons, many of whom are highly placed public officials or other 
politically compromised or exposed persons in their own government, 
through companies with opaque ownership structures. How extensive 
this problem is has been exposed through the now infamous Panama 
Papers and Paradise Papers leaks,2 although the actual amounts of the 
huge sums involved are at best educated guesses.3
Disclosure of beneficial ownership is a necessary and integral part of 
the efforts to promote and institutionalize transparency in the extractive 
1 Over, Marco Chown. British Virgin Islands growing rich as a global tax haven, The STAR, (2016, 
April 4); Doward, Jamie. Deloitte promotes Mauritius as tax haven to avoid big payouts to poor 
African nations, The Guardian, (2013, November 3). Accessed on August 20, 2018, and at https://
www.theguardian.com/business/2013/nov/03/deloittes-tax-savings-investments-in-poor-coun-
tries.
2 International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Leaders (ICIJ), Criminal celebrities. 
Retrieved from https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/ ICIJ, ICIJ releases Paradise 
Papers data from Appleby, (2017, November 17) at https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-
papers/icij-releases-paradise-papers-data-appleby/.
3 Henry, James. S. The price of offshore revisited: New estimates for missing global private wealth, 
income inequality and lost taxes, (2012, July) at http://taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_
Offshore_Revisited_120722.pdf.
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industries, and also to enable a more equitable amount of the sums 
earned in natural resource rich countries to actually be retained by them. 
Transparency as such is the sine qua non for governance reform in the 
extractive industry not only promoting accountability, but also fostering 
linkages to wider governance reforms in the industry, thus providing for 
a more equitable distribution or sharing of the profits of natural resource 
exploitation. From the perspective of private sector companies, minimiz-
ing the risk of association with undesirable business partners or ques-
tionable suppliers and dodgy entities or individuals posing political risk, 
is imperative in order to avoid any violation of laws regulating corruption 
and financial crimes, including money laundering and financing of ter-
rorism.4 Transparent beneficial ownership disclosures would presumably 
lead to the exposure of organizations linked with or owned by individu-
als posing a high political and legal risk to companies.
From the public sector perspective, natural resources such as oil, gas 
and minerals are by law held in trust by the government of a country, 
for the benefit of the people of that country. Public policy would thus 
dictate that the people should have accurate and complete knowledge of 
the management of their natural wealth. Transparency in the extractive 
industry fosters public trust and informs and engages the public on cru-
cial matters relevant to the governance and use of their natural resources, 
thus also benefiting the private sector as it engenders the process of 
obtaining and maintaining the social license to operate from the commu-
nities. Some advocates5 of maintaining the status quo of not disclosing 
4 Kelly, E. John, McBride, Thaddeus R., Richardson, Eli J. & Palmeri, Cheryl A. Proposed legisla-
tion would combat terrorist financing, money laundering. Accessed on June 8, 2017, available at 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=790a6c30-f647-46e0-a653-c792d9317309. See 
also Woods, Martin. Is beneficial ownership really so difficult? Thomson Reuters, (2015, January 
19).
5 Kenney, Martin. Open company UBO registers are not the panacea to financial crime, The 
FCPA Blog, (2018, May 7). Accessed on August 20, 2018, available at http://www.fcpablog.com/
blog/2018/5/7/martin-kenney-open-company-ubo-registers-are-not-the-panacea.html. [Martin 
states, “Why should a businessperson conducting perfectly legitimate business be denied the 
right to privacy in order to do so? The argument that ‘if it’s legitimate then why try and keep it 
confidential?’ doesn’t fly. We are all entitled to the protection of private data unless we are doing 
something wrong. Privacy is closely aligned to human dignity. The legitimate right to privacy is 
analogous to the privacy of a bank account and other financial data (expected, but not unquali-
fied) and medical records.”]. 
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identities of beneficial owners, point out issues of privacy (including pro-
tection from kidnapping and extortion if it becomes known that a person 
has considerable assets); protection of legitimate business interests,6 such 
as the decision to acquire or merge companies; protection of intellectual 
property; or the quiet pursuit of a new creative venture. Recently, some 
of these advocates have started to realize that tax authorities and other 
public regulators should have the right to examine, for specific purposes, 
officially maintained registers in which the identities of beneficial own-
ers are disclosed. While, as briefly noted above, there can be valid busi-
ness and personal reasons for the confidentiality of beneficial ownership 
information, it is questionable whether any of these reasons should, or do, 
apply to the natural resources sector in host countries of the developing 
world. Here, because of public ownership of such resources, states issue 
licenses or enter into agreements with operating companies to develop the 
resources. In such instances, the state is usually a partner in the project, 
and as such has a commercial interest in knowing with whom it is enter-
ing into a partnership, particularly when politically exposed or compro-
mised individuals from its own government enrich themselves through 
opaque ownerships7 in the very companies partnering with the state.
Transparency, accountability and trust are important features of a 
robust governance framework for the extractive industry, ranging from 
the allocation of licenses to the collection and management of revenues. 
Revenues from the extractive industry are an essential source of income 
for many developing countries, without which they cannot help fund 
their most critical institutions, their schools and their infrastructure. On 
the other hand, transparency helps foster competition, reduces cronyism 
and corruption, promotes fair business practices, and reduces reputa-
tional risks for the private sector. This results in an improved, reliable 
and friendly business/investment environment for private sector inves-
tors, and encourages them to enter emerging markets. The benefits of 
6 See Stiglitz, Joseph & Pieth, Mark. Overcoming the shadow economy, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 
(2016, November 11), page 6, for discussion on potential, legitimate reasons for the use of tax 
havens.
7 ICIJ, How family that runs Azerbaijan built an empire of hidden wealth. Retrieved from https://
www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/20160404-azerbaijan-hidden-wealth/, April 4, 2016. 
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transparency in the extractive industry are numerous and accrue to a 
diverse set of stakeholders, including the state/government, citizens, the 
private sector, and civil society. Ironically, it appears from the authors’ 
experience as advisors to governments and state-owned entities in 
emerging nations, that the advantages of transparency are still not fully 
understood by the extractive industry, probably due in part to a failure 
to appreciate the risks of non-transparency and the repercussions these 
companies can suffer from the failure of beneficial ownership disclosure. 
In fact, governments do not fully appreciate that transparency has the 
benefit of creating a more secure and reliable investment climate and 
facilitating better governance,8 which, from the authors’ experience, can 
become a virtuous circle. As such one of the goals of the recommenda-
tions made herein, is to help further the discourse on the benefits of dis-
closing ownership, including advancing the creation of such a circle in 
emerging nations rich in natural resources. 
Disclosure of beneficial ownership eliminates 
opaque ownership structures
The obvious benefit of disclosure of beneficial ownership for host coun-
tries and their people relates to the elimination of opaque ownership 
structures, which allow companies to hide improper relationships with 
politically exposed or compromised individuals – in short it is a power-
ful tool in minimizing corruption, which has spawned civil unrest and 
decades-long conflicts around the globe. There have been repeated cases 
of countries (specifically emerging economies) losing millions on account 
of sham companies or politically connected companies. For instance, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) lost approximately $1.36 billion in 
mining revenues, about twice the amount of the annual budget for health 
and education, between 2012 and 2013, because of the sale of underval-
ued mining assets to offshore companies with questionable ownership 




structures.9 Loss of valuable natural resource revenues impacts both the 
public and the private sector. As countries and governments lose poten-
tial revenue from the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, 
they lose the capacity to develop and improve their economy sustainably. 
Subsequently investors, particularly foreign investors, are hesitant to 
invest in the extractive industries since the country is unable to invest 
in infrastructure and other non-resource sector industries, which may 
attract direct foreign investment in potential projects, attractive to pro-
spective investors. For instance poor or absent infrastructure hinders 
development,10 and oil, gas or mining investors might be hesitant if access 
to assets and the facilitation of project operations require the investor to 
develop basic infrastructure like roads, which ideally should have already 
been in place. Further, loss of revenue fosters a cycle of corruption in 
developing nations, diluting all efforts made by the international com-
munity, and the developing nations themselves, to make the extractive 
industry as transparent as possible.11
Information on who ultimately owns and benefits from the activities 
of a corporation will eliminate the phenomenon of hidden owners and 
beneficiaries, revealing politically exposed or compromised individuals, 
who often use shell companies and/or tax haven jurisdictions to hide 
their ownership in oil, gas or mining assets, thus evading payment of 
taxes on the income derived from such assets, and avoiding the liabil-
ity12 associated with the operation and use of such assets.13 Benefits from 
9 Africa Progress Report 2013: Equity in extractives Africa: Stewarding Africa’s natural resources, 
Africa Progress Report, p. 56.
10 DW, Poor infrastructure is key obstacle to development in Africa, (2011, July 26).
11 Votava, Cari. Extractives sector corruption: What we have learned, Extractive Industry Transpar-
ency Initiative (EITI), (2018, January 18).
12 If the ultimate owners of a company are not known, it is difficult to hold them liable for the 
simple reason that their identity is unknown. If the identity of ultimate owners is made trans-
parent to government authorities, there are still legal hurdles to overcome, particularly because 
shareholders/stockholders of a company are by law not liable for the obligations of a company, 
although, in some jurisdictions, liability for environmental damage is now being extended to 
controlling shareholders. Knowledge of beneficial owners of a company provides the oppor-
tunity to issue an operating license with the condition that all significant shareholders of that 
company must execute a guarantee for the obligations and liabilities incurred by the company, 
especially for any liability for environmental damages.
13 Panama Papers reveal wide use of shell companies by African officials, (2016, July 25). New York 
Times.
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the transparency of ownership structures are not only restricted to host 
countries. Profit shifting through innovative corporate structures can 
also result in tax evasion or avoidance in the countries in which the oil, 
gas and mining companies are incorporated (home countries). In fact, the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the “global standard 
to promote the open and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral 
resources,”14 is supported by some home countries,15 and global interna-
tional oil companies such as Chevron, BP, Exxon Mobil and Hess.16 
The EITI has, as of 2016, included the disclosure of beneficial own-
ership within the EITI Standards reporting requirements, calling upon 
members states to keep a “publicly available register of the beneficial own-
ers of the corporate entity(ies) that bid for, operate or invest in extractive 
assets, including the identity(ies) of their beneficial owner(s), the level 
of ownership and details about how ownership or control is exerted”. In 
addition where possible, information on beneficial ownership should be 
incorporated in “existing filings by companies to corporate regulators, 
stock exchanges or agencies regulating extractive industry licensing.”17 
Furthermore by 2020, all member states “have to ensure that all oil, gas 
and mining companies that bid for, operate or invest in extractive proj-
ects in their countries disclose their real owners,” identifying the name, 
nationality and country of residence of the owners.18 The European Union 
too issued a directive in June of 2015, the 4th Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive (EU) No. 2015/849 (4th AMLD), requiring all member states to 
enact national laws on disclosure requirements for “beneficial ownership 
information for corporate and legal entities.”19 Such information, as per 
the directive, requires “adequate, accurate and current information on 
beneficial owners” of companies, including the “name, date of birth, place 
14 EITI, About us. Accessed August 12, 2018, available at https://eiti.org/about/who-we-are.
15 EITI, Supporting countries. Accessed August 12, 2018, available at https://eiti.org/supporters/
countries.
16 EITI, Companies. Accessed August 12, 2018, available at https://eiti.org/supporters/companies.
17 EITI, EITI Standards 2016. Accessed on July 16, 2018, available at https://eiti.org/node/4922#r2-5.
18 EITI, EITI beneficial ownership requirements. Accessed on July 16, 2018, available at https://eiti.
org/beneficial-ownership.
19 Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (ACAMS), Ultimate beneficial 




of residence, and nature and extent of such beneficial ownership,” which 
are eventually to be placed on national registries accessible to regulators, 
entities that might need to undertake customer due diligence, and indi-
viduals who can prove a “legitimate interest” in requiring access to such 
information.20 Recent amendments to the directive further cover the dis-
closure of beneficial ownership of trusts21 in a private register available 
to tax regulators, law enforcement authorities and businesses subject to 
anti-money laundering rules.22
The directive covers natural person(s) who ultimately own or control 
the company through “direct or indirect ownership of more than 25 per-
cent”23 of the shares or voting rights or ownership interest, or through 
“control via other means”; or hold(s) the position of “senior managing 
official,” in the event that no other natural person is “identified (having 
exhausted all possible means and provided there are no grounds for sus-
picion) or if there is any doubt that the person so identified is the benefi-
cial owner.”24 
In the United States, in 2016 the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN), created the “fifth pillar” of the Anti-Money Laun-
dering/Bank Secrecy Act compliance, for customer due diligence pro-
grams, which incorporates new features requiring “covered financial 
institutions,” such as banks, credit unions, brokers or dealers in secu-
rities, mutual funds, futures, commission merchants and commodities 
brokers25 to collect and maintain data on beneficial owners, commenc-
ing in May 2018. Beneficial owner(s) are defined as “[e]ach individual, if 
20 Mardle, David & Cloake, Debbie. (2017, June 30) Navigating the new European regime for dis-
closure of beneficial ownership. Retrieved from https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx-
?g=ef7a3a89-91c6-48c6-bf27-880dcd8f1016.
21 Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amend-
ing Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes 
of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/
EU (Text with EEA relevance).
22 Lochner, Eric. Public registers expand EU third-party compliance risks, FCPA blog, (2018, April 4).
23 The 25% standard will most likely not be effective in disclosing ownership by politically com-
promised individuals or those attempting to evade taxes for the simple reason that 25% can still 
obviously hide significant ownership positions.
24 FCPA Blog.
25 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 187, September 28, 2017, available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/
default/files/federal_register_notices/2017-09-29/CDD_Technical_Amendement_17-20777.pdf.
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any, who owns, directly or indirectly, 25 percent or more of the equity 
interests of the legal entity customer (e.g., each natural person owning 
25 percent26 or more of the shares of a corporation)”; and “[a]n individ-
ual with significant responsibility for managing the legal entity cus-
tomer (e.g., a Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief 
Operating Officer, Managing Member, General Partner, President, Vice 
President, or Treasurer).”27
Additionally, the United States Senate held hearings in February 
2018 for a bill on beneficial ownership disclosures, which would direct 
states that receive funding under the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice 
Assistance Grant program to enact laws requiring entities that form 
corporations or limited liability companies to disclose their beneficial 
owners, the definition of which includes all natural persons who 
“directly or indirectly exercise substantial control over a corporation 
or LLC (limited liability company), through ownership interests, 
voting rights or agreements,” or “have substantial interest in or receive 
substantial economic benefits from assets” of such a corporation or 
limited liability company.28 
The case for disclosure 
Information on beneficial ownership results  
in an efficient and optimum allocation  
of licenses/concessions
Disclosure of beneficial ownership will help governments ascertain the 
financial capacity and technical expertise of oil, gas or mining companies 
prior to granting licenses/concessions, and will require parent companies 
of such companies to guarantee the financial and technical obligations 
26 The 25% standard will most likely not be effective in disclosing ownership by politically compro-
mised individuals or those attempting to evade taxes. 
27 Federal Register, September 2017. See also FinCen’s long-awaited final rule on collection of 
beneficial ownership information and customer due diligence, Proviti. Accessed on June 24, 





of oil, gas or mining companies under such licenses/concessions. The 
need to ensure adequate technical expertise and financial capacity can-
not be stressed enough, especially where the applicant company, in many 
cases, is a subsidiary or affiliate company with no independent financial 
and technical wherewithal. For instance, license allocation on the basis 
of inadequate information to an extractive company with insufficient 
funds or technical knowledge can lead to situations where communities 
and the environment are significantly compromised, particularly when 
the license holder does not have the financial resources or the technical 
capacity to avoid and/or mitigate adverse impacts on the environment, 
and undertake rehabilitation measures and compensate communities 
for such adverse impacts.29 As such, beneficial ownership disclosure can 
inform the government about the financial and technical capabilities of 
the applicant for a license and its beneficial owners, and given this infor-
mation, the government can require the beneficial owner to guarantee 
the technical and financial abilities of the applicant for the life of the proj-
ect, and during and after closure, as appropriate, especially in respect to 
environmental damage.30
Information on beneficial ownership  
can ensure accountability
Often developing countries in the nascent stages of establishing 
their natural resource industries and the regulations governing such 
29 Time, Gray. (2017, July 14). Who cleans up the mess when oil and mining companies go bank-
rupt? The Globe and Mail.
30 In the absence of a guarantee, the applicant company could easily become a shell company, 
namely a company without any assets, other than the right to exploit or develop a natural re-
source, as the profits of that company are regularly and normally distributed as dividends to the 
shareholders registered on the books of the company, with the consequence that that company 
does not have adequate or sufficient financial resources to meet its obligations. This is particu-
larly and often the case at the end of the life of a project, at which time the resource is almost 
depleted and the accumulated profits have all been distributed (and spent). Consequently, it 
is prudent for a state to require a guarantee from the owners of a company for such liabilities, 
especially for covering the cost of restoration of the exploited area to its original condition and 
ensuring that there are no lingering environmental costs.
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industries, are handicapped by weak institutions.31 Due to lack of 
proper training, civil servants often lack the requisite skills, tools and 
experience, to protect the country and its people from natural resource 
revenue leakages. An asymmetry of information32 emerges, where 
companies with access to resources can equip themselves with an 
abundance of valuable information in order to negotiate complicated 
energy deals, while governments, and particularly government offi-
cials, are unable to effectively counter-negotiate due to lack of access to 
such information. 
In addition, as mentioned earlier, extractive industries are associ-
ated with negative externalities, such as costs and damages arising from 
adverse impacts to the environment and surrounding communities, etc. 
Moreover, abandonment of extractive assets and/or inadequate imple-
mentation of mine closure activities by the license holder are not uncom-
mon,33 with the consequence that the state bears the costs of cleanup and 
rehabilitation.34 For example, submissions made by a civil society group 
to the relevant government ministry in Ontario, Canada noted that the 
taxpayers of Ontario bore the burden of clean-up costs of many active 
and abandoned mines, for which the financial assurances were inade-
quate.35 In other instances, governments have undertaken mitigation 
and/or rehabilitation measures, spending taxpayers’ money on clean-up 
activities, due to the absence of specific obligations on the extractive com-
panies, as in the case of the government of South Africa, which had to 
31 Totaro, Paola. (2017, June 28). Few resource-rich countries properly manage their natural re-
sources: report. Reuters.
32 Stiglitz, Joseph. E. (2000). The contributions of the economics of information to twentieth cen-
tury economics, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4). 
33 Ashton, S., Bausch, K., Bulman, A.M., Cunha, I.P., Liu, D., Pathmanathan, J., Pham, L., Ravi-
chandran, N., Srikrishnan, M., Tecson, C., Ueda, K., & Yi, R. (2015). Supervised by Radon, J. 
Mining in Peru: Benefiting from natural resources and preventing the resource curse, Capstone 
Workshop, Columbia University.
34 Superfunds in the United States were created pursuant to legislation in 1980 that allows the Unit-
ed States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to use public funds to clean up contaminated 
sites, such as abandoned or unmanaged mining sites. See EPA, “What is a superfund?” Accessed 
on August 11, 2018, available at https://www.epa.gov/superfund/what-superfund.
35 See Ontarians for a Just Accountable Mineral Strategy (OJAMS), Submission to the Ontario 




spend at least $6.6 billion on mine closures and associated clean-up activ-
ities for abandoned mines.36 
Knowledge of beneficial ownership better equips government officials 
with the tools needed to leverage their position in negotiating agree-
ments governing natural resources. Carefully and well drafted contrac-
tual frameworks can require license holders to provide security, financial 
guarantees or fully bonded rehabilitation programs to cover environ-
mental costs. However, license holders are invariably a subsidiary or an 
affiliate company of another company, and as such have a limited finan-
cial and technical capacity to perform such contractual obligations, if 
such obligations are in fact negotiated. In these circumstances, knowl-
edge of beneficial ownership of oil, gas and mining companies can give 
governments the opportunity to protect themselves and the public, by 
requiring that the beneficial owners provide guarantees to cover the costs 
of adverse impacts on the environment and communities, mine closure, 
decommissioning and abandonment, rehabilitation and/or clean-up 
costs of extractive industry sites.
Disclosure of beneficial ownership informs 
communities and facilitates the social  
license to operate
In addition to acquiring the legal license to operate, extractive companies 
are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain their investments and their 
projects without obtaining a social license to operate – i.e., the ongoing 
responsibility of a business or company to “ensure its activities respect the 
rights of all those in any community” in which it operates.37 Obtaining 
the social license to operate in the impacted/affected communities and 
communal buy-ins for an extractive project is crucial in order to oper-
ate the project sustainably. Ernst & Young, a global professional services 
firm, in 2015 identified the failure to secure a social license to operate as 
36 Vecchiatto, Paul (2015, August 19). South Africa cost for cleaning up old mines almost $6.6 bil-
lion, Bloomberg.
37 Morrison, John, (2014, September 29). Business and society: Defining the ‘social licence’, The 
Guardian. 
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the third most prevailing business risk faced by mining companies today, 
moving it up from fourth place in its previous assessment for the year 
2013–2014.38 
Increasingly in this regard, stakeholders, including communities, 
lenders, governments, civil society, and activist shareholders alike expect 
companies to adhere to the highest transparency standards, thus fos-
tering trust between the communities, governments and the company. 
Disclosure of beneficial ownership would therefore inform the local com-
munities and other stakeholders of the real owners of the extractive com-
pany, and facilitate the process of acquiring and maintaining the social 
license to operate. 
Disclosure of beneficial ownership also serves  
the interests of other constituencies
Beneficial ownership information not only serves the interests of a gov-
ernment or the public, but also companies, as such information can help 
identify questionable business partners and entities on the supply and 
value chain. Multinational companies understand the benefits of benefi-
cial ownership disclosures in terms of: reducing pressure points for cor-
ruption and unsound business relationships with domestic companies, 
and goods and service suppliers that create risk; upholding the principles 
of competition by creating a fair and transparent process of granting proj-
ect licenses; and creating transparency in terms of complete and accurate 
market information.39 Furthermore, private sector actors are increasingly 
aware and concerned about their association and partnership with ques-
tionable entities and politically exposed individuals, in relation to both 
legal and reputational risk. As such, beneficial ownership disclosure can 
only improve their due diligence efforts to reduce the risk of partnering 
with such entities and individuals.




39 The B Team. (2015, January 15). Ending anonymous companies: Tackling corruption and pro-




The issues discussed above are only some of the concerns that can be 
addressed and resolved by beneficial ownership disclosures. The bene-
fits can also be noticed in other circumstances, such as fund structures 
where knowledge of sponsors/beneficial owners can help alleviate the 
concerns of limited fund life, etc. At its core, disclosure of beneficial own-
ership provides information and permits better assessment of potential 
partners.
Mismanagement and corruption resulting from a lack of transpar-
ency have many manifestations, and can result in dire consequences 
for governments and citizens of resource rich countries.40 Transparency 
through disclosure of beneficial ownership and the resulting account-
ability have the potential to transform governance structures in the 
extractive industries. As discussed above, countries can significantly 
benefit from disclosure of beneficial ownership, as increased trans-
parency can help plug natural resource revenue leakages, and retain 
precious resources needed to invest in education, healthcare and infra-
structure. A shift in focus away from the issues relating to disclosure 
of beneficial ownership will, therefore, have particularly far-reaching 
impact on these countries. 
The outrage over the circumstances arising from lack of information 
on beneficial ownership has been growing, strengthening the demand for 
a viable solution to the problem, from various sectors.41 In the United 
States, for instance, the Secretary of State of Delaware has publicly given 
his support to the end of anonymous shell company formation in his 
state,42 pursuant to the Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act which 
has been introduced in the United States Congress. Even the Treasury 
Secretary of the United States, recently announced that legislative ini-
tiatives need to be made to “deter money laundering and financing of 
40 Reuters (2017).
41 Fuller, Clay. (2018, July 30). It’s long past time for Congress and the Treasury to step up their 
global anti-corruption efforts, American Enterprise Institute.
42 Secretary of State of Delaware. June 8, 2018, available at https://thefactcoalition.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/06/DE-June-2018-Letter-to-HFSC-on-BOT.pdf; Rubenfeld, Samuel (2018, June 25). 
Delaware backs overhaul of shell company rules, Wall Street Journal.
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terrorism through the use of shell companies” by finding an “efficient and 
prudent way” to access beneficial ownership information”.43
The case for less ambiguous definitions of 
beneficial ownership disclosures
Beneficial ownership definitions should broadly consist of the following: 
 All natural persons who, directly or indirectly, ultimately own or 
control the license holder/extractive company.
 Details on name, nationality, location/address, personal identifica-
tion number, and other identifying markers and information for 
the abovementioned beneficial owners.
 Currently different formulations of what constitutes “beneficial 
ownership” exist with the shareholding thresholds set at 25 percent 
and above, which is worrying as a 25 percent shareholding thresh-
old allows companies attempting to hide questionable owners to 
circumvent the disclosure requirement by simply adopting struc-
tures that would keep the shareholding below this threshold. While 
the urge to simplify the definition for ease of compliance cannot 
be denied, it is important to ensure that we do not succumb to the 
trap of oversimplification. The definition of ‘beneficial ownership’ 
should achieve its ultimate aim at all times: procuring information 
on all natural person(s) who ultimately own or control the extractive 
company. 
 Different standards should be applicable to private and publicly 
listed companies:
 o  With respect to private companies: All natural persons that 
own or control (either directly or indirectly) any share or equity 
interest in the extractive company should be disclosed as bene-
ficial owners. Given that a private company by nature will have 




limited shareholders, disclosing information on all its sharehold-
ers is not an onerous requirement. 
 o  With respect to publicly listed companies whose shares are 
listed on recognized international stock exchanges, and domes-
tic companies that are listed on domestic stock exchanges (that 
are not internationally recognized): All natural persons that 
own or control, either directly or indirectly, 5 percent44 or more 
of the shares or equity interest in the extractive company should 
be disclosed as beneficial owners. 
 Ownership can be through shares or equity interest or in any other 
number of diverse manners, including contractual rights, voting 
arrangements, convertible stock, proxies, etc. 
 Ownership and control can be exercised individually or together 
with any corporate or other legal entity(ies) and/or natural per-
son(s) who act in consort. 
 “Control” triggers for disclosure include:
 o The right (directly or indirectly) to: 
 Appoint a majority of the directors of any of the companies in the 
entire corporate chain that have a relationship to the license holder, 
and/or 
 Control the management or policy decisions of any of the compa-
nies in the entire corporate chain that have a relationship to the 
license holder. 
 o De facto and de jure control. 
The case for public registries 
Efforts are being made to develop and institute national beneficial 
ownership registries. According to a publication by the Law Library of 
the United States Congress, information on corporate registration and 
44 In the United States, when “a person or group of persons acquires beneficial ownership of more 
than 5% of a voting class of a company’s equity securities, registered under Section 12 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,” such person or group of persons are required to file a Schedule 
13D with the SEC. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Fast Answers, accessed August 
14, 2018, available at https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerssched13htm.html.
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beneficial owners is collected by business registrars in countries such 
as Afghanistan, Argentina, India, Sweden, and the United Kingdom;45 
national tax authorities in Brazil; securities regulators in Australia and 
Pakistan; securities exchanges such as in South Africa; central banks 
as in Armenia and Costa Rica;46 or as required by the new amendment 
to the EU directive, a designated publicly available central registry in 
EU member states.47 Moreover, recently there has been discussion of 
a worldwide registry48 to facilitate efficient and swift access to infor-
mation on beneficial owners, specifically in regard to criminal inves-
tigations by tax and enforcement agencies in different jurisdictions. In 
fact the private sector and its advisors are currently trying to address 
the issue of collecting necessary information to identify beneficial own-
ers. For instance, financial institutions face the challenge of not having 
the knowledge and know-how to investigate layered and complicated 
shareholding structures across various jurisdictions, to identity ques-
tionable legal entities and exposed political individuals.49 Worldwide 
registries would help both private sector actors and governments alike 
to access information that could help the former comply with beneficial 
ownership disclosure requirements, and the latter with investigating 
potential financial crimes such as money laundering, corruption and 
tax evasion.
45 As of May 1, 2018, the parliament of the United Kingdom “voted to accept an amendment to the 
sanctions and anti-money laundering bill” that requires the United Kingdom’s overseas territo-
ries, which include Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, 
Gibraltar, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands, “to publish public registers of company 
ownership by the end of 2020.” See EITI, UK’s overseas territories to have beneficial ownership 
registers. Accessed on August 14, 2018, available at https://eiti.org/news/uks-overseas-territo-
ries-to-have-beneficial-ownership-registers.
46 The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center, Disclosure of beneficial ownership 
in selected countries, (2017, July). 
47 Lochner, Eric (2018, April 4). Public registers expand EU third-party compliance risks, FCPA 
blog.
48 Stiglitz & Pieth. (2016).
49 Chrusciel, Grzegorz (2016). Identifying the ultimate beneficial owner (UBO): The challenge of 
finding the needle in the haystack, Thomson Reuters.
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The case for reformed policy on service providers
The disclosures of 214,000 shell companies through the infamous Panama 
Papers illuminated the growing concern over the role of service providers 
in creating shell companies as part of complex ownership structures, to 
help many questionable beneficial owners hold assets without much reg-
ulatory tax oversight.50 Service providers, such as the law firm of Mossack 
Fonseca, were exposed as the facilitators of lost natural resource reve-
nues, bringing to light their decades long offshore financial services busi-
ness in the off-shore center of Panama, for example the “externalization 
of billions of dollars”51 of mining revenue from the DRC. As such, regu-
lations overseeing all service providers to the extractive industries should 
require that such providers are independent, and certify the correctness 
of the identification of all the true owners and the absence of all conflicts 
of interest. Further, such service providers should submit to the jurisdic-
tion in which their services to their client have an impact. For instance, 
if non-U.S. service providers provide services that have an impact in the 
United States, resulting in tax evasion or money laundering, which can be 
a conduit for the financing of terrorism, then these service providers must 
subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the United States. Such juris-
diction can be established through bilateral agreements, such as double 
taxation treaties and investment agreements that countries enter into.52 
The case for creating an environment of 
transparency and fair business practices
Governments, particularly those of developing countries rich in natural 
resources, must realize that transparency and accountability is a two-way 
50 Koren, Marina (2016, April 3). What are the Panama Papers? The Atlantic. Retrieved from http://
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/what-are-the-panama-papers/476658/. See 
also Stiglitz, Joseph E. & Pieth, Mark (2016, September 29). The real scandal behind the Pana-
ma Papers, Vanity Fair. Retrieved from http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/09/the-real-scan-
dal-behind-the-panama-papers.
51 Panama Papers unravel DRC mining concession deals, ANCIR. Retrieved from https://panama-
papers.investigativecenters.org/drc-copper-mining. 
52 This article focuses on ownership structures of companies, but trusts, by the nature of their legal 
characteristics, can create opportunities for politically exposed and compromised individuals, 
and as such the beneficial ownership disclosure of trusts needs to be handled separately and 
distinctly.
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street. If governments wish to curb the loss of natural resource revenues 
by requiring and using beneficial ownership disclosures to vet dubious 
applicant companies, then they must also inspire confidence amongst 
private sector companies and their lenders that governments are commit-
ted to transparency and fair business practices. Companies and foreign 
investors too are concerned about their reputation and their relationship 
with dubious and politically connected companies, locally in host coun-
tries where they operate. Often companies will enter joint ventures with 
local companies or enter contracts with local service providers (such as 
contractors and sub-contractors) due to cost efficiency, convenience or 
local content/service procurement requirements in host country regula-
tions or contractual obligations. As such while investing companies are 
responsible for conducting due diligence on local partners, third-party 
vendors or service providers, it is equally imperative that governments 
of developing countries rich in natural resources take all steps possi-
ble to curb the formation of sham companies with dubious ownership 
structures operating within their jurisdictions. This requires host gov-
ernments not only to prosecute politically connected individuals from 
within their ranks, who hide their ownership of sham companies with 
the intent to evade or avoid taxes, launder money or finance terrorism, 
but also to provide certification of the true ownership of local companies 
that investors in the oil, gas and mining industries might partner or enter 
into contracts with. Showing a strong commitment to allowing only the 
incorporation of legitimate companies, creates a better environment for 
business and attracts investors, since they will have greater confidence 
that their reputational and even legal risks decrease once they invest in 
the country. 
Conclusion
Transparency through disclosure of beneficial ownership and the result-
ing accountability have the potential to transform governance structures 
in the extractive industries. As discussed above, countries can signifi-
cantly benefit from disclosure of beneficial ownership, as increased 
transparency can help plug natural resource revenue leakages, and retain 
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precious resources required to invest in education, healthcare and infra-
structure. Mismanagement and corruption resulting from lack of trans-
parency have many consequences, most costly of which are loss of natural 
resource revenue, and damage to the environment and communities. 
Beneficial ownership disclosure is one of the easiest and most efficient 
ways of preventing loss of natural resource revenue, as companies can 
easily ascertain and disclose their owners, and allow governments and 
government officials to accurately map the potential money trail of natu-
ral resource revenue. 
Admittedly, dedicated government officials of emerging nations are 
often reluctant to impose conditions on natural resource companies, and 
which industry considers burdensome, non-competitive or adverse to 
their interests. This leads to officials fearing that industry will simply not 
invest, especially if other nations do not have similar requirements. At 
the same time, government officials are also hesitant to impose benefi-
cial ownership disclosure rules because of the fear of highly placed cor-
rupt officials, who stand to enrich themselves personally through opaque 
ownership structures in companies involved in the natural resource sec-
tor, leading to natural resource revenue loss for their own country.
The natural resource industry functions like the real estate industry, 
where location carries a premium and is the prime factor in corporate 
decision making. Natural resource development follows the simple rule 
of real estate development, which is location, location, location. If a state 
has an exploitable and profitable quantity of natural resources, especially 
if there are low security risks in that state, companies will come. As such 
a state can require disclosure of beneficial ownership information, since 
the existence of the natural resource will remain the magnet that attracts 
the industry.53 On the other hand, the private sector should not fear dis-
closure as it also benefits industry. Transparency promotes fair business 
practices, and alerts companies to dubious business parties that might 
want to partner with them. Additionally, financial institutions needing to 
comply with regulations on beneficial ownership of account holders, can 
53 Radon, Jenik & Ravichandran, Nandini. The ‘business’ of extractives: My resources, my rules, Na-
mibian. Retrieved July 8, 2015 at https://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=139106&page=ar-
chive-read.
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be further assisted by the increasing effort of the international commu-
nity to set up platforms for disclosing information in publicly available 
registries. Furthermore, lenders who are concerned about the types of 
companies they provide with project financing or project loans, will also 
benefit from beneficial ownership disclosure.
Given that both the public and the private sector benefit from the 
transparency that ensues through beneficial ownership disclosure, it is 
prudent that it gains the much-needed traction necessary to make it a 
common feature of natural resource projects, instead of merely a volun-
tary exercise in disclosure. Disclosure of beneficial ownership promises 
to be a win-win for all.
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Abstract: An increasingly opaque global economy demands new forms of collabora-
tion for journalists and civil society actors protecting democracy and the rule of law. 
Countries and jurisdictions have developed a deeply intertwined network of finan-
cial services and a social, political and physical infrastructure enabling regulatory 
evasion, tax avoidance, and eradicating accountability in business operations. Whis-
tleblowers have in recent years made a solid impact on new discussions of the role of 
the tax haven complex in the global economy. Collaboration with whistleblowers is a 
strategy that journalists and civil society have utilized to overcome the challenges of 
investigating big players in the economy. This collaboration calls upon parliaments 
to update their legislation affecting collaborative investigative journalism. This article 
examines discussions on whistleblower protection in both the EU and Norway in 
light of the Lux Leaks whistleblower-journalist collaboration, and the internal whis-
tleblower in the Telenor/VimpelCom corruption case. Attention is also drawn to the 
increase in international collaboration among investigative journalists.
Keywords: investigative journalism, tax havens, regulatory evasion, whistleblowing, 
whistleblower protection
Introduction
Quality journalism can amplify popular opinion, improve the depth and 
range of political decision-making and discipline abuse of power. These 
are among the positive externalities of high-grade journalism (Møen, 
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cited in Allern & Pollack, 2018). On the other hand, Allern and Pollack 
emphasize the fact that the lack of investigative journalism and the suc-
cess of superficial, sensationalized journalism make it easier to cover up 
malpractice and crime in economic and political life (Allern & Pollack, 
2018, p. 3). In economic terms, Hamilton argues that one dollar invested 
in an investigative story can generate hundreds of dollars in social bene-
fits (Hamilton, 2016a).
Collaborative investigation into the black boxes of the global eco-
nomy is now more relevant than ever in light of the string of recent 
tax haven revelations (ICIJ, 2014; ICIJ, 2015; ICIJ, 2016; ICIJ, 2017; ICIJ, 
2018). This article analyzes two such cases to demonstrate the chal-
lenges faced by journalists and civil society actors who investigate the 
global economy. I will argue that these case analyses highlight the 
development of an opaque global economy thus demanding new forms 
of collaboration, which in turn calls for parliaments to update legisla-
tion affecting collaborative investigative journalism. An examination 
of the background, boundaries and the possible effects of current leg-
islation on whistleblower protections is presented in the second part of 
this article.
The first case is the so-called Lux Leaks case. It revealed how consul-
tancy firms negotiated tax avoidance agreements with the Luxembourg 
authorities on behalf of transnational corporations. The second case is 
the Telenor/VimpelCom corruption scandal. It revealed how complex 
company structures make it nearly impossible to impose accountability 
on a state-owned company when corruption connected to a major invest-
ment is taking place.
First, both cases offer valuable insights on the different types of col-
laboration needed to reveal the workings of the global economy. Second, 
both cases showcase the potential value of whistleblowers, when taken 
into consideration. Finally, both cases shed light on the ongoing debate 
on blowing the whistle inside an organization or to the authorities versus 
whistleblowing to journalists or civil society actors.
As we will see, increasingly complex ownership structures, regula-
tory evasion, use of secrecy jurisdictions and a global division of labor 
in the finance industry are main components of the global economy. 
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Investigating within this context is a fastidious task, and new forms of 
collaboration are needed.
The analyses in this article set out to answer two questions import-
ant to anyone wanting to understand investigative journalism within the 
global economy. What kind of cooperation can be used as a response to 
tax haven development in the global economy? Given the value to democ-
racy of high-quality investigative journalism, how can parliaments facil-
itate the safe environment needed for collaboration among investigative 
journalists?
As shown later in this article, the infrastructure and financial innova-
tions of the global economy create an opaqueness different from old time 
secrecy. While transparency is often put forward as the ultimate goal of 
any policy attempting to strengthen the rules of the global economy and 
“ending the era of tax secrecy”, as UK Prime Minister David Cameron 
said three years before being exposed in the Panama Papers (Gov.uk, 
2013; Boot, Whatt & Pegg, 2016), I will argue that transparency is not 
always sufficient. If the ownership structures and financial instruments 
introduced below were available in a register, which journalists would 
have the capacity, knowledge and time to understand them?
Before analyzing the specific cases and answering the questions con-
cerning journalist collaboration and whistleblower protection, a review 
of the work being done in corporate law, organizational management, 
economics and civil society research is needed to understand the issues. 
This will help break down the main features of the global economy and 
reveal the forces in play. Knowledge about the infrastructure and the 
actors serves as a background, delineating an important component of 
the reality to which journalists, civil society and lawmakers must be 
connected.
Litterature review 
The tax haven complex
Jurisdictions and states defined as tax havens have established structures 
and regulations enabling corporations, organizations and individuals to 
hide the traces of both legal and criminal activity. Once a company is 
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registered in a tax haven, illegal amenities become more available. The 
structure of tax havens is a driver of corruption, as Moene and Søreide 
say. Opaque corporate structures make it lucrative for owners to make 
use of well-functioning capital markets, and at the same time hide illegal 
activity or activity that is damaging to the corporation’s name (Moene & 
Søreide, 2015).
The classification of a country as a tax haven or not a tax haven is 
rarely fruitful. Countries falling within a definition of tax havens, as well 
as those that do not, may offer a whole array of financial services that 
make it difficult for journalists and civil society to investigate ownership 
or financial matters. This is why Tax Justice Network has developed the 
Financial Secrecy Index (FSI), ranking countries based on type of tax 
regime, regulations and financial services on offer to non-nationals, and 
the size of their financial sector (FSI, 2018). Financial centers can be gov-
erned both nationally and locally. While the UK is not considered a tax 
haven, the City of London district is described as “the spider in the web 
of tax havens” (Oswald, 2017).
However, if one was to define a pure example of a tax haven, some main 
features could be identified. First and foremost, the jurisdictions offer dif-
ferent tax regimes to non-residents and residents. This twofold tax regime is 
a so-called ringfencing of the tax regime (Ringstad, 2017). Furthermore, the 
jurisdictions offer simple, quick and flexible rules with little supervision or 
control, often in combination with low or no taxes. One last main feature is 
the use of so-called straw owners. This is a method of hiding the ownership 
of a company, fund or bank account. A person is paid to be registered as the 
owner of a company he or she de facto is not involved in. A shell company is 
a company with no employees, created to obscure the ownership of another 
company. Anonymity for beneficial owners is the most important service 
offered in the tax haven complex (see Sharman, 2010). Secrecy jurisdictions 
is the preferred term used by the Tax Justice Network.
As shown in emails leaked by the whistleblower behind the Panama 
Papers, the law firm Mossack Fonseca singlehandedly created 123 shell 
companies in Nevada so that a friend of the former president of Argen-
tina could steal millions of dollars from government contracts (Hamil-
ton, 2016b).
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Different jurisdictions specialize in different markets. Garcia-Ber-
nardo, Fichtner, Takes and Heemskerk (2017) found both geographical 
and sectoral specialization in offshore financial centers of all sizes. Geo-
graphically, the financial centers in developed countries in Europe and 
Asia have well established connections to a separate set of smaller off-
shore financial centers. Sectoral specialization can be seen in how dif-
ferent countries offer different organizational structures and services to 
industries such as oil, computer manufacturing or shipping. More than 
60 percent of the bank accounts in Switzerland are established through a 
shell company. Gabriel Zucman observes that the different jurisdictions 
do not compete with one another, but use different yet deeply intertwined 
strategies (Zucman, 2017).
Tax evasion is often the main purpose of organizing a part of the com-
pany structure in a secrecy jurisdiction. However, regulatory evasion is a 
more apt term for what happens in these places. Organizational structures 
evolve into a network of different judicial units and judicial contracts, 
which in sum become tools for regulatory evasion (Anker Sørensen, 2016). 
Dating back to the 1980s the diminishing accountability of transnational 
corporations has been called “one of the great unsolved problems of mod-
ern company law” (Schmitthoff, 1982 in Anker Sørensen, 2016, p. 158).
The theoretical and political limitations of defining a country or juris-
diction as a tax haven (or not a tax haven) show that it might make more 
sense to consider a tax haven complex. Here, ‘complex’ is understood as 
a whole structure consisting of interconnected or related structures. The 
interconnectedness and specialization existing in the tax haven complex 
could be exemplified through the distinction made by Garcia-Bernardo 
et al. between sink and conduit offshore financial centers (OFCs). Sink 
OFCs are jurisdictions that draw in and retain foreign capital. Con-
duit OFCs are attractive intermediate destinations channeling the flow 
of capital. These include developed countries with the right regulatory 
infrastructure in place. The Netherlands, Ireland, Singapore, the UK and 
Switzerland channel the majority of offshore corporate investment glob-
ally (Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2017).
In this sense, while not being defined as a tax haven based on strict crite-
ria, a country like the Netherlands arguably constitutes an important part 
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of the whole complex. The Netherlands is the largest host of shell compa-
nies globally, and is an important jurisdiction for corporate profit shifting 
based on internal debt and different income deductions. This attracts cap-
ital flows ranging from tax-financed, private Norwegian health companies 
to Vietnamese oil revenues (PWYP, 2011; Herning, 2016).
For companies and individuals to exploit the possibilities existing in the 
tax haven complex, they need help. Herein enters the industry that builds, 
maintains and manages transnational corporations’ tax haven subsidiary 
networks (Jones, Temouriac & Cobhamb, 2018). How do they contribute to 
the global structures investigated by journalists and researchers?
Consultancy firms creating the infrastructure
Audit firms and consultancy agencies offer mainly two services for their 
clients, claim Fjeldstad, Jacobsen, Ringstad and Ngowi (2018). First, they 
make sure that the current accounts are correct. One job could be to 
make sure that all internal trading in a company is in line with regula-
tions. Tax planning is offered inside this framework. Second, they audit 
finished accounts. The demand for these services is increasing, and four 
companies dominate this industry. The Big Four are: Pricewaterhouse- 
Coopers (PwC), Ernst & Young, Deloitte, and KPMG (Fjeldstad et al., 
2018; Jones et al., 2018).
Jones et al. reveal a correlation between corporations’ use of the Big 
Four and tax avoidance. Transnational corporations that are audited by 
the Big Four accountancy firms are more likely to have a larger tax haven 
subsidiary network compared to those corporations that do not use the 
Big Four to audit their accounts. The study also shows that the growth 
rate of a corporation’s tax haven network is enhanced via the use of a Big 
Four firm (Jones et al., 2018).
For the purpose of this article, I will concentrate on two features of 
the tax haven complex. The first has to do with pure regulatory evasion, 
specifically, how consultancy agencies make agreements with a country 
to avoid taxes in this country or other countries. The second is how tax 
haven infrastructures facilitate corruption by concealing identity and 
ownership.
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Despite an increasingly opaque global economy, several international 
journalism projects have succeeded in reporting excellent, accessible 
and engaging stories about company structures, regulatory avoidance 
and business operations that harm the public interest and challenge 
democracy.
Before the analyses of two examples of such journalistic work, an expla-
nation of the choice of cases and other methodological reflections are 
needed. Why are the Lux Leaks and Telenor/VimpelCom cases import-
ant years after their closure? What elements do they contribute to the 
discussion of investigative journalism, whistleblower protection and jour-
nalist-whistleblower collaboration, and perhaps also to democracy in a 
broader sense?
Collaboration in investigating the global 
economy: Methodological reflections
To assess the status of whistleblower protection and the conditions for 
journalistic collaboration both with and without whistleblowers, I have 
analyzed the Lux Leaks scandal of 2014 and the Telenor/VimpelCom cor-
ruption case, which ended in 2016.
Here, whistleblowing is understood as “the act of telling the authori-
ties or the public that the organization you work for is doing something 
immoral or illegal” (Collins Dictionary cited by Ottosen, 2018).
The reasons for analyzing the two cases are threefold. First, they 
demonstrate the different types of collaboration needed to latch onto 
the global economy. Whistleblower collaboration is showcased in the 
Lux Leaks investigation. International collaboration among investigative 
journalists is displayed in the Telenor/VimpelCom case.
Second, the two cases demonstrate how different actors can follow dif-
ferent routes when they receive notifications from a whistleblower. The 
Lux Leaks case shows the bumpy yet targeted road of whistleblower-jour-
nalist collaboration. Beyond communication and safety issues, employer 
retaliation and judicial struggles, the collaboration exposed, for the 
first time on a global scale, how Luxembourg works as a tax haven in 
the middle of Europe (ICIJ, 2014). Meanwhile, the Telenor/VimpelCom 
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case shows how a whistleblower had been effectively sidelined for years 
when information on the issue was finally called for in the public debate, 
both in the ongoing investigation in the media and in public hearings in 
parliament.
Third and most importantly for this analysis, the two cases highlight 
the need for improved whistleblower protection. An important element 
in the debate on whistleblower protection is to what degree collaboration 
between journalists and whistleblowers is acknowledged and inscribed 
into legislation. Whistleblowing to journalists or to civil society is often 
contrasted with internal recipients of whistleblower reports addressed 
to an employer, either private or public (EU, 2018; NOU, 2018; Loyens 
& Vandekerckhove, 2018). As we will see, the two cases offer insights 
into the processes and outcomes produced by the choice of different 
whistleblower recipients.
I conducted one interview by email with the each of the two known 
sources of Lux Leaks, Antoine Deltour and Raphaël Halet. Bernard Ben-
oit has produced a brilliant documentary film on Halet referred to in this 
article, offering useful perspectives on the details of the case. One POLIT-
ICO interview with Raphaël Halet also provided details to the string of 
events relevant to the Lux Leaks case.
To gain an insight into the Telenor/VimpelCom case, I have studied the 
two parliamentary hearings of the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and 
Constitutional Affairs. A journalist at that time in the Norwegian daily 
Klassekampen, Emilie Ekeberg contributed to finalizing the investigation 
on Norwegian and Swedish corruption in Uzbekistan in 2014–2015. She 
wrote a method report to the Norwegian investigative journalist institute 
SKUP that provides a comprehensive understanding of the Telenor/Vim-
pelCom case and of journalistic collaboration and investigation in gen-
eral. I conducted one telephone interview with Ekeberg to retrieve more 
details from the investigative work. Moreover, the work of Gottschalk 
(2018) and Allern and Pollack (2018) offer the necessary recap of the Tele-
nor/VimpelCom case, along with the articles printed in Dagens Næring-
sliv in 2012 and Klassekampen in the autumn of 2014.
Finally, I made an explorative discursive analysis of a set of public doc-
uments on whistleblower protection. To explore the context and detect 
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the core of the wider societal debate in the EU, I rely on declarations 
in the EU Parliament and in the legislative background paper for new 
whistleblower protection presented by the EU Commission. The sum-
mary of the Lux Leaks Court of Appeals Judgment on Antoine Deltour, 
Raphaël Halet and journalist Eduard Perrin of March 2017 also adds 
valuable material to the debate on whistleblower protection.
To understand the Norwegian context in relation to the debate on 
and legislative development of whistleblower protections, I have analy-
zed the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs’ Official Norwegian 
Report (NOU) on whistleblower protection published in the spring of 
2018. The NOU is the background for a new whistleblower act and a 
whistleblower ombudsman. Reflections on the legislative background 
work for earlier whistleblower protection in the Working Environment 
Act are also needed for proper consideration of whistleblower protec-
tion in Norway.
The range of parliamentary output highlights the development of new 
whistleblower protections, and offers insights into the debates and prio-
rities as the process matures. As we will see, the analyses of the legisla-
tive background work in the EU Commission, the EU parliament and 
the Norwegian parliament feed into the response to the Lux Leaks whis-
tleblowers and the parliamentary hearings on the Telenor/VimpelCom 
case, and vice versa.
To break down the elements of the problem at hand, I will start by pre-
senting the Lux Leaks case.
Tax planning in Luxembourg
Luxembourg is developing into a central component of the tax haven 
complex. The finance industry comprises 40 percent of the economy of 
the small duchy and has specialized in tax agreements with corporations 
and investment funds (Zucman, 2017).
In 2011 the former PwC employee Antoine Deltour leaked informa-
tion on secret tax agreements between transnational companies and 
Luxembourg authorities to the French investigative journalist Eduard 
Perrin. The material was first presented on French TV in 2012, before 
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it was handed over to the international journalist network the Interna-
tional Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). Their network of 
publishing houses released stories on the Luxembourg tax agreements 
on a larger scale. In total, the leak exposed 548 different tax agree-
ments made between transnational corporations and Luxembourg 
from 2002 to 2010. All the Big Four consultancy firms were involved. 
The companies involved were the partly state-owned Norwegian 
Bank (DnB), along with Pepsi, IKEA, Apple, Amazon and many more 
(ICIJ, 2014).
Lux Leaks was the second revelation of the tax haven complex from the 
ICIJ, which started with the Offshore Leaks of 2013. This streak of revela-
tions has arguably changed the political climate on the issue of tax havens 
(Oxfam 2016). Lux Leaks preceded the Swiss Leaks (2015), the Panama 
Papers (2016), and the Paradise Papers (2017–18).
Raphaël Halet was the second identified whistleblower provoking the 
Lux Leaks scandal. Like Deltour he worked for PwC.
In June 2016 Antoine Deltour was sentenced to 12 months of condi-
tional prison and a 1500 euro fine. Raphaël Halet received nine months 
conditional prison and a 1000 euro fine for his leak. The journalist Eduard 
Perrin was exonerated. Neither Deltour nor Halet was acknowledged as 
a whistleblower, which at the time was a huge setback for whistleblowing 
and investigative journalism according to Tax Justice Network (Furuly 
2017). An appeal reduced the penalties for Deltour and Halet before a 
final appeal to the Supreme Court in Luxembourg acquitted Deltour and 
Halet of all claims. The Supreme Court acknowledged Deltour as a whis-
tleblower. Halet’s penalty was reduced and only the fine remained. Halet 
was not acknowledged as a whistleblower.
To understand the background for court decisions like the one on the 
whistleblowers Deltour and Halet, we need to review the literature.
Whistleblowing
Thanks to whistleblowers, many white-collar criminals have been 
exposed. While the police only account for two percent of the revela-
tions of white-collar crime, Petter Gottschalk affirms that 101 out of 405 
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convicted white-collar criminals were exposed by journalists through 
the work of a whistleblower (Gottschalk, 2018). A background paper 
of the NOU concludes that the indirect benefit of whistleblowing is 
expected to be considerable, also from a socioeconomic perspective 
(Oslo Economics, 2018).
Therefore, whistleblowers are protected by law. But at what point is a 
person acknowledged to be a whistleblower?
In Norway whistleblower protection has been enshrined in the Work-
ing Environment Act. As we will see, the parliamentary report published 
in the spring of 2018 suggests changes. Still, the criteria found in the 
Working Environment Act represent the foundation of any future whis-
tleblower protection in Norway.
This protection has two criteria. First, the notification must be about 
“censurable conditions”. Second, the employee shall “proceed responsi-
bly”. The employer has the burden of proof that a notification has been 
made in breach of these criteria.
There is an ongoing discussion about who should be the receiver of 
a whistleblower alert. Gottschalk points out four criteria from the liter-
ature. The recipient must have enough knowledge about the subject to 
understand the substance of the notification; the recipient must corro-
borate or disprove the alert with other sources; the recipient must have 
knowledge of the nature and motives of white-collar crime; and the recip-
ient must have experience with investigation.
The Norwegian Working Environment Act strongly emphasizes inter-
nal notification, due to the wording of “responsible” notification. The idea 
is that if you notify the organization where the misdeed was done, the 
organization has the ability and power to put an end to the censurable 
conditions. The Act mentions public authorities as a second option. The 
media are only acknowledged as a legitimate recipient of a notification if 
internal notification is tried first, or if the whistleblower has reasonable 
grounds to believe that internal whistleblowing will harm the case, such 
as fear of the destruction of evidence.
Gottschalk highlights the expectation that the whistleblower do the 
whistleblowing internally at first. As we will see, this is a fundamental 
question in whistleblower protection.
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Internal and external whistleblowing
Lux Leaks
When Antoine Deltour was acknowledged as a whistleblower by the Lux-
embourg Supreme Court, the court referred to six criteria from Article 
10 of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). There is no defi-
nition of a whistleblower in the ECtHR, but a judgement summary from 
Vandendriessche states that ECtHR jurisprudence does “protect persons 
denouncing apparent or hidden facts, which are of general interest and 
which are contrary to law, ethics or the public interest” (Vandendriessche, 
2017, p. 16). Illegality is not a precondition for blowing the whistle, accord-
ing to Vandendriessche. Severe dysfunctions can also be denounced.
The six conditions assumed by the Supreme Court were: (i) the com-
municated information represented a real public interest; (ii) the infor-
mation was authentic (exact and believable); (iii) communication to the 
public was a means of last resort; (iv) the importance that the public 
receive the information outweighed the damage caused to the employer 
by the revelation; (v) the whistleblower acted in good faith; and vi) the 
intervention was proportionate, meaning that the same revelations could 
not be made by a smaller leak.
Raphaël Halet did not fulfill the fourth condition, as he did not present 
any new information in addition to the leak already made by Antoine 
Deltour.
The Luxembourg Supreme Court spends surprisingly little time dis-
cussing criteria (iii), weather Deltour or Halet should have notified inter-
nally or to the authorities instead of to a journalist. A look at the Raphaël 
Halet case as it happened offers valuable insights as we proceed into the 
discussion of new legislation on whistleblower protection in Norway and 
the EU.
As a clerk working at the bottom of the hierarchy in PwC, Halet 
himself said that he was working “like a worker on an assembly line”, 
where you work on small pieces of a bigger whole you never see your-
self (Bringer, 2016, my translation). The investigative story presented on 
French TV changed Halet’s perception of his job, since the TV report 
showed a reflection of the global economy in his daily tasks. Halet leaked 
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to the journalist a range of “tax rulings”, i.e. agreements on how compa-
nies registered in Luxembourg would be taxed in the future. The organi-
zational structure coupled with political will allowed the companies to 
shift their profits to Luxembourg, where they had no production.
The whistleblower shared the documents on unencrypted platforms. 
This led to PwC exposing Halet’s leak by means of tracking software. 
Subsequently PwC forced Halet into a confidentiality agreement. PwC 
cooperated with the French police and retrieved information from Halet 
using the most questionable methods involving Halet’s family, described 
elsewhere (Bringer, 2016; Marks, 2016). Deltour and Perrin used encryp-
tion tools (Deltour, 2018).
Whistleblower collaboration can indeed suffer from a lack of resources 
in digital communication. On the other hand, besides technical skills 
in its use of tracking software, the employer also received judicial sup-
port. PwC obtained a search warrant from the Metz courthouse, quoted 
by journalist Benoit Bringer as giving PwC permission to “take copies 
of received and sent email, including all emails or attachments sent or 
received from a journalist”. Article 2 in the French press Freedom Act 
deems all actions aimed at exposing journalistic sources an indirect 
attack on source protection and are illegal (Bringer, 2016). This did not 
prevent the judge from providing the ad hoc search warrant, seriously 
challenging the fundamental right of source protection.
The PwC scandal was already known to the public, and PwC was in the 
process of taking on whistleblower Deltour and journalist Perrin in court. 
During the trial Halet took sides with PwC, and said that he worked as 
an accomplice for PwC to get information from Perrin. Two years passed 
before Halet would break the confidentiality agreement, speak the truth 
alongside Deltour, and win in court.
The ruthless response of the employer adds weight to both Halet’s and 
Deltour’s judgement faced with a whistleblower’s dilemma. How does one 
proceed to make an impact and maintain personal safety?
For Halet it was never an option to blow the whistle inside the orga-
nization. “There was no committee, no procedure, no contact person” 
(Halet, 2018). Deltour points out that tax avoidance is a part of the busi-
ness model of the Big Four. “It is not possible to blow the whistle if [the 
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notification is] against the normal activity of the company,” says Deltour 
(Deltour, 2018). He says that PwC has channels for dealing with harass-
ment and other types of discrimination issues, but not unethical business 
behavior.
Surveys done in the EU show that 49 percent of respondents did not 
know where to report corruption if they encountered it (Special Euro-
barometer on Corruption, 2017). Only 15 percent knew there were laws 
protecting whistleblowers in their country.
One employee knowing very well how to blow the whistle by the book 
was the whistleblower in the Telenor/VimpelCom corruption scandal. He 
also came to realize the limitations of such an approach.
Telenor/VimpelCom
The unveiling of the Telenor/VimpelCom corruption scandal is the sec-
ond case I will discuss here. The Norwegian state owns 54 percent of Tele-
nor shares through the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Regjeringen.no). 
At the time of the revelations, Telenor owned 43 percent of the shares in 
VimpelCom (Ekeberg & Tallaksen, 2015).
Dating back to 2011, Swedish and Norwegian journalists had done thor-
ough investigations on corruption involving the operations of each of the 
national telecom companies Telia and Telenor in Uzbekistan. Both the 
collaborative work of journalists and the reception of the whistleblower 
in Norway are of interest here.
The collaboration ranged from building on existing stories, to sharing 
material and personal on-site teamwork. The Norwegian daily Dagens 
Næringsliv picked up on the investigations done by Swedish Television 
(STV) into the national telecom company Telia in 2011, and ran a series of 
stories on the Telenor subsidiary VimpelCom (DN, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c). 
The first report showed how VimpelCom was used as a tool to prosecute 
opposition in Uzbekistan (Kibar & Eriksen, 2012). Two years later the 
Norwegian daily Klassekampen followed up and managed to shed light 
on systematic corruption practices in Telenor’s investments in Uzbeki-
stan (Ekeberg, 2014; Ekeberg & Tallaksen, 2014; Ekeberg, Tallaksen & 
Lysberg, 2014). Klassekampen also showed that Telenor executives and 
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Telenor’s representatives on the VimpelCom board should have known 
about the corrupt payments (Ekeberg, 2015).
The investigative work done by Klassekampen was possible due to two 
forms of cross-border collaboration. First, Klassekampen built on earlier 
work, especially the investigations done by STV. The Swedish journal-
ist handed over all his material to his Norwegian colleague (Ekeberg, 
2018). Furthermore, close collaboration with the Organized Crime and 
Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) was key in developing the story. 
Based in Sarajevo, Bosnia, the OCCRP was conducting an ongoing inves-
tigation into the Uzbek dictator’s regime, with a network of sources and 
investigative journalists contributing to the work. The OCCRP managed 
to retrieve an account statement that was instrumental in revealing the 
corruption by VimpelCom in Uzbekistan (Ekeberg, 2018).
The methodology of the OCCRP highlights some points of entry into 
the tax haven complex. Klassekampen and the OCCRP spent weeks 
retrieving and analyzing tax haven company registers, which are mostly 
names, dates and key events like new directors. The OCCRP is experi-
enced in eking out tax haven data, where an aggressive and brash style 
is needed. Calling officials continuously is mandatory, and from time 
to time the OCCRP visits the tax havens in question to retrieve docu-
ments physically from company register functionaries. The OCCRP has 
even developed its own visualization software to systematize the material 
(Ekeberg, 2018).
Klassekampen and the OCCRP had no collaboration with whistleblow-
ers in developing the Telenor/VimpelCom revelations. One or more whis-
tleblowers did however try to get in touch with the Norwegian owners. 
Whistleblower reception is our second topic of interest in the Telenor/
VimpelCom case.
On two different occasions there was internal whistleblowing on Tele-
nor’s investments in Uzbekistan. First, several Telenor executives were 
notified in 2011, but this was finally rejected by the CEO of VimpelCom, 
Norwegian Jo Lunder (Gottschalk, 2018).
Then, one week before the public hearing in 2015, a Telenor employee 
contacted the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry (NFD). The 
ministry forwarded the email to the hearing committee in the form of a 
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letter the day before the hearing. The ministry said it was too short notice 
to include the notification in the public hearing. At first the ministry said 
that the whistleblower provided some new information on the payments 
made by VimpelCom to a shell company in Gibraltar (260S, 2014–2015, 
p. 5), but that in general there were no new details on the issue. After fur-
ther written questions from the hearing committee, the minister chose 
to play down the information from the whistleblower, maintaining that 
the whistleblower added no new information to the workings of the Vim-
pelCom board and its Telenor representatives, which seemed to be their 
main concern (260S, 2014–2015, p. 6).
From the manner in which the minister and high officials responded 
in the two open hearings on the Telenor/VimpelCom case, it is difficult to 
know what kind of formal structures were in place in the ministry to han-
dle whistleblowing, or if there was any formal structure at all. According 
to the government’s homepage, all state employers shall have formal noti-
fication routines, “based on the needs of the entity”.1
In this particular case, such a structure does not seem to have been 
applied. Ministry Director General Mette I. Wikborg responded that the 
administration considers notifications on a case to case basis, and that in 
some cases they even forward the notification to the company involved 
(Attachment 16 in 413S, 2015–2016, p. 120).
The minister herself concluded earlier on a general basis that notifi-
cations should be forwarded to the relevant recipients and authorities 
for further review and follow-up (260S, 2014–2015, p. 6). In this case, the 
ministry forwarded the notification to the Norwegian National Author-
ity for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental 
Crime (ØKOKRIM) and did not itself develop contact with the whis-
tleblower (413S, 2015–2016).
The whistleblower confirmed the work published by Klassekampen 
starting in November 2014, including details on payments to the shell 
company in Gibraltar. A lack of follow-up on whistleblower notification 
from both private and public stakeholders was fortunately compensated 
1 «Alle statlige virksomheter skal ha utarbeidet egne varslingsrutiner, basert på virksomhetens 
behov», from Regjeringen.no. Retrieved 15.8.2018 https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/
retningslinjer-for-utarbeidelse-av-lokal/id485618/
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by ongoing parallel investigations made possible by international 
collaboration.
In 2016 VimpelCom recognized the crimes committed and made a set-
tlement with both Dutch and US authorities, where VimpelCom is reg-
istered. The chairperson resigned after the second hearing, along with 
the CEO when it became clear that he had withheld information to the 
hearing committee (Ekeberg & Ekeberg, 2015b). Telenor later sold all their 
shares in VimpelCom (Hinna, 2018).
The Lux Leaks revelations and the Telenor/VimpelCom corruption 
scandal offer several valuable experiences for a discussion on whis-
tleblower protection.
The Lux Leaks and EU whistleblower protection
After several whistleblower induced revelations in recent years, the EU 
Commission presented a new whistleblower protection directive (EU, 
2018). The commission highlights Lux Leaks, the Panama Papers and the 
Paradise Papers in the very first sentence of the regulation’s background 
paper. Furthermore, the commission maintains that whistleblowers rep-
resent a “key element in preventing wrongdoings and protecting pub-
lic interests” (EU, 2018a, p. 1). In the second paragraph the commission 
emphasizes that whistleblowers are a “crucial source for investigative 
journalism” (EU, 2018b, p. 1) and compares the protection of whistleblow-
ers with the protection of journalistic sources in general.
Despite the strong wording on whistleblowers and journalism, the EU 
directive maintains that the “reporting persons are generally required 
to use internal channels first”. Competent authorities are next in line. 
Reporting to the public or the media is considered a measure of last resort 
(EU, 2018b, p. 12). However, there are several provisions allowing excep-
tions to this requirement. Situations where the whistleblower has either 
tried to report internally or to public authorities, or situations where 
there is reason to believe that internal reporting is not expected to func-
tion properly, are mentioned.
The issue of disclosing material in a proportionate manner is not clari-
fied in the EU proposal. Raphaël Halet was not deemed a whistleblower 
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because he provided tax agreements of the same type as were leaked by 
Antoine Deltour. Even though he added more material to the case, reveal-
ing more companies, the material was not new. His action was therefore 
not judged to be proportionate to the damage inflicted on Luxembourg, 
PwC, and the companies granted the tax agreements.
There is a non-exhaustive list of issues considered to be whistleblower 
worthy in the EU directive, but few further details on additional require-
ments, like the novelty criteria or one leak’s relation to another, which 
were two elements that struck Halet. This causes uncertainty for future 
whistleblowers. One could hardly blame Halet for not assessing whether 
his leak represented something substantially new in the case compared 
to Deltour, as he did not have access to Deltour’s documents. One further 
requirement is that the whistleblower must have reasonable grounds to 
believe that the information reported was true at the time of reporting. 
Honest errors do not disqualify you from protection.
On the question of advice for future whistleblowers, both Deltour and 
Halet highlight the need for collaboration with a lawyer as early as pos-
sible. However, Deltour also says that whistleblowers act “spontaneously 
and with a feeling of ‘internal emergency’”, which might hinder a cau-
tious, judicious approach (Deltour, 2018; Halet, 2018).
Norwegian whistleblower protection
The Telenor/VimpelCom corruption scandal was among the cases that 
sparked a debate on whistleblower protection in the Norwegian parlia-
ment in 2016. Like the EU, Norway has made an effort to update its whis-
tleblower protection. In 2018 the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
published an Official Norwegian Report (NOU) on whistleblower pro-
tection. The NOU is the background for a new whistleblower act and a 
whistleblower ombudsman.
There are two main concerns regarding the perspectives presented 
in the NOU. The first concern is a definition of so-called “censur-
able conditions”. It is unclear whether the authors want to narrow or 
broaden the scope of breaches deemed whistleblower worthy. “Cor-
ruption and other economic crime” is the first of six short categories 
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defining the scope of the protection. The categories are fresh proposals in 
the NOU.
In the legislative background paper on whistleblower protection from 
2006 censurable conditions are defined as criminal offenses, breaches of 
ethical guidelines firmly stated by the company or institution in question 
and acts contrary to “ethical standards broadly supported in society” (Ot.
Prop. Nr. 84, 2005–2006, p. 50, my translation). Petter Gottschalk con-
cludes that the scope of censurable conditions is insufficient, and points 
out unjustifiable budgets, professional issues and questionable priorities 
as examples. Blowing the whistle on aggressive tax planning might also 
fall outside of the scope of the act. The NOU concludes that there is need 
for additional definitions of what is considered “censurable conditions”.
Meanwhile, the EU proposal is both more detailed and broader in 
defining censurable conditions and important public interests deemed 
whistleblower worthy. First, ten categories are mentioned, ranging from 
denouncements on transportation safety and public procurement to 
financial services. Furthermore, there are three more subparagraphs, 
where tax avoidance is explicitly mentioned:
Breaches relating to the internal market […] as regards to acts which breach the 
rules of corporate tax or arrangements whose purpose is to obtain a tax advantage 
that defeats the object or purpose of the applicable corporate tax law. (EU, 2018, 
p. 32)
Finally, there is a paragraph referring to sector specific rules on reporting 
listed in an annex.
Discussion
As seen in the Lux Leaks case, there is rarely talk of purely economic 
crime when harmful practices are established in the global economy. 
Also, despite being a clear-cut corruption case, ØKOKRIM dismissed 
the case against the VimpelCom executive and the Telenor representa-
tives on the VimpelCom board for being held responsible for the corrup-
tion in Uzbekistan. VimpelCom made a settlement with US and Dutch 
authorities. Regardless of how the question of guilt was concluded in the 
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Telenor/VimpelCom case, the fact that revealing “crime” is a prerequi-
site in invoking whistleblower protection causes uncertainty for future 
whistleblowers.
Based on the complex judicial nature of questions related to economic 
crime, coupled with an opaque global economy, I will argue that “crime” 
is not a suitable precondition for whistleblower reporting. Future legis-
lation on whistleblower protection should maintain that whistleblowers 
who have reasonable grounds to believe that misdeeds, whether crime, 
unethical behavior, acts against the public interest or severe dysfunctions 
are taking place, can denounce them.
Further, I will argue that whistleblowing to journalists and civil soci-
ety organizations must be acknowledged as “responsible notification”. 
The NOU does not highlight the democratic value of journalism and 
whistleblowing. This runs contrary to the sentiments shown both in the 
EU directive and in the statement of the EU parliament, leading up to the 
directive.
First, in 2016 the EU parliament asserted that “Member States should 
ensure the protection of legitimate business secrets while in no way hin-
dering, hampering or stifling the capacity of whistleblowers and journalists 
to document and reveal illegal, wrongful or harmful practices where this is 
clearly and overwhelmingly in the public interest” (EU 2016: 19, my empha-
sis). The EU parliament refers to Lux Leaks and the Panama Papers and “[s]
trongly emphasizes that the work of whistleblowers is crucial for revealing 
the dimension of tax evasion and tax avoidance.” Second, the background 
paper for the EU directives gives credit to investigative journalism and the 
collaboration with whistleblowers at the very beginning of the paper.
Time will show if the Norwegian parliament has the same interest as its 
EU counterpart in highlighting the democratic value of whistleblower–
journalist collaboration.
The starting point, however, is poor. Looking into the method chapter 
of the Norwegian NOU, one finds no journalistic material and no inter-
views with the media or civil society listed. The issue of notifications to 
the media is discussed in a subchapter on source protection in which a 
summary of the legislative status of source protection is provided. An 
interesting remark by the authors is that the unwavering source protection 
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enshrined in press ethics is contrary to current legislation. The current 
practice in journalism is in fact civil disobedience.
The NOU does not propose any changes in legislation to solve this 
problem. However, the authors call for clarification on what is deemed a 
“responsible notification”. The legislative background paper (Ot.prp. nr. 
84, 2004–2005) explains some circumstances that must be in order for the 
whistleblower to report externally. Whether the notification is responsi-
ble will in each case depend on an “overall assessment” including: (i) if 
the reported criticism has a “sound basis”; (ii) the employee has taken due 
consideration of the employer’s objective interests; (iii) if the employer 
acted in good faith and was convinced of the authenticity of the infor-
mation; (iv) who was notified and how; (v) the nature of the information 
and the damage potential of the information; and finally (vi) whether the 
information is of general interest. In the next paragraph it is nevertheless 
briefly maintained that there cannot be strict conditions on the employer, 
and that the employer should have some leeway in deciding how to pro-
ceed. (Ot.prp. nr. 84, 2004–2005, p. 50).
The authors point out other criticisms of these requirements. The 
requirements can seem unclear, create insecurity and limit employees’ 
freedom of speech. The NOU refers to judicial reviews concluding that 
there are very few cases in the courts and before the ombudsman that 
even question the legitimacy of external whistleblowing. This coincides 
with the Luxembourg Supreme Court’s consideration of the Lux Leaks 
case, in which the legitimacy of external whistleblowing was not ques-
tioned. The NOU concludes that cases brought to the courts and the 
ombudsman might already be constrained by strict conditions. Finally, 
they refer to the criticism that the requirements are based on a “mirrored 
principle”, and that the main responsibility is placed on the whistleblower 
and not the employer (NOU, 2018, p. 159).
In an individual remark, the General Secretary of the Norwegian 
Association of Editors Arne Jensen asserts that whistleblowing cannot 
only be considered a work environment phenomenon, but instead must 
be seen as a resource for society as a whole (NOU, 2018, p. 146).
In their final remarks on due process, the following recommendations 
are suggested. First, the whistleblower should report internally. Second, 
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reporting censurable conditions externally is not considered irresponsi-
ble if the notification is made internally first. Third, external whistleblow-
ing is acceptable if others have earlier tried in vain, or if the notification 
concerns the executive management. Finally, external whistleblowing 
should be acceptable if there is reason to fear retaliation or destruction 
of evidence.
Conclusions
In this article I have described a set of challenges emerging from a century 
of the development of the tax haven complex. Countries and jurisdictions 
have developed a deeply intertwined network of financial services, and a 
social, political and physical infrastructure enabling regulatory evasion, 
tax avoidance, and eradicating accountability in business operations.
Consultancy firms represent an industry with excellent working con-
ditions under these circumstances. As shown in the Lux Leaks case, these 
actors are a powerful factor that needs political attention. Gabriel Zuc-
man claims that the extended use of tax havens is not only an issue of 
demand. He says that the part of the tax haven industry that offers the 
gateway into secrecy jurisdiction, such as the big consultancy firms, must 
be weakened if we are to reduce or end tax avoidance and tax evasion 
(Zucman, 2017).
There has been a surge in ‘tax haven laws’ all over the world, says Fjeld-
stad et al. (2018, p. 17). Indeed, it seems that what Fjeldstad calls ‘tax haven 
laws’ are becoming the laws of the global economy. However, any policy 
aimed at reducing tax avoidance or strengthening accountability must 
be tailored to the particular circumstances in those developed countries 
within the tax haven complex. It might also be worth mentioning that 
the policies should not be written by those developed countries alone, 
as is being tried in the OECD. The recent EU “black list” of so-called tax 
havens is revealing. None of the major conduit offshore financial centers 
identified by Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2017) are on the list.
Collaboration with whistleblowers is a strategy that journalists and civil 
society have utilized to overcome the challenges they face in investigat-
ing the global economy. In recent years, whistleblowers have been crucial 
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in developing ground-breaking stories on the dark side of a lustrous eco-
nomic system, as well as the mundane workings of local government. 
Whistleblowers have a role in revealing how the global economy works.
Allern and Pollack site the World Bank study conducted by Stapen-
hurst (2000), which maintains that investigative journalism has the long 
term effect of considerably strengthening accountability among politi-
cians, public bodies and institutions (Allern & Pollack, 2018). Journalists 
and whistleblowers seem to share a community of interest, because of 
the democratic ideals grounded in investigative journalism and the whis-
tleblower ethos, as can be seen in the work of Halet and Deltour (Halet, 
2018; Deltour, 2018).
Whistleblower protections are being developed in the EU and in Nor-
way. The collaboration between journalists and whistleblowers is explic-
itly acknowledged by the EU, but is so far being played down in the 
Norwegian context. The strict conditions tied to external whistleblow-
ing must be withdrawn to reduce the obstacles whistleblowers face. The 
perceived responsiveness of internal or external recipients can also affect 
the decision of potential whistleblowers to report their concerns or not 
(Loyens & Vandekerckhove, 2018). Regulations will decide whether the 
whistleblower remains silent or speaks up (Gottschalk, 2018).
Both the EU parliament and the Norwegian parliament have yet to 
ensure the needed protection for whistleblowers faced with unscrupulous 
employers or vested national interests.
The Lux Leaks case shows the indispensable need for collaboration 
between journalists and whistleblowers. The subsequent court cases also 
show that despite the lack of judicial protection for whistleblowers at the 
time, whistleblowing to a journalist was deemed legitimate. In the Nor-
wegian context, external whistleblowing is rarely questioned in the rele-
vant court cases, nor in the cases brought to the ombudsman.
Whistleblowers who do everything by the book can be marginalized, as 
seen in the Telenor/VimpelCom case. Strict formal conditions for external 
whistleblowing might hinder proper handling of important notifications. 
The similarity in the responses from Telenor and the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry are striking. First, the whistleblower was rejected after notifying 
the Telenor hierarchy. Then, one can argue that the whistleblower was not 
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properly considered by the ministry. Ekeberg claims that this is hardly sur-
prising, as the ministry itself is a majority shareholder, and has the same 
interest in playing down the situation as Telenor itself (Ekeberg, 2018).
Not all unethical behavior is illegal, and as the ECtHR maintains; also 
“dysfunctional” or “questionable practices” could be disclosed (Vanden-
driessche, 2017, p. 5), as they are also a threat to democracy and the legal 
economy. The reasoning of the Ministry of Trade and Industry for why 
they forwarded the notifications to the investigative unit ØKOKRIM 
is therefore weak. ØKOKRIM is indeed not responsible for executing 
the Norwegian state ownership policy, which is the job of the minis-
try. The drawback of forwarding the notification to ØKOKRIM can be 
seen through the fact that ØKOKRIM dismissed the case in the end. The 
information provided by the whistleblower could have been valuable to 
the accountancy process in parliament. The ministry has a huge respon-
sibility as a majority owner, especially keeping in mind that the ministry 
is a majority owner on behalf of the Norwegian population.
Without the massive work done first by Swedish then by Norwegian 
journalists with Bosnian and Uzbek assistance and guidance, the mis-
deeds in VimpelCom would probably never have seen the light of day. 
This investigative work took years. When Klassekampen latched onto the 
last phase, vast amounts of material were shared with the Klassekampen 
journalist. Allern and Pollack (2018) point out the increased coopera-
tion and sharing of material among investigative journalists in the past 
decade. Ekeberg highlights a flexible employer, financial support, and 
supportive colleagues as other elements enabling the investigative work 
(Ekeberg, 2015). 
How can parliaments facilitate a safe environment for whistleblowers? 
The EU highlights the ombudsman as a safe harbor for whistleblowers, 
in their insistence on notifying the authorities before considering noti-
fying the media. The newly designated Whistleblower Ombudsman in 
Norway will likely create a much safer environment for anyone wanting 
to report censurable conditions in their workplace. However, it remains 
to be seen how such an institution will be able to handle the reports. A 
whistleblower might face the same limitations as seen in the Telenor/Vim-
pelCom case, when the ministry forwarded the message to ØKOKRIM.
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Discussing the range of recipient institutions is beyond the scope 
of this article. This is a growing concern among scholars. Loyens and 
Vandekerckhove maintain that rather than discussions on legislation, 
“the emerging policy question for the next decade will be through what 
institutional framework whistleblowing legislation can be implemented” 
(2018, p. 3). While this is an exciting field for further research, we cannot 
afford missed opportunities in strengthening journalistic collaboration 
with whistleblowers. This remains a political responsibility.
Gottschalk (2018) reminds us that any new legislation on whistleblower 
protection must have only one target group, namely the whistleblowers.
Protection from retaliation is not discussed in this article, but is one 
of the gravest challenges in whistleblower protection, especially for those 
reporting in the public sector (Ottosen, 2018). As seen in the Lux Leaks 
case, not even adequate law is enough to protect whistleblowers when 
powerful corporations request assistance from the authorities. Perhaps 
the most controversial aspect of the treatment of whistleblower Raphaël 
Halet is that the Metz court assisted a foreign company in using illegal 
methods against a national citizen.
Eduard Perrin, Antoine Deltour and Raphaël Halet managed to tell 
excellent stories on the global economy when they exposed the secret 
Luxembourg tax agreements enabling the snatching of tax revenues from 
other countries. Despite inexperience, lack of proper digital tools, and 
retaliations, Perrin and journalists from all over the world managed to 
tell intriguing stories on complicated matters in the global economy. Lux 
Leaks sparked an interest in tax havens never seen before.
Both cases shed light on whistleblower regulations from different 
angles. First and foremost, the Lux Leaks case shows the indispensable 
need for whistleblowing in revealing the workings of the global eco-
nomy. Furthermore, the Telenor/VimpelCom case shows the questionable 
reception of internal notifications from both the corporation and the state 
as a majority owner. The truth behind the Telenor/VimpelCom case was 
nonetheless exposed through traditional journalistic handicraft, building 
on and sharing material, and finally, tight international cooperation.
These cases show that whistleblowing to the media must be acknow-
ledged as responsible whistleblowing, and the strict limitations on 
chapter 14
206
media–whistleblower cooperation must be withdrawn. Whistleblowing 
must be considered a broad democratic issue. Conditions for investigat-
ing the global economy are unfavorable, and the adversaries of investi-
gative journalism and civil society are resourceful and fierce. However, 
the stories emerging from international cooperation in the last few years 
suggest that there are only more to come.
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What Is a Leak, Who Is a 
Whistleblower? An Evaluation 
Within the Scope of the 
Cumhuriyet Newspaper, Can 
Dündar and MİT Trucks Case
Behlül Çalışkan
Independent journalism researcher
Abstract: Information leaks and the revelation of government secrets by hackers 
have become issues of note in Turkey’s political sphere during the course of the last 
ten years. Turkey has also witnessed a steady flow of leaks in recent years. Of these, 
the MİT (The National Intelligence Organization) trucks case, concerning the role 
of the Turkish secret service in supplying weapons to jihadist militants in Syria, has 
perhaps been the most distinctive. This chapter discusses whether the MİT Trucks 
scandal can be regarded as a whistleblowing leak serving the public interest in terms 
of its revelations, the identities of its sources, its wider political entanglements, and 
the timing of its emergence into the public domain.
Keywords: leaks, whistleblowing, leaks journalism, Cumhuriyet, Can Dündar
Introduction
The increasing use of information technology, the significant decrease in 
information storage costs, data’s instant reproducibility and ready dis-
semination, have all made leaks such as the Panama or Paradise Papers 
cases ever more difficult to police and prevent. Today, information leaks 
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provide a sustained and extensive view of how power works, as well as 
what it thinks and does, as Beckett and Ball (2012) maintain.
Those who have gained access to confidential information, whether by 
virtue of their privileged status or through other means, have undoubt-
edly changed the concept and practice of investigative journalism dra-
matically, with leak journalism increasingly becoming an essential part 
of the investigative journalism canon. 
Information leaks and the revelation of government secrets by hack-
ers have also become issues of note in Turkey’s political sphere during 
the course of the last ten years. In fact, Turkey has witnessed a steady 
flow of leaks in recent years, many of them concerning alleged corrup-
tion by members of government and their inner circles. Other leaks, such 
as those relating to the AKP government’s alleged illegal ties with Isla-
mist jihadists, and those dealing with Turkish state military secrets have 
been revealed by anonymous sources. Of these, the MİT (The National 
Intelligence Organization) trucks case, concerning the role of the Turk-
ish secret service in supplying weapons to jihadist militants in Syria, has 
perhaps been the most distinctive. 
In order to place this in context, the “Whistleblower Prize 2017”, 
awarded to the former editor-in-chief of the independent Turkish news-
paper Cumhuriyet, Can Dündar, may be a good starting point. Dündar 
received the prize “for his revelations, under the most difficult, repressive 
conditions in Turkey, of a so-called state secret of the Erdoğan regime” 
(Die Welt, 2017). The revelation involved the attempted delivery of weap-
ons and military armaments to jihadists in Syria, conducted by the 
Turkish secret service, the MİT, and contrary to applicable international 
law – a case known as the “MİT Trucks case”. 
This chapter discusses whether the MİT Trucks scandal can be 
regarded as a whistleblowing leak that serves the public interest in terms 
of its revelations, the identities of its sources, its wider political entangle-
ments, and the timing of its emergence into the public domain. Within 
these criteria, this article will examine some of the motivational elements 
underpinning the journalism of the Cumhuriyet newspaper, and attempt 
to identify the variables contributing to the decision to award the prize to 
Can Dündar. The article draws on “whistleblower” and “leak” definitions 
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set out by Peter B. Jubb (1999) and David E. Pozen (2013) respectively, as 
well as Stephen Hess’s (1984) typology on why leakers leak. 
The “MİT Trucks” case
On 19 January 2014, the prosecutor of the Anti-Terror Court of Adana 
province in Turkey instructed the Adana Provincial Gendarmerie Com-
mand to stop and search three trucks. A security force of 200 personnel 
stopped the trucks and a car accompanying them at the Adana Sirkeli 
motorway entry point. Eight drivers and other personnel in the convoy 
were detained by the police (Taştekin, 2014). First reports from the scene 
suggested that there were MİT officers in the truck, and they had clashed 
with the gendarmerie, who tried to confiscate the truck’s contents and 
arrest the officers. Hatay’s governor intervened and demanded the release 
of the officers, since they were subject to Law Number 2937 (MİT law), 
according to which the personnel have a special status directly subor-
dinated to the prime minister’s office, and their undue detention would 
result in criminal consequences. Nonetheless the trucks were searched 
and videoed, despite the efforts of MİT officers to obstruct this (Başaran, 
2017). President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan later announced that the trucks 
were carrying humanitarian aid to Syrian Turkmens and it was paral-
lel1 judicial and security personnel who had tried to stop the MİT trucks 
in Adana (Pamuk & Tattersall, 2015). A broadcast ban was immediately 
imposed on the case. All relevant online content was deleted by court 
order, and even commenting on the subject was prohibited. The prose-
cutors and gendarmerie officers who conducted the investigation were 
arrested on suspicion of espionage. However, despite all the attempts at 
a cover-up, the trucks’ search documents and testimonies of the gendar-
merie included in the charges were leaked (Başaran, 2017).
On 21 January 2014, the Aydınlık newspaper, a nationalist daily affiliated 
with the Patriotic Party of Turkey, a strong supporter of the government, 
1 A term used by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to describe members of the Gülen movement 




particularly in its struggle against the Gülen movement, published the 
first images of the search and a report claiming that the trucks were car-
rying munitions from Turkey to Syria. In the report entitled “Here Is the 
Ammo in the Trucks”, it stated that thanks to the images captured by the 
newspaper’s personnel, it had been proven that the Turkish trucks were 
carrying munitions and not the humanitarian aid claimed by govern-
ment officials. 
The interception of the trucks in the MİT Trucks case was linked to 
the struggle between the AKP government and the Gülen movement. 
The Gülen movement, also known as “Cemaat”, is a religious group led 
by Turkish preacher Fethullah Gülen, who has been living in the United 
States since 1999. The search was seen as a continuation of the struggle 
between the two organizations, which began in 2013. As a well-established 
supporter of the government when it first took office, the Gülen move-
ment commenced criminal investigations on 17 December 2013, through 
the offices of its members in judicial and security units, of businessmen 
connected in various capacities to the ruling party. These included sev-
eral family members of cabinet ministers, who were accused of bribery, 
corruption, fraud, money laundering and gold smuggling. Shortly after 
these investigations, tape recordings of the then Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan’s phone calls were leaked to the media by anonymous 
and hitherto unknown sources. This scandal, also known as the cor-
ruption scandal, revealed details of Erdoğan’s relationships with people 
from the media, business and politics, and along with the investigations, 
it was seen essentially as an attempted coup against the government by 
Gülen party members. Although the opposition reacted to the scandal 
with large demonstrations and called on the prime minister to resign, 
the investigations were considered by the public to be an attack by the 
Gülen movement on the government. Set against this background, it has 
been claimed that leaking the images relating to the delivery of munitions 
was the work of Gülen-movement-related sources. Immediately after the 
incident, investigations into the actions of the prosecutors, gendarmes 
and police officers involved in the interception of the MİT trucks were 
initiated. Adana Chief Public Prosecutor, Süleyman Bağrıyanık; Deputy 
Chief Public Prosecutor, Ahmet Karaca; Prosecutors, Aziz Takçı and 
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Özcan Şişman; as well as Colonel Özkan Çokay were among those who 
were detained on charges of attempting to subvert the Republic of Turkey 
(Hamsici, 2017).
Following his appointment as the new editor-in-chief of the Cumhuri-
yet newspaper in 2015, journalist Can Dündar began to publish stories 
critical of the AKP government. However, the uploading of a video of the 
MİT trucks search to Cumhuriyet newspaper’s website on 29 May was 
the catalyst for a more extensive discussion of the issue of espionage in 
general. It was evident from the published photos that cardboard boxes, 
which had been placed inside steel boxes, had medicines in them. How-
ever, the munitions had been hidden under the medicines. These reve-
lations caused a political storm in Turkey, and enraged President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, who vowed that Dündar would pay a “heavy price”.
Dündar, and the newspaper’s Ankara bureau chief, Erdem Gül, were 
arrested on 26 November 2015 on the charge of military espionage, and 
of wilfully aiding an armed terrorist organization (Bilginsoy, 2015). After 
92 days in jail, Dündar and Gül were released on 26 February 2016 after 
Turkey’s constitutional court ruled in a majority decision that their free-
dom of expression and that of the press had been violated in conjunction 
with their right to liberty and the security of their persons (The Constitu-
tional Court, 2016). Dündar moved to Germany in June 2016, after he was 
sentenced to five years and 10 months’ imprisonment for “leaking secret 
information of the state”.
Leaks, whistleblowing and journalism
The figurative sense of the verb ‘leak’ meaning “to come to be known in 
spite of efforts at concealment” dates from at least 1832, while it has been 
used as a noun in the sense of the “revelation of secret information” since 
1950 (etymonline.com). Today, it is used broadly to mean “an array of 
practices involving the accidental and strategic sharing of information, 
including whistleblowing, settling grudges, culling favors, drawing atten-
tion to policy initiatives, signalling foreign governments, and releasing 
trial balloons so as to discern early public response” (Thorsen et al., 2013, 
p. 103). Within the scope of this chapter, a leak is taken to be “a targeted 
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disclosure by a government insider (employee, former employee, contrac-
tor) to a member of the media of confidential information the divulgence 
of which is generally proscribed by law, policy, or convention outside of 
any formal process with an expectation of anonymity” (Pozen, 2013).
Leaks vary depending on the motives of the leaker, the identity of the 
leaker, and the scope of the leaked material (Kwoka, 2015). With regard 
to the motives of leakers, Hess (1984, pp. 77–78) examines leaks under six 
different categories: the ego leak, the goodwill leak, the policy leak, the 
animus leak, the trial-balloon leak and the whistleblower leak. The ego 
leak refers to the providing of information primarily to satisfy a sense of 
self-importance; in effect, “I am important because I can give you infor-
mation that is important.” The goodwill leak is a ploy for a future favor. 
The primary purpose is to accumulate credit with a reporter, whom the 
leaker hopes can be called upon later. The policy leak is a straightforward 
pitch for or against a justified proposal. The animus leak may be used to 
settle grudges: information is disclosed to embarrass another person. The 
trial-balloon leak reveals a proposal that is under consideration in order 
to assess its assets and liabilities. Finally, unlike the others, the whis-
tleblower leak is usually employed by career personnel. Going to the press 
may be the last resort of frustrated civil servants, who feel they cannot 
correct a perceived wrong through regular government channels.
As a synthesis of seven widely quoted definitions, spanning a range 
of views within the literature (Bowie & Duska, 1990; Elliston et al., 1985; 
Chiasson et al., 1995; Chambers, 1995; Miceli & Near, 1992; Courteman-
che, 1988; De Maria, 1995), Jubb (1999) defines whistleblowing as “a delib-
erate non-obligatory act of disclosure, which becomes part of the public 
record and is made by a person who has or had privileged access to the 
data or information of an organization, about nontrivial illegality or other 
wrongdoing, whether actual, suspected or anticipated, which implicates 
and is under the control of that organization, to an external entity having 
the potential to rectify the wrongdoing”.
This runs the risk, however, of equating whistleblowing with inform-
ing. Whistleblowing is a distinct act of dissent, in which a member or for-
mer member of an organization goes outside the organization or outside 
normal organizational channels to reveal organizational wrongdoing, 
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illegality, or actions that threaten the public, and typically involves inside 
informants who want to expose “actual nontrivial wrongdoing” by col-
laborating with the media (Thorsen et al., 2013, p. 102). However, whis-
tleblowing is not merely informing. There are many kinds of informers, 
from simple conveyors of messages to sneaks, spies or squealers. Whis-
tleblowing is distinguishable from these types of informing because the 
disclosure is an indictment. It identifies perceived wrongdoing, typically 
a bad-news message about misconduct, incompetence, fraud and the 
like, alleged to have been ignored and/or covered up; or it might be about 
good news concealed for private advantage (Jubb, 1999). In contrast to 
informers, a whistleblower is usually cast in a positive light: that is, as 
someone who discloses confidential information to the press reluctantly, 
in the belief that it is necessary to do so because public attention must 
be directed toward a perceived wrong, crime, or injustice (Thorsen et al., 
2013, p. 102).
The European Commission’s proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of whistleblowers defines 
them as: persons who report (within the organization concerned or to 
an outside authority) or disclose (to the public) information on wrong-
doing obtained in a work-related context; or help prevent damage and 
detect threat or harm to the public interest that may otherwise remain 
hidden (European Commission, 2018). However, the definition of the 
Commission differs from the definitions in the literature noted above in 
its restriction of the act to work-related activities only. It also excludes 
the disclosure of classified information, “which European Union law or 
the laws, regulations or administrative provisions in force in the member 
state concerned require, for security reasons, to be protected from unau-
thorised access.” According to the whistleblower definition of the Ger-
man non-profit association Whistleblower-Netzwerk e.V., whistleblowers 
are people who no longer silently accept illegal actions, grievances or 
dangers to people and the environment, but rather reveal them. They 
do this internally within their companies, agencies or organizations, or 
externally to competent authorities, third parties, or the press.
According to the jury of the “Whistleblower Prize” (IALANA, 2017), 
journalists can also be whistleblowers. Whistleblowers are insiders who 
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act in their “own sphere of influence” or “own working environment” and 
“sound the alarm” where necessary. They no longer silently accept illegal 
action, serious grievances or serious dangers to people and the environ-
ment, democracy, peace or the common weal, but reveal them. They col-
lect data and facts, analyze them critically, weigh up counterarguments, 
seek remedies, and refuse to continue to participate in these abuses and 
aberrations themselves, to trivialize them and to shield them against crit-
icism, or even to make themselves accomplices. By doing that, they make 
a contribution to open critical discourse and act in the interest of the 
public welfare. They follow their conscience – even when it can become 
uncomfortable for them. As such, they often place themselves at great 
risk, and put their reputation or even their existence on the line. They are 
frequently pressured by those who want to hide uncomfortable truths. 
On the other hand, the term “whistleblower” does not normally include 
people who are simply performing a professional task, such as journalists, 
who conduct investigations and then publish their findings. However, a 
journalist may become a whistleblower because of an investigation and a 
publication, if he/she has to act under extreme, repressive conditions and 
still decides to do so for important public interest reasons.
A whistleblower is a person who is motivated by a strong belief that 
wrongdoing has occurred and that it needs to be corrected. In this context, 
motivation is dealt with as the driving force causing employees to come 
forward and report wrongdoing (Çalışkan, 2018, p. 315). In order to bet-
ter understand and analyze the motives underpinning whistleblowing, a 
broader categorization has been proposed, one that embraces both altruism 
and self-interest. As part of his research project entitled “Whistling While 
They Work”, Roberts (2014) compiled the motives of Australian public sec-
tor whistleblowers, and identified altruistic reasons such as disagreements 
with organizational policies, legal obligations to report wrongdoing, per-
sonal morality and ethical breaches such as fraud, theft, breaches of codes 
of conduct, misuse of allowances, and falsification of records.
However, according to the model of “prosocial behavior”, another 
effective theoretical framework for analyzing motives for whistleblow-
ing, it is not necessary for the whistleblowing act to have only altruistic 
motives. 
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Many whistleblowing incidents are positive behaviors. Even if avoid-
ing and stopping wrongdoing benefits society, but not the organization 
per se, it is still a positive behavior. In this context, whistleblowing may 
be seen as prosocial behavior intended to benefit other persons (Miceli 
et al., 2008, pp. 33–35). However, according to Staub (1978, p. 10), pro-
social behavior has another class similar to altruism, but which does 
not require total unselfishness on the part of the actor. Prosocial actors 
can, unlike altruistic ones, also intend to gain rewards for themselves. 
The degree to which people intend to benefit themselves by benefiting 
others varies across instances of prosocial behavior. Consequently, it is 
not necessary for unselfish motives to dominate, but simply that they be 
present. So, even though whistleblowing may benefit the whistleblower 
personally, whistleblowing can be viewed as prosocial behavior because 
it generally also benefits persons other than the whistleblower (Dozier 
& Miceli, 1985).
Numerous examples can be adduced of individuals whose position in 
an organization has afforded them access to otherwise secret or classified 
information, and who have initiated noteworthy news stories. In 1967, 
Daniel Ellsberg leaked 7,000 top-secret documents about the Vietnam 
War to reporters of the New York Times and the Washington Post. The 
“Pentagon Papers” were from the “Vietnam Study Task Force” that had 
been established within the Pentagon without the knowledge of the US 
president, and was charged with examining the history of US involve-
ment in the Vietnam War. The leaks created a sense of distrust in the 
US decision-making process within the American populace, and played a 
significant role in ending the Vietnam War. During the Watergate scan-
dal, information leaked by the former FBI Associate Director, William 
Mark Felt Sr., under the pseudonym “Deep Throat” to reporters of the 
Washington Post revealed unlawful activities on the highest levels of gov-
ernment. In consequence, Americans began to look at their political sys-
tem anew, and several reforms were introduced in relation to issues such 
as political ethics and eavesdropping.
In addition to Ellsberg and Deep Throat in the Watergate scan-
dal, several other individuals whose place inside an organization 
afforded them access to otherwise secret or classified information have 
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generated noteworthy news stories. Jeffrey Wigand, who worked with CBS’s 
60 Minutes in 1996, revealed how the tobacco company Brown & 
Williamson manipulated nicotine content in cigarettes to addict smok-
ers. Also Sherron Watkins, who helped uncover the Enron crisis in 2001, 
is among the other significant whistleblowers to emerge over the years 
(Thorsen et al., 2013, p. 102–103).
In the context of the intricately and densely networked spheres of com-
munication pervasive in all our lives, information leaks have provided a 
detailed and extensive insight into the workings of power. In this way, 
they have changed the concept and practice of journalism, and leak jour-
nalism has increasingly become a noteworthy component of investigative 
journalism. With respect to the form of investigative journalism prac-
tised through the collaboration of citizens and journalists, leak journal-
ism may be defined as a process in which leaked information obtained 
from whistleblowers within a network is edited by journalists and pub-
lished through mainstream and alternative media. Leak journalism is 
described by Beckett as “leaking with a purpose” (2012). According to 
Uçkan (2011, 2012), it constitutes a fundamental dimension of journalism, 
which has always had a democratic function at its core, and an important 
communication channel helping citizens understand “the real scoop” in 
relation to what’s actually going on in the world around them. Leak jour-
nalism is the process of editing and publishing information leaks submit-
ted by whistleblowers with the help of journalists and experts through 
mainstream and/or alternative media, and appears as a normative model 
encompassing descriptions of the organizational and operational factors 
underpinning it, as well as the motives of the actors involved (Çalışkan, 
2016). Although these norms can appear in different ways, as a whole they 
define leak journalism as a new form of journalism. Organizational fac-
tors of the model consist of the network-based and decentralized organi-
zational structure of the leak platform, as well as the security and privacy 
measures provided to the actors involved in the leaking. Journalistic work 
related to the process of obtaining, editing and publishing leaks en route 
from whistleblower to audience establishes the operational factor of the 
model. Finally, the motives of the actors involved serve to shed light on 
the human dimension.
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Whistleblower Prize
In October 2017, Can Dündar was awarded the “Whistleblower Prize” 
together with economist, Martin Porwoll, and pharmaceutical technical 
assistant, Maria-Elisabeth Klein. The Whistleblower Prize has been pre-
sented biannually by the German section of the International Associa-
tion of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) and the Federation of 
German Scientists (VDW) since 1999, and is given to individuals whose 
behavior meets certain criteria:
1. Revealing wrongdoing: The whistleblower should reveal grave 
wrongdoings, serious abuses or undesirable developments in her/
his own work environment or sphere of influence. 
2. Going outside: If her/his internal alarm is suppressed and/or 
remains ineffective, the whistleblower goes outside and depends 
upon outsiders or the public. 
3. Serving the public interest: The whistleblower serves the public 
interest and does not achieve any economic benefit for herself/him-
self or those close to her/him. 
4. Risking retaliation: In committing to the action, the whistleblower 
accepts that her/his behavior is associated with considerable risks 
and/or disadvantages for her/his own professional career or per-
sonal existence.
To date, perhaps Daniel Ellsberg, Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden 
are some of the better-known winners of the Whistleblower Prize. Daniel 
Ellsberg received the prize for his leak to the press in the early 1970s of 
the so-called “Pentagon Papers” on US involvement in the Vietnam War, 
thus making a significant contribution to ending the war. Chelsea Man-
ning posted hundreds of thousands of documents on WikiLeaks in 2010, 
detailing serious war crimes by US soldiers in Iraq. As a member of the 
NSA, Edward Snowden publicized the mass surveillance and storage of 
communications data by US intelligence and other Western intelligence 
agencies.
According to IALANA and VDW (2017), Can Dündar met the cri-
teria for the Whistleblower Prize in 2017, in revealing that the Turkish 
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government had violated not just the UN Security Council’s binding deci-
sion to combat Al-Qaeda and its cells, but also other relevant provisions 
of the UN Charter as well. They noted that Dündar, through this revela-
tion, had shown that he was not only a critical journalist and editor aware 
of his responsibilities, but also a brave whistleblower. He was deemed to 
have served the public interest by covering the weapons delivery to jihad-
ists in Syria, which was contrary to international law, had been denied 
up to that point, and had not been sanctioned by the Turkish parliament. 
Finally the committee noted that, despite advice to the contrary from his 
colleagues and lawyers, Dündar, through his action, had undertaken the 
gravest risk of arrest and long-term imprisonment.
In lieu of a conclusion 
In terms of both the public’s right to know and freedom of the press, it 
could be argued that the MİT Trucks case is of particular significance 
and that Dündar’s receiving the Whistleblower Prize in Germany flows 
directly from that. However, in order to understand why the prize was 
awarded to him in particular (and others such as Daniel Ellsberg, Chelsea 
Manning and Edward Snowden), and not, for example, the German Fed-
eral Intelligence Service (the BND had eavesdropped on representatives 
of the Syrian government and army through the use of a signals-intelli-
gence ship in the Eastern Mediterranean [Lambeck & Özgenç, 2012]), a 
number of points need to be examined. When evaluated within the scope 
of the literature on leaks and whistleblowing, and against the political 
background discussed above, describing Dündar’s behavior as whis-
tleblowing and awarding him the Whistleblower Prize seem problematic 
in three respects. 
Firstly, contrary to common belief, it was not Cumhuriyet that broke 
the story on the seizure of the MİT trucks. As stated above, the Aydınlık 
newspaper published the first images of the search and a report claiming 
that the trucks were carrying munitions from Turkey to Syria on 21 Janu-
ary 2014, only two days after the trucks were stopped. Just like the Cum-
huriyet newspaper did 15 months later, the report stated that thanks to 
the images captured by the newspaper’s staff, it had been proven that the 
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Turkish trucks were carrying munitions and not the humanitarian aid 
claimed by government officials. Orhan Ceyhun Bozkurt, former news 
editor-in-chief of the newspaper, said that a state officer from Ankara sent 
the images to him via WhatsApp and the newspaper published the images 
and the report because they were newsworthy (Aydınlık, 2017). Later, the 
newspaper’s editor-in-chief Mustafa İlker Yücel and Bozkurt were both 
charged with “revealing confidential state information” (Aydınlık, 2017). 
The only difference in the report published in the Cumhuriyet newspaper 
was that it contained video material of the search of the trucks in addition 
to images. The court justified its decision not to charge Aydınlık staff with 
military espionage and wilfully aiding an armed terrorist organization, 
unlike Dündar, by the argument that Aydınlık’s report didn’t contain 
any information, document or video other than the images, and that the 
report published by Dündar revealed much more newsworthy informa-
tion, documents and images.
Secondly, if the MİT Trucks case could be considered within the realm 
of whistleblowing based on the leaks journalism model, it would be more 
appropriate to define Dündar as the publisher of the leaked information, 
rather than the whistleblower per se. In the MİT Trucks case, on 27 May 
2015, Dündar was given a memory stick containing a video by a hitherto 
unknown informant. Later in his book (2016, p. 12), Dündar stated that it 
was a leftist member of parliament who had delivered the video to him. 
Some 15 months later, following the publication of the book, the main 
opposition Republican People’s Party deputy and former journalist Enis 
Berberoğlu was sentenced to 25 years in prison for allegedly “leaking state 
secrets” in the MİT Trucks case, by providing the video to the Cumhuri-
yet newspaper (Hürriyet Daily News, 2017). According to the available 
information, the memory stick was prepared by the gendarmes who had 
searched the MİT trucks at Adana on 19 January 2014, and the video on 
it recorded the entire process from the initial interception of the trucks 
to the opening of the transported boxes containing the weapons. After 
checking the authenticity of the video, Dündar realized that he had proof 
of Turkish government violations of international and domestic law. The 
Cumhuriyet newspaper then published on 29 May 2015 a lengthy front-
page article including photos under the heading “Here Are the Weapons 
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that Erdogan Denies”. Cumhuriyet also published the video on its web-
site (2017). The Whistleblower Prize jury announced Dündar as the whis-
tleblower of the MİT Trucks case, saying that journalists can also be 
whistleblowers, and for a journalist, research and publication can turn 
into a whistleblowing act in and of itself if the journalist has to act under 
extreme, repressive conditions and still chooses to do so for the public 
weal. In his book entitled We Are Arrested, the story of the MİT Trucks 
case and his detention, Dündar also claims that he himself was a whis-
tleblower by comparing his act with earlier whistleblowing incidents:
I knew that crimes could not be kept secret. One after the other, files stamped 
Top Secret concealing dirty operations sanctioned by politicians had been ex-
posed: Watergate, Irangate, the Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks being just a 
handful of examples. And in each case, it was the guilty politicians who were 
tried, not the journalists. (Dündar, 2016, p. 14) 
However, Dündar was one of the publishers of the leaked images of the 
MİT Trucks in the same way that Neil Sheehan of the New York Times 
was in the “Pentagon Papers” case, or Glenn Greenwald of the Guardian 
was in the “Snowden Files” case. In the cases of Sheehan and Greenwald, 
the investigative reporters acted under repressive conditions, and chose 
to publish stories on leaked documents for the public weal after working 
on the confidential documents revealing wrongdoing, together with the 
whistleblowers Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden. 
Finally, it would be more accurate to say that in terms of the motives 
of the person who leaked the images to the Cumhuriyet newspaper, the 
objective was to settle grudges and to embarrass another person – Hess 
describes it as an “animus leak” – rather than a desire to serve the public 
interest or to reveal wrongdoing. From this perspective, the MİT Trucks 
case is reminiscent of the case of the German intelligence ship in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. The activities carried out by the ship showed that 
Germany was playing a far greater role in the Syrian conflict than had 
hitherto been known. According to the report published by the German 
BILD newspaper, the information gained on military operations of the 
Syrian army was passed on to the American and British secret services, 
and from there was relayed to the so-called “Free Syrian Army”. At first 
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glance, this information leak would appear to be clearly different from 
well-known whistleblowing cases such as the Pentagon Papers or Cable-
gate. Listening to the enemy is a method of communications intelligence 
during war, and as such made Germany a party to the conflict in Syria 
(Lambeck & Özgenç, 2012; Cieschinger et al., 2016; Die Bundesregierung, 
2016; El-Hamid, 2017). But when evaluated with regard to the motivation 
behind the leaks, both cases may be regarded to be similar. The searching 
of the trucks heading for Syria was one of the incidents that resulted in 
the Gülen movement and the government eventually coming into con-
flict with each other. In addition to the corruption investigations and the 
leaked tape recordings of Erdoğan’s phone calls, this raid and the leak-
ing of the images were perceived as attacks against the government by 
the Gülen movement (Gürsoy, 2015, pp. 34–35). Before the power strug-
gle between the AKP government and its former ally in 2013, the Gülen 
movement was a well-established supporter of the government when it 
first took office. As part of this struggle, the Gülen movement often leaked 
audio and video documents obtained by its members in judicial and secu-
rity units without revealing their identities. As already noted, leaks vary 
depending on the motives and identity of the leaker, and whistleblowing 
is done out of altruism to further the public interest without expectation 
of personal gain. Accordingly, with regard to the source of the leaks in the 
MİT Trucks case, it could be argued that it is a matter of public discretion 
as to whether the subsequent publication of that information could be 
regarded as whistleblowing within the framework described above.
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Chilling Effects on Free  
Expression: Surveillance,  
Threats and Harassment
Elisabeth Eide
Professor of Journalism Studies, Oslo Metropolitan University
Abstract: This chapter addresses global surveillance as revealed by Edward Snowden 
in 2013 and discusses the effects such surveillance – and indeed its revelation – may 
have on freedom of the press and investigative journalism. The chilling effect – an 
act of discouragement – has proven to be an effective way of deterring public intel-
lectuals and other citizens from voicing their opinions in the public sphere. This 
chapter presents some examples of how it works on practicing freedom of expres-
sion for both groups and individuals, as well as how it may affect relationships 
between various actors in the public sphere, particularly the state and the media, 
and journalists/writers and politicians. Finally, it discusses consequences for the 
future of investigative journalism.
Keywords: chilling effect, investigative journalism, surveillance, freedom of expression
Rarely it is mentioned, in this regard, that surveillance fundamentally questions 
journalistic work as such – at least in its form of investigative journalism that 
requires confidential communication with sources.
 —Arne Hintz (2013)
Introduction
This chapter addresses the chilling effect on freedom of expression and free-
dom of the press. As a case study, it discusses how investigative journalism, 
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revealing modern global surveillance helped by whistleblower Edward 
Snowden (in June 2013), may be hampered by this effect, oftentimes in the 
form of a tight relationship between state power and the media. 
It elaborates on how journalism – which is essential for whistleblowers’ 
outreach – treated the revelations, and which challenges such indepen-
dent investigative journalism faces. The concept chilling effect is central 
to my approach, since this effect has demonstrated its effectiveness in 
stimulating self-censorship and thus less transparency in any given pub-
lic sphere, and since the chilling effect may have severe repercussions 
vis-à-vis this particularly important strand of journalism. Surveillance 
and the threat of being surveilled (and thus perhaps also persecuted) are 
in turn important components of the chilling effect, as claimed by the U.S. 
PEN chapter (see below).
After clarifying the concept chilling effect, a major part of the chapter 
presents the Snowden revelations of mass surveillance, Edward Snowden 
being the most important whistleblower of our era. This part discusses 
the ways in which threats of surveillance may affect people’s willingness 
to make full use of their freedom of expression. It then takes on jour-
nalism and other public individuals’ practices, and demonstrates how 
revelations of surveillance (and its chilling effects) have deepened con-
flicts between the media and state power, between various actors in the 
journalistic field (for example editors and journalists), and between whis-
tleblowers and society at large. Last, but not least, I outline some future 
scenarios for journalism and free expression. 
An act of deterrence
The concept chilling effect has been thoroughly treated as a phenomenon 
linked to the judiciary, as shown by a variety of lexical definitions. This 
short one synthesizes the legal approach: “A discouraging or deterring 
effect, especially one resulting from a restrictive law or regulation”.1 
Schauer (1978) writes that the “very essence of a chilling effect is an act 
of deterrence” (p. 689). Furthermore, he finds it proper to distinguish 
1 https://www.dictionary.com/browse/chilling-effect accessed 24.09.2018
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between “an activity as being chilled” while one oftentimes talks of “peo-
ple being deterred” (ibid.).
The two concepts [activity and people] go hand in hand, of course, in that an 
activity is chilled if people are deterred from participating in that activity. Al-
though an individual’s decision not to engage in certain behavior may be influ-
enced by a wide range of stimuli, in law the acknowledged basis of deterrence is 
the fear of punishment - be it fine, imprisonment, imposition of civil liability, or 
deprivation of governmental benefit. (Schauer, 1978, p. 689)
Furthermore, Schauer discusses how laws on obscenity or defamation may 
impose a chilling effect on citizens, preventing some types of expression. 
This chapter’s focus is not primarily on the judicial approach to freedom 
of expression. The emphasis on deterrence enables a broader approach to 
the chilling effect, i.e. as an effect constituted by a variety of institutions 
or groups/individuals, contributing to the exclusion or barring of people 
from the democratic exercise of their right to free expression. The aim of 
this chapter is to investigate how this works, with a particular emphasis 
on surveillance and other threats to public speakers/writers/journalists.
In a world where media platforms and channels offer themselves in 
multitudes, laws still play a role. However state and military practices in 
conflict with laws (or with a country’s adherence to international charters 
and treaties), as well as threats and actions by non-government entities, 
may also cause deterrence. We should also not forget that conventions of 
loyalty to authorities within news organizations might have a ‘chilling 
effect’ on journalists, especially when working with sensitive areas such 
as national security. The Post, a recently released movie, clearly demon-
strated this (Spielberg, 2017) by focusing on controversies within the 
mainstream press on whether to print The Pentagon Papers.2 Below, we 
shall see how (the practicing of) laws as well as other factors contribute to 
a chilling effect on free expression, whistleblowing and democratic rights 
in a given society.




Surveillance: The Snowden revelations
In June 2013, a person hitherto unknown to the world, Edward Snowden, 
revealed how the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) practiced mass 
surveillance on citizens in large parts of the world. The surveillance 
included phone tapping, and data gathering helped by email services 
and IT giants such as Google, Facebook and others. It was a global reve-
lation, involving other countries’ secret services as well, not least the 
GCHQ (General Central Headquarters) in the U.K. Edward J. Snowden 
was working as a senior IT consultant at the Booz Allen Hamilton Com-
pany, but on lease to the NSA, where he had access to top secret surveil-
lance data. When he could no longer tolerate what he knew about the 
illegal surveillance, he made an appointment to meet reporters and left 
for Hong Kong. 
When the news of mass surveillance was revealed, it caused massive 
reactions from political leaders, as well as from citizens, as WikiLeaks 
had previously done. Unlike in WikiLeaks, Snowden entrusted experi-
enced reporters to transform/translate his whistleblowing into inves-
tigative journalism. He contacted Glenn Greenwald, who had worked 
for The Guardian, as well as documentary filmmaker Laura Poitras, 
to do the job. Both had experience in writing about surveillance and 
secret services. In his book on the ‘affair’, Greenwald confirms that it 
was “vital to publish the documents journalistically […] rather than 
just publishing them in bulk” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 52), thus hinting at 
the previous experiences of WikiLeaks, which did just that – publish 
‘in bulk’. 
In Hong Kong, Guardian staff reporter Ewen MacAskill joined 
Poitras and Greenwald. Together, they went through the vast material 
Snowden had stored, and started publishing the revelations, but took 
care not to endanger ordinary citizens. Snowden has later revealed that 
he had never spoken to a journalist before, and thus labelled himself a 
“virgin source”.3
3 Coll, Steve. (2014, October 21) How Edward Snowden changed journalism. The New Yorker Re-
trieved from https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/snowden-changed-journalism, 
accessed 13.07.2018
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More transparency
The Snowden case is a perfect example of how a whistleblower join-
ing hands with professional journalists, with support from a pow-
erful media institution, may shape a series of powerful investigative 
journalism reports on issues vital to hundreds of millions of people. 
It may remind us of the Watergate affair, but unlike the Washington 
Post’s “deep throat” who kept his identity hidden until late in his life4, 
Snowden wanted to go public about his role in the revelations, and did so 
in a video interview in The Guardian. Thus, his strategy is more related 
to the way in which former military analyst Daniel Ellsberg revealed 
The Pentagon Papers, and took the risk of going public as the source 
of the revelations on the historical role of the U.S. in the Vietnam War 
(Ellsberg, 2001).5 Snowden stated in the interview that he “did not want 
to live in a society that does these sorts of things” and that the surveil-
lance activities were done “outside the democratic model”.6 By stepping 
forward in this manner, he made the issue of transparency even more 
prominent, since working with anonymous sources remains a contested 
area within professional journalism. This was also an important gesture 
vis-à-vis the public, since he could be explicit about his motives and be 
judged accordingly.
This ultimate revelation of Snowden’s own identity came at a high cost, 
not least to the whistleblower himself, since he has lived involuntarily in 
Russian exile since 2013. It seems he will remain there for the foreseeable 
future, although the European Parliament with a slim majority voted in 
favor of granting him asylum in a member country.7 
4 von Drehle, David (2005, June 1). FBI’s no. 2 was ‘Deep Throat’: Mark Felt ends 30-year mystery of 




5 Ellsberg has, after the Snowden revelations, toured many countries together with other Ameri-
can whistleblowers in support of Edward Snowden.
6 https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/jun/09/nsa-whist leblower-ed-
ward-snowden-interview-video Accessed 13.07.2018.
7 Friedensdorf, Conor (2015, October 29). European Lawmakers Vote in Support of Edwards 




The case of Norway
Norway, being part of the NSA’s ‘nine eyes’, has a particularly close 
connection to the U.S. surveillance system. The most important results 
regarding the surveillance of its citizens until now have been provided by 
reports from the “Status for Freedom of Expression in Norway” (Staksrud 
et al., 2014). This survey of citizens in general includes several questions 
on attitudes towards surveillance and other security measures. It reveals 
a rather divided people when it comes to confidence in the government 
being able to hinder a terror attack on Norwegian soil (35 percent have 
great or moderate confidence, 30 percent have low or no confidence, and 
a substantial number say neither/nor or do not know). 
These results must be judged in context, appearing just three years after 
a major terrorist attack against the government and the Labor party’s 
youth camp in Norway, killing 77 people and wounding many more. 
Also important here is the context of the subsequent Gjørv commission8, 
revealing severe weaknesses in Norway’s preparedness in relation to such 
attacks. Another question concerned phone tapping in a situation with a 
“rapidly approaching terror attack” (ibid. my translation). A vast major-
ity (81 percent: 42 percent ‘absolutely’, 39 ‘probably’) would accept this 
measure in such a situation (ibid., p. 53). About two thirds would – to an 
extent or absolutely – accept surveillance of emails in the same described 
extreme situation, while one third would not (ibid., p. 57). Approximately 
the same proportions emerge when respondents are asked about surveil-
lance of social media, with somewhat fewer being negative (ibid., p. 58). 
The phrasing of the questions (immediate danger) might have influenced 
the outcome in a more pro-authorities direction.
When asked in general about attitudes towards the authorities’ cont-
rol of the Internet, the sample population is more equally divided, the 
proportion of “control skeptics” being slightly larger than those who are 
“control supportive” (ibid. p. 60). The report reveals that journalists in 
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Source protection – for whom?
Such discrepancies between citizens in general and people whose liveli-
hood depends on freedom of expression, may in the long run have politi-
cal consequences, although a significant Supreme Court decision ruled 
in favor of source protection.9 The case in question concerned documen-
tary filmmaker Ulrik Imtiaz Rolfsen, who was working on a film about 
extremists recruiting young people for the so-called Islamic State. Such a 
decision, whereby the surveillance authorities (PST) had to return confis-
cated material to the filmmaker, may be seen as working in the opposite 
direction, i.e. as part of an unchilling effect on journalists and related pro-
fessionals working with sensitive issues of national security.
As we can see from the above, the questions in the survey were different 
from the ones in a survey orchestrated by U.S. PEN (see below), although 
the Norwegian research was also conducted in the autumn of 2013, i.e. 
while the Snowden revelations were still fresh news. What the answers 
reveal, though, is a varying alertness in the general population on ques-
tions concerning freedom of expression, but also a varying level of confi-
dence towards the media, exemplified by the fact that about one third of 
the respondents think journalists may refrain from writing about politi-
cally extremist groups in fear of their reactions (Staksrud et al., 2014, p. 77).
In an anthology on surveillance (Hausken et al., 2014, not treating the 
Snowden revelations in particular), several chapters warn against not 
taking surveillance seriously enough, and Bjørn Erik Thon (Thon, 2014) 
envisages with fear a situation where you may be arrested due to an algo-
rithm. Furthermore, he warns against a “development where confidence 
in data analysis overrides the human analytic ability”. He also says that 
the law passed concerning the fight against terror is not precise enough 
on these issues. He concludes that it is not acceptable that Norwegian 
citizens may be surveilled by programs such as PRISM (one of the pro-
grams later revealed by Snowden10), and therefore it is of vital importance 
9 https://www.aftenposten.no/kultur/i/qkJo/Full-seier-til-kildevernet-i-Hoyesterett_-PST-ma- 
gi-tilbake-6-8-timer-med-filmopptak Accessed 16.07.2018
10 Lee, Timothy B. (2013, June 12). Here is everything we know about PRISM so far. Washington 




that the Norwegian government pressures the U.S. on these issues. This 
does not seem to be the case, and politicians have in general been reluc-
tant to take part in public discussions of the Snowden revelations (Eide 
& Lånkan, 2016). 
The case of U.S. writers
The revelations of mass surveillance may have changed the practices of 
people who work with journalism and literature more than we know 
so far. Journalists increasingly use encryption techniques to safeguard 
exchanges with sources and colleagues. This has proven to be a good tool 
for many professionals, but when/if noticed this usage itself may raise 
suspicion among surveillance services.
A survey conducted by U.S. PEN11 among its members, done after the 
Snowden revelations in 2013, may be an indicator, although the response 
was low (which may in itself be an indicator of a chilling effect of sorts). 
Respondents expressed having reservations to the survey since it was 
conducted online (U.S. PEN, 2013). Nevertheless, the results may be con-
nected to chilling effects, and to the need for further research on this vital 
issue. The members of U.S. PEN are writers, translators, and journalists, 
and among the more than 500 who responded, 85 percent expressed 
worries about government surveillance of Americans. While 73 percent 
were worried about privacy rights and freedom of the press, almost all, 
96 percent, were concerned about government efforts to compel journal-
ists to reveal sources of classified information, and most of these were 
very concerned. After the Snowden revelations, more than one fourth of 
the respondents reported limiting their exposure to or totally avoiding 
social media. Equally, one fourth avoid speaking of certain issues on the 
telephone. Sixteen percent have avoided writing or speaking publicly on 
special subjects. Several respondents also reported a reluctance to com-
municate with sources or friends abroad for fear of endangering them.
11 PEN is a global organization promoting literature and free expression. Created in 1921, it orga-
nized poets, essayists and novelists, thus the acronym PEN.
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In addition, quite a few PEN members expressed reluctance to pursue 
research on certain types of subject matter. The surveillance of profes-
sional research, be it directed against journalists, writers or academics, 
is of particular importance, as such research oftentimes has to do with 
accessing controversial websites, and mass surveillance does not include 
monitoring the researcher’s motivation for accessing these websites.
Among the respondents, the ‘younger’ writers (below 50 in this sur-
vey), seemed less concerned about surveillance, but simultaneously more 
likely to take precautionary measures against it. The explanation may be 
that the younger generation is ‘groomed’ to reveal matters of privacy on 
digital platforms, yet on the other hand this generation is more digitally 
literate and thus more aware of digital surveillance methods.
According to U.S. PEN, surveillance of a mass character, such as the 
one revealed by Edward Snowden, represents a great detriment to the 
study of foreign cultures, and a subsequent loss of international under-
standing. A high proportion (88 percent) felt a real concern that a vast 
amount of data is already in government hands, and is as such vulnerable 
to bureaucratic bungling, misuse and partisan abuse.
Despite its shortcomings (for example a non-satisfactory percentage of 
respondents), the results from this PEN survey included very relevant ques-
tions, and ought to inspire researchers elsewhere to take up the challenge 
of monitoring or doing research on the chilling effect and its consequences.
Post-privacy society?
It is no exaggeration to claim that in late modernity, citizens are much 
more than before subject to Foucault’s panopticon-like surveillance (Fou-
cault, 1977). Surveillance has become a fundamental model of social orga-
nization and, I would add, a threat to any social organization. One may 
dispute the claim that most citizens connected to the digital world con-
tribute every day to their own surveillance by innocent actions on email 
and a variety of social media platforms. Nevertheless, it is relevant to dis-
cuss, as seasoned commentator Gary Younge (2012) does, whether we are 
seamlessly transforming ourselves into a post-privacy society, partly by 
way of low citizen digital media literacy. 
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Whistleblower Edward Snowdeń s revelations taught us that mass sur-
veillance is a global phenomenon, and that everyone using phones, email 
or social media, risk being part of the so-called ‘haystack’ where the 
agents of mass surveillance eventually search for the ‘needles’, i.e. those 
individuals or groups who pose alleged threats to society. The ‘needle in 
the haystack’, albeit a bad metaphor, was a prime argument in defense of 
the NSA surveillance. 
Threats to journalists and public individuals
The journalists (Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald) and media (The 
Guardian, The Washington Post) at the heart of the revelations, have 
reported being subject to special scrutiny in the aftermath of publica-
tion. The Guardian, the newspaper that broke the NSA news, received 
visitors from GCHQ (Government Communication Headquarters, part 
of British surveillance), who ordered journalists to destroy their laptops 
in a futile exercise to destroy the ‘Snowden files’.12 Furthermore, Green-
wald’s partner, David Miranda, was arrested and searched at Heathrow 
airport after the revelations, and the police justified their action by refer-
ring to anti-terror legislation.13 If these acts were intended to produce a 
chilling effect (knowing that the Snowden data would also be in storage 
elsewhere), they might have worked.
However, surveillance is far from the only way in which the chilling 
effect operates. Globally, between 2012 and 2016, 530 journalists were 
killed, which amounts to an average of two deaths per week (UNESCO, 
2017). The absolute majority (92 percent) of these were reporters working 
in their home country. The norm in such cases remains impunity, since 
in only ten percent of the cases the perpetrator(s) are brought to justice 
12 Editorial in the Guardian (2013, August 20). NSA files: Why the Guardian in London destroyed 
hard drives of NSA files. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/20/nsa-
snowden-files-drives-destroyed-london Accessed 15.07.2018
13 Green, Damian (2013, August 20). Police who arrested David Miranda were ‘protecting us from 
terrorism’, The Telegraph Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/10254309/
Damian-Green-Police-who-arrested-David-Miranda-were-protecting-us-from-terrorism.html 
Accessed 15.07.2018
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(ibid.). UNESCO also emphasizes growing threats to digital safety, by 
way of cyberattacks, hacking (see also Patrikarakos, 2017), intimidation 
and more online harassment, particularly of women journalists. 
Navigators between states and extremists 
In countries at war, journalists and writers risk a lot just by being in 
contact with a ‘westerner’, since terrorists and extremists do not differ 
between journalists critical of Western policies and ‘US agents’, the latter 
being particularly targeted. Extremist organizations in many cases pay 
special attention to foreigners, to them synonymous with Americans and 
their policies in the Middle East and beyond. Thus, for example, visiting a 
country such as Afghanistan may put friends and colleagues with whom I 
work at risk. In their world, the threats – indeed a source generating chill-
ing effects – may take the form of death threats from terrorists, threats 
to entire media houses, or the threat of arrest from government officials, 
central and local. Extremists and terrorists in Afghanistan have explicitly 
targeted media institutions and groups of journalists, resulting in record 
numbers being killed during recent years.14 They have their own system 
of surveillance enabling them to target special individuals, not least by 
using ‘insiders’ both in the military and elsewhere. 
Journalists in countries such as Afghanistan may have to navigate 
between threats from the state and threats from multiple extremist groups, 
the latter in particular often branding freedom of expression a ‘Western 
value’, as also happened during the ‘cartoon controversy’ (Kunelius et al., 
2007; Eide et al., 2008). Quite a few reporters facing such circumstances 
leave the country or choose another profession (for example joining gov-
ernment circles), if possible. The ultimate ‘goal’ of the chilling effect is 
thus achieved. According to local sources, a couple of hundred journal-





The case of investigative journalism
The ways in which Snowden’s revelations were treated, varied widely. In 
the U.K. and elsewhere The Guardian (being a global news institution) 
stood firm in their contribution to the revelations, while an editor for 
another liberal-leaning media group, Chris Blackhurst, issued a statement 
in The Independent declaring his trust in the surveillance authorities. 
He revealed that the media group, to which the newspaper belongs, had 
received advice from the government not to publish news on the global 
surveillance revelations, as it would hurt national security (Blackhurst, 
2013). The then editor-in-chief of The Guardian Alan Rusbridger stated 
(see Eide & Kunelius, 2018) that he had a hard time understanding this as 
a journalist – since relations to the state are so fundamental to journalists. 
In the Washington Post, a newspaper that stood alongside The Guard-
ian in its news coverage of the NSA revelations, the leadership thought 
differently. An editorial signed by the editorial collective of the newspa-
per appealed for a stop to the “damaging revelations or the dissemination 
of information to adversaries”. The main argument against going pub-
lic with documentation of mass surveillance was in many cases national 
security, framed by the ongoing ‘war on terror’. While this national secu-
rity argument is used against openness in many countries, in yet other 
ones restrictive laws, including blasphemy regulations, may add an addi-
tional chill to the work of journalists. 
In the ‘Hong Kong process’ (when three reporters secretly met with 
Edward Snowden for the first time)15, there were moments when Gre-
enwald was so impatient that he thought he would publish without The 
Guardian on board (Greenwald, 2014). While the media house checked 
all legal routes and made the decision to let its New York newsroom pub-
lish, Greenwald and his colleagues waited together with a 29-year-old 
whistleblower who was at great risk of being found out by U.S. intelli-
gence and deported to his home country to receive a lifetime prison sen-
tence. The strain caused by the reporters’ sense of responsibility to their 
unique source and the resistance they anticipated following publication, 
15 The reporters were documentary filmmaker Laura Poitras, Glenn Greenwald (connected to The 
Guardian), and Ewan MacAskill from The Guardian. 
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may indeed be seen as part of a chilling effect. However, it did not deter 
them or the newspaper from publishing. 
Many editors seem to disregard the journalistic principle of the peo-
ple’s right to know when it comes to national security and surveillance 
(Kunelius et al., 2017). Of course, this is a contested issue, and no doubt, 
there exists information, which is not always fit to publish, for exam-
ple when peoples’ lives are at stake. On the other hand, the magnitude 
of this global mass surveillance calls for journalistic vigilance, since it 
does not at all discriminate between legitimate targets and surveillance 
of millions of people’s legitimate activities, their writing, their research 
and their right to privacy. Attitudes such as these editorial statements are 
blatant signs of the weak autonomy of the journalistic field in relation to 
the political field (Bourdieu, 2005; Champagne, 2005; Hallin, 2005), and 
another indication that editors are often closer to the political elite than 
to grassroots people, and thus more prone to pressure. Consequently, it 
leaves a narrower space for investigative journalism on sensitive issues – 
which is what investigative journalism is oftentimes about.
This narrowing space might be one of several driving forces behind the 
emergence of new, investigative media institutions, such as the one born 
in the aftermath of the Snowden affair, named The Intercept. The three 
main journalist personalities behind this wholly net-based medium are 
Laura Poitras, Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill, who is from the U.S.-
based progressive newspaper The Nation, and is also responsible for two 
huge volumes based on much investigative work (Scahill, 2008; 2014). The 
Intercept is financed by E-bay owner Pierre Omidyar, which means a busi-
ness model dependent on one of the “rogue members of the plutocracy” 
(Boyd-Barrett, 2005), and in a sense more vulnerable than an institution 
Scahill had previously worked for, the crowdfunded Democracy Now. 
In Norway, many newspapers of different leanings actually recognized 
Edward Snowden as a whistleblower. Norway’s largest print newspaper, 
the liberal-conservative Aftenposten, published an editorial even sup-
portive of his nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. This rather unique 
situation of reduced chilling effects may have emerged due to Norway’s 
experience with an earlier surveillance commission, as well as an open 
debate on the EU’s data retention directive, and a few well-known cases 
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in which specific media had intruded on celebrities’ privacy (see Eide & 
Lånkan, 2016). 
Conclusion: The future of investigative 
journalism and free speech
In the near future, most journalists may still depend on mainstream 
media for the publication of their investigative stories. Nevertheless, the 
emergence of ‘new’ channels, such as the two publications mentioned 
above, and groups of freelancers offering their stories to fringe media 
willing to take the risk, reveal a changing landscape, in which new actors 
may be able to play a greater role. They may enjoy more freedom to pub-
lish controversial investigative stories, but simultaneously they will be 
living with more economic vulnerability and less political and other (edi-
torial) protection against surveillance, threats and harassment. Related 
professions, such as writers and artists, also fear the future and as shown 
above, some resort to self-censorship to protect themselves.
Future investigative journalism and free speech in an era of global 
digital surveillance will depend on several relationships. One is the rela-
tionship between the journalistic field and the state (or multi-state institu-
tions, such as surveillance networks). Whether the journalistic field is able 
to exercise its autonomy from the political field, in the face of dwindling 
resources and more pressure, is a delicate question. The role of editors, as in 
the examples of The Independent and The Washington Post editorial collec-
tive, may serve as an illustrative example of weak autonomy (see also Eide 
& Kunelius, 2018). In the latter case, a conflict within the journalistic field 
became apparent, when editors positioned themselves against their own 
journalists, referring to the question of national security. Furthermore, the 
issue of journalists’ relationships to sensitive sources in general and whis-
tleblowers in particular, is significant. Potential whistleblowers may feel 
discouraged from contacting the media considering the lack of protection 
and reluctance of the media to support openness and transparency in a 
given society. If the mentality of “who are we to question the authorities?” 
gains even more momentum, investigative journalism is bound to meet 
with more constraints in the years to come. 
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The Snowden revelations and the journalism surrounding them may 
have worked in different ways. Snowden’s fate in (permanent?) exile, but 
with the status of prominent intellectual (digital) speaker around the 
world, may encourage both doubt and courage among future whistleblow-
ers. Journalists and related professionals facing harassment and harsh 
control mechanisms, as well as editorial hesitance, may, in order to pro-
tect themselves, be tempted to find less sensitive areas of (creative) work. 
On the other hand, journalistic determination, as in the case of the sup-
portive Snowden coverage in Norway where most newspapers endorsed 
him as a whistleblower, or indeed in cases of transnational co-operation 
such as the Panama Papers, may point towards a more promising future.
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Abstract: Cross-border cooperation among journalists represents a new situation 
for investigative journalism and new challenges for security and safety. Publishing 
articles about corruption and financial crime can have different reactions and con-
sequences depending on the context of the specific country. This study focuses on 
emerging digital media and cross-border cooperation in investigative journalism as 
it relates to safety and security. Major international leaks, like the Panama and Para-
dise Papers and Lux Leaks, have shown the importance of collaboration across bor-
ders. As financial crime and corruption traverse borders, so must journalistic work. 
International networks of journalists represent opportunities for collaboration in 
both data sharing and exchanging experiences, as well as in gaining information 
and knowledge on safety and security. Doing investigative journalism and exposing 
financial corruption can represent a risk for editors, journalists, and sources. 
 Whereas financial crime and collaboration among journalists can tran-
scend borders, journalists operate physically within borders. It is therefore crucial 
to understand national and local contexts in order to make in-depth reporting on 
sensitive issues safer. This study explores the need for greater knowledge about spe-
cific local and national contexts to develop manuals for in-depth journalism, safety, 
and security. The focus is on investigative journalism in Guatemala and the digital 
platform for investigative journalism, Plaza Pública. The basis is interviews, reports, 
and published speeches and an analysis of the role of new digital media in a post-
war process in Guatemala. Important also is an analysis of the types of physical and 
digital risk journalists face while reporting on power structures related to estab-
lished elites, politicians, private companies, and illicit financial flows. An important 
finding presented here reveals how reporting on the links between national political 
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elites and illicit financial flows increases the risk of attacks on journalists. These 
attacks tend to create a ‘chilling effect’, aimed at scaring and intimidating journal-
ists. The study also points out the lack of research on the safety and security of 
the partners in countries in, for instance, Latin America in relation to international 
collaboration.
Keywords: digital journalism, safety and security, cross-border cooperation, Gua-
temala, chilling effect
Introduction
In 2016, the chair of the board of the International Consortium of Interna-
tional Journalism (ICIJ) presented a keynote address entitled, “A Golden 
Age of Global Muckraking at Hand”, arguing that cross-border cooper-
ation among journalists and editors ushers in a new era of investigative 
journalism (Coronel, 2016, June 20). One of the reasons for this thriv-
ing collaboration is the need to report on issues that transcend borders, 
like illicit financial flows (IFF), corruption, business networks, criminal 
groups, and politicians (Sambrook, 2018). Another reason is technology. 
Technology makes it possible to collaborate over distances and with large 
amounts of data, and technology enables the establishment of digital 
platforms for investigative journalism that are able to compete with, or 
complement, traditional media (Grennan et al., 2015). Cross-border coop-
eration brings together small, independent media platforms and larger, 
more established platforms. Looking, for instance, at cross-border coop-
eration on the Paradise Papers, we find twenty-one media partners from 
Latin America, only five of which were from traditional media, while the 
great majority were from new and digital media platforms for investiga-
tive journalism.1 
Many journalists work in countries where reporting on the ‘wrong 
muck’ can be a matter of life and death. Between 2012 and 2016, 530 jour-
nalists were killed, 90 percent of whom were local reporters (UNESCO, 
2018). Coronel (2016) claims we need “watchdogs who can transcend bor-
ders because we live in a borderless world”, however working conditions 
for journalists still depend upon local and national contexts within the 
1 https://www.icij.org/paradise-papers-media-partners/ 
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borders. Even though there is an increased focus on safety and security, 
Hughes and Márquez-Ramírez (2017) stress the importance of under-
standing how unsafe contexts and overlapping risks influence journalism, 
and the ways that context and overlapping risk can vary significantly. In 
considering cross-border cooperation, the safety of investigative journal-
ists should be a matter of great concern. More specifically, the working 
conditions for small and independent media platforms contributing to 
cross-border cooperation need to be addressed. This paper seeks to high-
light the working conditions for investigative journalism in Guatemala, 
and thus to contribute to an ongoing discussion of security and safety 
for journalists in a new digital era with ever increasing cross-border 
cooperation.
Latin America and Guatemala
In Latin America, the new digital media have grown rapidly (Weiss, 2015), 
and Guatemala is no exception. In 2011, the digital platform Plaza Pública 
was established to support in-depth journalism in a country struggling 
to implement peace and a trustworthy democracy after four decades of 
war. Plaza Pública is a part of the Global Investigative Journalism Net-
work (GIJN) and a founding member of ALiados, an association of online 
media from nine Latin American countries. Plaza Pública has a team of 
approximately 15 people and after seven years of experience they have 
produced more investigative journalism than any other media outlet in 
Guatemala (Avila, 2013). They recognize that transcending national bor-
ders and creating alliances with journalists around the world is funda-
mental to their work (Plaza Pública, 2018, January 26). 
Safety and security have become issues of great concern due to an 
increase in harassment and the killing of journalists on a global scale 
(UNESCO, 2018). The numbers are especially worrying in Latin America. 
Between 2012 and 2017, Latin America and the Caribbean have registered 
a significant upward trend in the killing of journalists, connected largely 
to organized crime, drug trafficking and corruption (UNESCO, 2018, 
p. 133). Guatemala shares borders with Mexico, El Salvador, Belize and 
Honduras, all countries where threats against journalists are a serious 
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concern (Benítez, 2017). Although the three countries share some similar 
problems, there are important specificities to consider. Despite the signing 
of the peace agreement in 1996 in Guatemala, steps towards democracy 
including efforts to comply with international transparency standards 
(Tax Justice Network, 2018) have not been fulfilled. The current political 
situation in Guatemala has exposed a deep crisis of corruption involving 
politicians and high-level officials, including the former president and 
vice-president of the country, making reporting on issues like embezzle-
ment and tax evasion extremely sensitive (Tax Justice Network, 2018). The 
Committee to Protect Journalists (2018) reports that twenty-four journal-
ists have been killed in Guatemala since 1992, however almost all of them 
are local reporters, mainly from radio stations, in smaller cities or rural 
areas. The media, particularly community radio and digital media, have 
been at the forefront of the demand for a democratic transition (Velásquez, 
2016; Støen, 2018). Yet, the statistics on both physical crimes and increas-
ing digital harassment against journalists in Guatemala remain worrying 
(Cerigua, 2017). In the Corruption Perceptions Index for 2017 published by 
Transparency International, countries are ranked by their perceived lev-
els of public sector corruption, according to experts and business people. 
Almost all the Latin American countries, with few exceptions, are found 
to have high levels of corruption, and Managing Director Patricia Moreria 
underlines the link between corruption and safety for journalists: “CPI 
results correlate not only with the attacks on press freedom and the reduc-
tion of space for civil society organizations. In fact, what is at stake is the 
very essence of democracy and freedom”.2
Existing literature on digital investigative 
journalism and collaboration
A well-functioning society depends on a free and independent media. It 
is the lifeline of freedom of expression and democracy (Carlsson, 2017). 
For decades, journalists have worked on corruption, human rights abuses 
2 https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 
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and corporate exploitation called either global muckraking (Schiffrin, 
2014), investigative journalism, or in-depth journalism (Hunter, 2012; 
Lindholm, 2018; Witschge et al., 2016). Despite different names, all con-
sider the journalist to be a watchdog or a digger with one mission: “to 
bring accountability to a global scale” (ICIJ Manifesto). 
Investigative reporting is increasing, despite the news industry being 
caught up in “the biggest crisis since the Second World War” (Hunter, 
2012, p. 8). This crisis consists of, and is provoked by, the concentration 
of news media, leading to huge budget cuts that again affect the number 
of working journalists (Hunter, 2012). The crisis has appeared in almost 
all OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
countries. Journalists struggle to adapt to both a new technological era 
and to fast-changing social, political, and economic circumstances (Sam-
brook, 2018). The media has lost a great amount of credibility, threatening 
to undermine the legitimacy of serious in-depth journalism with ‘fake 
news’ as a rising phenomenon (Sambrook, 2018). In addition, the crisis 
in investigative reporting is growing, not only in the OECD countries, 
but also in countries where media ownership concentration has been the 
rule rather than the exception for a much longer period (Hunter, 2012). 
According to Sambrook (2018) collaboration is fundamental for finding a 
way out of the current crisis. 
Investigative Reporters and Editors (IRE), the world’s largest non-profit 
investigative journalism association, defines investigative journalism as 
“systematic, in-depth and original research and reporting, often involving 
the unearthing of secrets, heavy use of public records and computer assisted 
reporting, with a focus on social justice and accountability” (Investigative 
Reporters & Editors, 1983). The idea of working in cross-border networks 
on investigative journalism is not only about sharing data and information, 
but also about sharing methods (Hunter 2012). “Methods of conception, 
research, organization and composition” are all the foundation blocks of 
investigative journalism (Hunter, 2012, p. 3). According to Sambrook (2018) 
journalism is normally a competitive and investigative activity seeking 
exclusivity. When ICIJ got the IRE award for innovation in investigative 
journalism due to the Panama Papers investigation, the IRE emphasized 
“the unprecedented collaboration […] making public something that 
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others would want to keep secret” (ICIJ, 2017). Sambrook (2018) claims 
that increasing collaboration is driven by several factors: firstly, data leaks 
require specialist expertise in handling data, which can put an economic 
strain on news organizations making collaboration more attractive; sec-
ondly, accountability journalism should cross borders to meet the globally 
networked challenges of, for instance, corruption and IFF; and finally, col-
laboration is needed to address safety and security concerns. 
Going back to the ICIJ manifesto, we can understand investigative 
journalism, both historically and in the digital era, as a tool to deepen 
our knowledge of how the world works. Who is in power? Who con-
trols war and peace? Who controls the money and the power? Piketty 
(2015) argues that if we are interested in inequality, global injustice and 
the future of democracy, we should care about how private persons and 
companies hide money in tax havens. Reuter (2017) estimates that IFF 
exceed $1 trillion annually. IFF have five major sources: bribes, tax eva-
sion, criminal enterprise earnings, corporate profit shifting and currency 
regulating evasion (Reuter 2017: 1). Tax havens and IFF contribute to a 
dysfunctional world-economy deepening the gap between rich and poor 
(Tax Justice Network 2016). Some countries are more vulnerable to this 
than others, especially countries in Latin America and Africa that suffer 
from hidden fortunes and tax evasion (Alstadsæter et al. 2016). “The rule 
of law is partly dependent on the support of economic and political elites 
[…] Broader public trust can also be eroded by the revelation of elites 
moving money out of the country” (Reuter, 2017, p. 2). 
Sorting out the power and money structures hidden in the massive 
leaks requires a system to handle big data. A specific team for data jour-
nalism inside the ICIJ was established in 2014 to organize the 2.6 tera-
bytes of information from the Panama Papers leading to thousands of 
articles around the world on tax havens and IFF (Knightscenter, 2016). 
This is one example of how collaboration can lead not only to one break-
ing story, but multiple stories simultaneously. The amount of data can be 
overwhelming, however, and for this reason books on data journalism are 
increasingly shared and updated frequently online. 
Changes in digital technology combined with an increased dependency 
on digital communications technology pose a new risk for journalists 
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and their sources (UNESCO, 2018). Telling stories that want to be hid-
den can lead to the silencing of journalists. The 2015 press freedom index 
of Reporters Sans Frontières documents that freedom of expression is 
declining on all five continents, and that the main reason lies in infor-
mation wars and increasing attempts to control information, leading to 
physical and digital threats against journalists. Hunter (2012) also high-
lights the concentration of ownership of news media as a problem for 
freedom of the press, leading to censorship if the news questions an own-
er’s political or financial interests. 
According to the ICIJ manifesto, the journalist’s job is to arm the pub-
lic with information, to empower citizens to strengthen democratic insti-
tutions and democracy itself. 
The media and journalists can play an important role in post-conflict 
processes by promoting participation and dialogue, providing informa-
tion to civil society, as well as through their watchdog function (Org-
eret, 2016). Combining in-depth muckraking and data collection with 
the capacity to tell the story to the public, is what makes investigative 
journalism powerful. Yet when this has an influence on public debate and 
touches the “untouchable”, it can represent a risk to the journalist.
Methodology
This study is based upon six semi-structured interviews with investiga-
tive journalists, editors, academics, and digital security consultants. The 
names of those interviewees have been anonymized. 
The study is also based on an analysis of the manual “Así investigamos 
(y así nos cuidamos)” (“this is how we investigate (and how we protect 
ourselves)”)3 for in-depth journalism created by Plaza Pública. The man-
ual explains how Plaza Pública seeks to engage investigative journalism 
and access data inside Guatemala. The study is also based upon a close 
reading of the material published by Plaza Pública related to the Panama 




the Guatemalan economic and political elites with tax havens. Addition-
ally, the study refers to published keynotes, presented by relevant actors, 
to understand both the importance of collaboration in investigative jour-
nalism and the political context in Guatemala. The keynotes are from the 
conference “Making Transparency Possible” organized by Publish What 
You Pay in Oslo in December 2016 entitled “Against all odds in Guate-
mala: A corruption case involving the highest political and military lev-
els” by Iván Velásquez, Commissioner of the International Commission 
against Impunity in Guatemala, (CICIG, Spanish acronym), and the 
panel debate from the same conference, “How to hold a president and a 
vice-president accountable for corruption charges”4 with Ivan Velasquez, 
Professor Mariel Støen (University of Oslo) and Rodrigo Véliz, investiga-
tive journalist from Guatemala (Plaza Pública and CMI Guatemala). The 
study is also based upon a published article by the journalist Véliz, an 
interview with Iván Velásquez published on InSight Crime (2018, Febru-
ary 1), and the Open Society Foundations report: “Unfinished business: 
Guatemala’s International Commission against Impunity (CICIG)”. 
Guatemala: Digital investigative journalism 
After almost four decades of war in Guatemala, the Truth Commission 
(1999) documented the killings of 200,000 people, the majority indig-
enous people from rural areas. During the civil war, the formation of 
Illegal Bodies and Clandestine Security Apparatuses (CIACS, Spanish 
acronym), groups of parallel structures composed of (former) military 
intelligence officers, judges, prosecutors, police officers and other state 
officers, was revealed (Velásquez, 2016). The CIACS basically took con-
trol of Guatemala after the signing of the peace agreement in 1996, with 
violent results and destructive effects on Guatemalan society and the 
young democracy (Open Society Foundations, 2015). The CIACS became 
‘untouchable’ both for the justice system and for the media. In 2007, the 
International U.N. Commission against Impunity in Guatemala started 
4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VTfoVzIRGjM 
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working with national authorities to resolve complex cases and investi-
gate and prosecute the ‘untouchable figures’ in Guatemala (Open Society 
Foundations, 2015). In 2015, CICIG and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
together with the Attorney General and the National Civilian Police, 
revealed how several politicians in the administration of former President 
Otto Pérez Molina set up a corrupt customs ring with the help of high 
ranking officials in the tax and customs administration, a case known as 
La Línea (Velásquez, 2016). The revelation led to massive demonstrations 
for 22 weeks throughout Guatemala and culminated in the downfall of 
President Molina and the government. Velásquez (2016) calls La Línea 
a watershed in Guatemalan history and underlines three key elements 
for understanding the events that shook Guatemala in 2015: the work of 
CICIG, the role of the population and the role of the press. 
New digital platforms like Plaza Pública, Nómada and Centro de 
Medios Independientes (CMI) reported on the case of La Línea on a 
deeper level than simply the court case. They reported on the histori-
cal connections among the power elites in Guatemala, making it possi-
ble to reveal to the public how La Línea was merely one example of how 
power structures persisted in Guatemala since the war. However, there 
is still some ‘unfinished business’ in Guatemala (Open Society Founda-
tions, 2015). In August 2017 the current Guatemalan President, Jimmy 
Morales, ordered the immediate expulsion of the head of the CICIG, 
Iván Velásquez. This has resulted in a climate of insecurity in Guatemala, 
making it hard to predict what will happen (Støen, 2018). This unpredict-
ability and uncertainty also affect the work of journalists who, for the last 
few years, had been able to write about formerly ‘untouchable’ issues in 
Guatemala (Anonymous, 2018). 
Media ownership concentration and  
the rise of digital platforms
Media ownership and the absence of public service media exacerbate the 
problem of a free press in Guatemala (Avila, 2013). As mentioned, the con-
centration of media ownership is now of great concern in many OECD 
countries, but in most of the Latin American countries media ownership 
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concentration has historical roots. Four out of five terrestrial television 
channels and 90 percent of television audiences in Guatemala are con-
trolled by a single individual, the Mexican born Remigio Ángel González, 
and four out of five major national newspapers are controlled by two fam-
ilies (Avila, 2013). González not only owns the TV channels 3, 7, 11 and 13, 
and 25 percent of the radio stations in Guatemala, he also owns the Latin 
American media network Albavisión, consisting of 45 TV channels and 
68 radio stations. In 2016 Interpol issued an international arrest warrant 
for the registered owner of the Guatemalan TV channels belonging to 
Albavisión, González’s wife, Alba Elvira Lorenza Cardona. Cardona was 
accused of illegally financing former President Otto Pérez Molina’s politi-
cal campaign in exchange for favoring her companies (Alonso, 09.09.16). 
Despite historical media ownership concentration, Guatemala has a long 
history of investigative journalism. The Guatemalan Journalists’ Associa-
tion (Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala, APG) was founded in 1947, 
but the civil war, the criminalization of journalists, and corporate control 
of the media have, together, effectively silenced journalists and editors. A 
quarter of all adults in Guatemala are unable to read, and although tele-
vision is increasingly popular, radio is still the only mass medium readily 
available throughout the country (Avila, 2013, p. 6). No official number of 
community radio stations exists: some estimate that there could be 240 
stations broadcasting in more than twenty-three indigenous languages 
(Cultural Survival, 2005), while others estimate between 500 and 1000 
community radio stations in Guatemala (Skaar, 2010). According to Avila 
(2013, p. 7) community radio stations offer the best hope of challenging 
the corporate media in Guatemala. 
However, internet use is also rising in Guatemala, leading to the emer-
gence of new digital platforms. Today, 42 percent of the Guatemalan pop-
ulation can access the internet (We are Social, 2018). Facebook is by far 
the most used social media with 7.2 million users, followed by Twitter and 
Instagram (ibid.). Since 2002, different initiatives, from television and 
the printed press to social media journalism and digital platforms, have 
entered the communication scene (Anonymous 5, 2018). Anonymous 1 
(2018) calls the last decade “the golden age for investigative journalism 
in Guatemala”. Crucial for this ‘golden age’ in Guatemala is the work of 
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CICIG and the juridical processes starting to tear apart the parallel struc-
tures, as well as increased access to technology and the internet, thus 
creating alternatives to traditional media (Velásquez, 2016; Støen, 2018; 
Anonymous 1, 2018, Anonymous 2, 2018). “The new media and emerging 
digital platforms are important, first because they are a sign that the pub-
lic sphere and freedom of expression have expanded in Guatemala, and 
second because for that same reason the population has access to better 
information” (Anonymous 5, 2018). Anonymous 5 (2018) even claims that 
to some extent, the alternative media have set the tone for the informa-
tion being presented in Guatemala, and that even the traditional media 
now present more courageous and diverse analyses compared to what 
was possible even just ten years ago. 
Eroding the muck – the work of Plaza Pública
Plaza Pública (Public Square) was established in 2011 as an autonomous 
digital platform for in-depth journalism in Guatemala. The site’s name 
and concept was inspired by Jürgen Habermas’ idea of the public sphere, 
where private citizens come together to discuss matters of public rele-
vance. Plaza Pública is hosted by the private Rafael Landívar University, 
but claims total autonomy from the university in their editorial perspec-
tive. Plaza Pública began covering subjects that were invisible or ignored 
by the national media due to the “injustice committed by previously 
unmentionable powers in the country” (Plaza Pública, ¿Quiénes somos?). 
In October 2018 Plaza Pública published a manual on investigative 
journalism, or what they call profound journalism. The manual has two 
purposes: to educate the journalists inside Plaza Pública, and to distrib-
ute information to students who want to become journalists. The first 
part of the manual explains how they work to develop a story, what kind 
of language they use and the length, thus providing in-depth insights 
while retaining people’s attention. The second part outlines how to inves-
tigate and where to look for information. Distinct from online manu-
als like “Computer-assisted reporting: A practical guide” (2014) or “The 
data journalism handbook: How journalists can use data to improve the 
news” (2018), this manual presents detailed information on how you can 
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work in Guatemala. There are lists and explanations with addresses, insti-
tutions, people and offices where you can go to obtain information. The 
core of their work is based upon the methods of the old muckrakers: to 
ask people in the field who, why, how, where and when, and combine this 
with digital data and investigation in physical archives.
In 2008, Guatemala approved the law of free access to public informa-
tion (Ley de Libre Acceso a la Información Publica), yet getting access 
often remains a matter of security (Anonymous 3, 2018). There are two 
problems concerning access to data: firstly, not all is made public despite 
the law; and secondly, you will be registered if you search for data, which 
can be a risk (ibid.). The information system for private companies in Gua-
temala is opaque and even looking for small data can take weeks (Anon-
ymous 2, 2018.). The opaque system in Guatemala is partly explained by 
the parallel structures that for years learned how to protect themselves, 
creating a system so opaque that it is nearly impossible to access informa-
tion on ownership of the media and large scale companies (Anonymous 
2, 2018, anonymous 4, 2018). 
Through their work with the ICIJ, Plaza Pública was able to process 
data from the Paradise Papers and LuxLeak. Plaza Pública was the only 
news outlet in Guatemala with access to the data, and for eight months 
three journalists worked on it full time with the editors. When writing 
stories based on the leaks, it was important for Plaza Pública not to be 
tempted by ‘dynamite news’, explained as the shocking information of 
the leak itself, but rather to go deeper into the stories by linking national 
companies to a global network of IFF, and emphasizing the underly-
ing structures (Anonymous 2, 2018). Even though data from the leaks 
revealed the connection of companies and politicians in Guatemala to tax 
havens, it was challenging to track down this data and trace the money 
back to its origin (ibid.). “The leaks give us a hint that can bring us to an 
international plot with national actors, but you don’t know exactly where 
the leak will take you” (Anonymous 2, 2018). In the case of the Paradise 
Papers the “hint” brought Plaza Pública to one of the ‘untouchable’ sec-
tors in Guatemala: the sugar producers (los azucareros). “Los azucareros 
had been a ‘no-go’, something you can’t write about because they are part 
of the ‘untouchable’ elite. With proof from the leak, together with our 
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earlier investigations of the companies, we could do solid publications, 
not only on their connection to tax havens, but also on the power they 
have in Guatemala” (Anonymous 2, 2018). 
Security and safety 
In February 2018 two journalists were killed in the department of 
Suchitepéquez in Guatemala. “The murders […] only further chill the 
climate of press freedom in Guatemala, where journalists work with con-
stant fear of intimidation and violence” (CPJ, 07.02.18). The assassination 
of journalists is a phenomenon affecting the rural areas of Guatemala 
(Støen, 2018). The city of Guatemala appears to be physically safer for jour-
nalists (Anonymous 2, 2018). However, digital harassment of a different 
kind is becoming more common among emerging digital journalists in 
the cities (Cerigua, 2017; Avila, 2013). Anonymous 4 (2018) explains how 
digital and physical threats have different motivations. While the former 
try to disqualify people, censor and steal information, the latter aim to 
put an end to the work of a journalist by simply taking his or her life. 
Death threats against journalists are common and Véliz (2017) explains in 
his article “The coal case of Guatemala” how he experienced death threats 
after publishing an article that revealed some parallel structures. Accord-
ing to Avila (2013) threats against journalists create a chilling effect due 
to the general failure to bring perpetrators to justice, and the lack of reli-
able investigation makes it harder to claim that those deaths are directly 
connected to journalism. The two journalists killed in Suchitepéquez 
in February 2018 were doing investigative reporting on corruption, and 
they were investigating the murder of two journalists from 2015 in the 
same area. These two journalists are often included in lists of commu-
nity leaders killed during 2018 in Guatemala, murders characterized by 
one fact: there are no results from the investigations. Cerigua has tried 
to put pressure on the on the government to complete the development 
of the Program to Protect Journalists. However, as of now, the murders 




characterize Guatemala as a country where crimes against journalists are 
protected with impunity. 
Assassinations and direct physical violence against journalists are 
more serious problems in the rural areas of Guatemala, however digital 
threats against journalists in urban areas are increasing. Plaza Pública is 
concerned about this increase in digital attacks, both personally against 
journalists, but also against the website itself. Anonymous 2 (2018) relates 
how increasing harassment affects the political climate in Guatemala, 
and creates insecurity in relation to how the elites might adapt after the 
case of La Linea. More recently, there has been a growing awareness of 
what the journalist Luis Assardo calls “digital assassins” or “armies of 
opinion shapers” (Medium 2018, February 8). The “digital assassins” are 
described as net centers that routinely and relentlessly harass and intim-
idate opponents of Guatemala’s entrenched elite. The net centers involve 
people who can manage hundreds of fabricated accounts on social media 
at the same time. The Intercept (2018, April 7) also explains this phe-
nomenon referring to Assardo’s work showing how “digital assassins” 
have attacked people like the head of the CICIG Iván Velásquez, former 
Attorney General Thelma Aldana, and several journalists. The “armies 
of opinion shapers” are a global problem, and according to a report from 
Freedom House (2017) there are thirty countries where governments 
were found to employ “armies of opinion shapers” to spread govern-
ment views, drive particular agendas, and counter government critics 
on social media. The number is rising and the technology is becoming 
more sophisticated, with the proliferation of bots, propaganda producers 
and fake news outlets (Freedom House, 2017). Guatemala has a growing 
population connected by the internet, and there is increasing concern 
about how both “digital assassins” and “armies of opinion shapers” can 
affect the possibility for more open and free debate, which had been 
developing during the last ten years (Anonymous 5, 2018). 
Concluding remarks
Studies on safety and security for journalists reveal an increase in vio-
lence against journalists, and at the same time, investigations and reports 
reporting on unfinished business 
257
like the World Press Freedom Index show us that working conditions for 
journalists around the world are inequitable (Hanitzcsh, 2017). Hughes 
and Márquez-Ramírez (2017) in their case study on Mexico underline an 
awareness of unsafe contexts and overlapping risks for journalists, while 
Torsner (2017) stresses the need to explore the multidimensional nature of 
risk. As was stated in the introduction, investigative journalism through 
cross-border cooperation is increasing, both due to the need to transcend 
borders just as financial crime transcends borders, but also because dig-
ital technology makes it possible to share big data. The work and devel-
opment of the digital platform Plaza Pública in Guatemala, discussed in 
this article, offer insights into the potential of these types of platforms, 
which are in many cases partners in cross-border cooperation on leaks 
like the Panama and Paradise Papers and Lux Leaks. What experiences 
from Guatemala can help us understand are the multidimensional and 
overlapping risks in doing in-depth journalism on financial crimes and 
corruption. Revealing what those in power want to hide is far more dan-
gerous in countries with greater corruption, and where there is a weaker 
judicial system. It is therefore important to highlight how investigative 
journalism in Guatemala has been able to develop due to a judicial sys-
tem that manages, partially, to put an end to the pattern of impunity 
for the political and economic elite. Ulla Carlsson (2017) claims that a 
well-functioning society depends on a free and independent media; how-
ever, it is also the other way around. Freedom of speech and freedom of 
the press also depend on a trustworthy democracy where crimes do not 
go unpunished. It is likely that the development of cross-border coopera-
tion will continue to increase, because the work is indispensable in order 
to end illicit financial flows, but it is also important for ensuring that 
major leaks do not lead to silencing journalists who work in vulnerable 
situations. Developing safety manuals based upon proper work and expe-
riences, like the one Plaza Pública is working on, can be a step towards 
not only enabling journalists to do the digging, even in opaque countries 
like Guatemala, but also helping to secure the work of the journalists. The 
fact that this manual is written specifically for the context of Guatemala 
and specifically for the journalists who will continue the work on finan-
cial crime and corruption in Guatemala, makes the manual much more 
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adapted to securing the safety and security of these journalists than gen-
eralized manuals aimed at journalists who work on in-depth journalism 
‘anywhere’. The potential of cross-border cooperation depends upon the 
work of the journalists who operate inside the borders of countries where 
corruption is at its worst. However this requires a much greater focus on 
the working conditions for both the editors and the journalists. 
References
Alonso, F.L. (2016, September 9). Interpol issues warrant for prominent Guatemala 
businesswoman. Retrieved from https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/
interpol-issues-warrant-for-guatemala-businesswomen/ (accessed 05.10.18).
Alstadsæter, A., Johannesen, N., & Zucman, G. (2016). Chapter in Skjult – 
Skatteparadis, kapitalflukt og hemmelighold (2nd edition). Tax Justice Network 
Norway. 
Assardo, L. (2018, Februrary 8). Los netcenters: Negocio de manipulación. 
Retrieved from https://medium.com/@luisassardo/los-netcenters-negocio-de-
manipulación-2140cf7262fc (accessed 20.04.18). 
Avila, R. (2013). Mapping digital media: Guatemala. A report by the Open Society 
Foundation. Retrived from https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/
default/files/mapping-digital-media-guatemala-20140115.pdf.
Benítez, J.L. (2017). Violence against journalists in the northern triangle of Central 
America. Media Asia.
Carlsson, U., & Pöyhtäri, R. (Eds.) (2017). The assault of journalism. Building 
knowledge to protect freedom of expression. Gothenburg: Nordicom.
CERIGUA (2017). Estado de situación de la libertad de expresión 2017. Retrieved from 
https://cerigua.org/article/estado-de-situacion-de-la-libertad-de-expresion-pr/.
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). (2018). 24 journalists killed in Guatemala 
between 1992 and 2018. Retrieved from https://cpj.org/data/killed/americas/
guatemala/?status=Killed&cc_fips%5B%5D=GT&start_year=1992&end_
year=2018&group_by=year (accessed 25.04.18). 
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) (2018, February 7). Journalist, radio worker 
found dead in Guatemala. Retrieved from https://cpj.org/2018/02/journalist-
radio-worker-found-dead-in-guatemala.php.
Coronel, S. (2016, June 20). A golden age of global muckraking at hand. 2016 
Conference of Investigative Reporters and Editors. Retrieved from https://gijn.
org/2016/06/20/a-golden-age-of-global-muckraking/ (accessed 13.04.18).
Cultural Survival (2005, June). A question of frequency: Community radio in 
Guatemala. Retrieved from https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/




Freedom House (2017). Manipulating social media to undermine democracy. 
Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2017 
(accessed 20.04.18).
Gray, J., Chambers, L., Bounegru, L., et.al. (2018). The data journalism handbook. 
How journalists can use data to improve the news. Retrieved from http://
datajournalismhandbook.org/.
Grennan, K., Robinson, J.J., & Schiffrin, A. (2015). Publishing for peanuts: Innovation 
and the journalism start-up. Columbia University School of International and 
Public Affairs. Report commissioned by the Open Society Foundation’s Program 
for Independent Journalism. Retrieved from http://www.cima.ned.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/PublishingforPeanuts.pdf
Hanitzsch, T. (2017). Collaboration is the future: Doing research in the network  
era. In U. Carlsson & R. Pöyhtäri (Eds.), The assault of journalism. Building 
knowledge to protect freedom of expression. Gothenburg: Nordicom.
Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) (1999). Guatemala: Memory of silence. 
Guatemala City: Historical Clarification Commission.
Houston, B. (2014). Computer-assisted reporting: A practical guide. 4th Edition. 
Routledge.
Hughes, S., & Márquez-Ramírez, M. (2017). How unsafe contexts and overlapping 
risks influence journalism practice. Evidence from a survey of Mexican 
journalists. In U. Carlsson & R. Pöyhtäri (Eds.), The assault of journalism. 
Building knowledge to protect freedom of expression. Gothenburg: Nordicom.
Hunter, M.L. (Ed.) (2012). The global investigative journalism casebook. UNESCO 




Investigative Reporters & Editors. (1983). The reporter’s handbook. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press.
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). Safeguarding the truth 
– ICIJ’s manifesto. Retrieved from https://www.icij.org/about/icijs-manifesto/ 
(accessed 12.04.18 no publication date informed).
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) (2017, April 5). Panama 
Papers project wins four more reporting honors. Retrieved from https://www.icij.
org/blog/2017/04/panama-papers-project-wins-four-more-reporting-honors/ 
(accessed 13.04.18).
Knightcenter (2016, June 3). Panama Papers: Mar Cabra, ICIJ’s data editor, talks 





Lindholm, M. (2018, Frebruary12). The investigative tradition, US and Norway. 
Lecture on digital investigative journalism and cross-border cooperation. Oslo 
Metropolitan University.
Open Society Foundation (2015). Unfinished business: Guatemala’s International 
Commission against Impunity (CICIG). Retrieved from https://www.
opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/cicig-report-english-20150319.pdf.
Orgeret, K. (2016). Introduction in K. Orgeret & W. Tayeebwa (Eds.), Journalism 
in conflict and post conflict conditions - Worldwide perspectives. Gothenburg: 
Nordicom.
Piketty, T. (2015). Foreword to Zucman, G., The hidden wealth of nations: The scourge 
of tax havens. The University of Chicago Press. 
Plaza Pública. Qué es Plaza Pública? Retrieved from https://www.plazapublica.com.
gt/content/quienes-somos (accessed 15.03.18).
Plaza Pública (2018, February 20). Siete años de periodismo autónomo, y vamos por 
más. Retrieved from https://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/siete-anos-de-
periodismo-autonomo-y-vamos-por-mas (accessed 08.03.18). 
Plaza Pública (2018). Así investigamos (y así nos cuidamos). Retrieved from https://
www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/material-formativo (accessed 16.11.18).
Reporters Sans Frontières (2015). World press freedom index 2015. Retrieved from 
https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-2015.
Reuter, P. (2017). World development report 2017: Illicit financial flows and 
governance: The importance of disaggregation. World Bank. Retrieved from http://
pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/677011485539750208/WDR17-BP-Illicit-Financial-
Flows.pdf.
Sambrook, R. (Ed.) (2018). Global teamwork: The rise of collaboration in investigative 
journalism. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, Department of Politics 
and International Relations, University of Oxford.
Schiffrin, A. (Ed.) (2014). Global muckraking: 100 years of investigative journalism 
from around the world. New Press.
Skaar, K. (2010). A community voice: An explorative study of Maya community 
radio practice in Guatemala. Universitetet i Oslo Institutt for medier og 
kommunikasjon.
Støen, M. (2018). Digital investigative journalism. Webinar (05.03.2018). Retrieved 
from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWux6XYcU_g
Tax Justice Network (2018). Financial secrecy index 2018. Retrieved from https://
www.financialsecrecyindex.com/explore/overviewmap (accessed 25.04.18).
Tax Justice Network Norway (2016). Skjult – Skatteparadis, kapitalflukt og 
hemmelighold (2nd edition). 
reporting on unfinished business 
261
The Intercept (2018, April 7). The rise of the net center: How an army of trolls 
protects Guatemala’s corrupt elite. Retrieved from https://theintercept.
com/2018/04/07/guatemala-anti-corruption-trolls-smear-campaign/(accessed 
01.10.18).
Torsner, S. (2017). Measuring journalism safety. Methodological challenges. In U. 
Carlsson & R. Pöyhtäri (Eds.), The assault of journalism. Building knowledge to 
protect freedom of expression. Gothenburg: Nordicom.
UNESCO (2018). World trends in freedom of expression and media development: 
2017/2018 global report. Paris: UNESCO. Retrieved from http://unesdoc.unesco.
org/images/0026/002610/261065e.pdf
Velásquez, I. (2016). Against all odds in Guatemala - A corruption case involving 
the highest political and military levels (December 14). Conference 2016. 
Making Transparency Possible. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/
watch?list=PLM-HU3V5QjmM2z2AbG-bkI7hs8HquEdiu&v=ePtjHQUZH5I.
Véliz, R. (2017, November 23). The coal case of Guatemala. Retrieved from https://
www.publishwhatyoupay.no/nb/node/17442 (accessed 10.04.18).
We Are Social (2018, January 29). Digital in 2018 in Central America. Retrieved 
from https://www.slideshare.net/wearesocial/digital-in-2018-in-central-
america-86863218 (Accessed 19.04.18).
Witschege, T., Anderson, C.W., Domingo, D., & Hermida, A. (Eds.) (2016). The 
SAGE handbook of digital journalism. SAGE.

263
Citation: Fonn, B.K. (2019). “What someone wants kept in the dark.” An Analysis of the Norwegian Panama 
Papers Coverage. In R. Krøvel & M. Thowsen (Eds.), Making Transparency Possible. An Interdisciplinary 
Dialogue (pp. 263–286). Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk. https://doi.org/10.23865/noasp.64.ch18
License: CC BY-NC 4.0
chapter 18
“What someone wants  
kept in the dark.” An Analysis  
of the Norwegian Panama  
Papers Coverage
Birgitte Kjos Fonn
Associate Professor, Oslo Metropolitan University
Abstract: The Panama Papers was a successful example of investigative journalism, 
both in terms of scope and international cooperation, as well as, to an extent, even 
having an impact on police and tax authorities’ practices. But to what extent did the 
investigation contribute to influencing public understanding – thus awakening pub-
lic awareness and enhancing democratic participation with regard to the question of 
transparency? Norway is a country where no politician or other elite representative 
had to resign as a result of the leak. This article analyses the messages of those Nor-
wegian media outlets having the most comprehensive coverage in the first weeks 
following the leak, and tries in part to see it through the eyes of an ordinary citizen 
attempting to make sense of this complex phenomenon. 
Keywords: Panama Papers, investigative journalism, tax base erosion, public 
empowerment
The Panama Papers was impressive work, and has given rise to claims of a 
new kind of international cooperation in the press (Sambrook et al., 2017). 
Not only did the cross-border handling of over 11 million digital files lead 
to a string of exposures and millions of dollars of unpaid taxes suddenly 
finding their way home, but Europol also used tools from the journalistic 
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investigation to disclose trafficking and money laundering.1 In Norway, 
the editor of Aftenposten, the front-runner of the Panama Papers’ Norwe-
gian coverage, stated in an op-ed only a few days after the launch of the 
leak that “together we can achieve anything”.2 
Despite all the good work, the Panama Papers was far from solving 
the problems that tax base erosion represent to the world’s nations. On 
the other hand, neither is this the task of the press. But what is the task 
of the press? Most codes of ethics for journalism emphasise its function 
as a ‘watchdog’, whose task is to scrutinise power and disclose power 
abuse on behalf of the ‘ordinary citizen’, and thus contribute to transpar-
ency and democratic participation. As the ICIJ’s manifesto reads: “We 
believe it is the job of journalists to arm the public with information, to 
empower citizens to strengthen democratic institutions and democracy 
itself. We believe that truth is society’s best weapon against corruption, 
injustice and inequality.”3 The Norwegian press code of ethics, Vær var-
som-plakaten, is one among many with similar formulations. 
The notion of transparency, used in a media context, subsequently 
means more than making financial flows transparent to tax authorities. 
It also means making complex international issues intelligible to citizens. 
As Aftenposten’s editor also wrote in his op-ed: “Investigative journal-
ism is important because it gives to all of us the information that makes 
debate in society more fact-based.”4
National economies are exceedingly intertwined in a global network, 
and economic issues are exceedingly difficult to understand. In many 
countries people still struggle to cope with the repercussions of the recent 
financial crisis. The European welfare states are said to be threatened due 
to a dwindling tax base. Researchers claim that social and economic 
inequality is on the rise. In other words, the gap between the ordinary 
citizen and the rich and mighty seems to be widening. The need for infor-
mative journalism on what those with power do, can be said to be more 
1 Aftenposten, 2 December 2016.
2 Aftenposten, 9 April 2016.
3 https://www.icij.org/about/icijs-manifesto/
4 Aftenposten, 9 April 2016.
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pressing than ever. This is where investigative journalism and work like 
the Panama Papers come in.
This paper is a study of the outcome of the leak in one country, Nor-
way, mainly built on a study of Aftenposten and two other important 
newspapers that specialise in economic journalism. The participants in 
the ICIJ consortium cooperated on all cases of international interest, 
whereas national outlets contributed by revealing their own cases and 
stories. Norway was one of the countries where the leak did not have any 
notable immediate consequences, as opposed to neighbouring Iceland, 
for example, where the Prime Minister had to leave office after the dis-
closure of his family’s tax arrangements. The lack of immediate conse-
quences in Norway does, however, also make it more interesting – it begs 
the simple question: How much useful information for readers, in the 
context of democracy, did the coverage contain? 
In this paper I will discuss the relationships between international 
issues and national journalism; between actors and structure; between 
law and morality; the problem of information without sufficient context; 
and finally, touch upon the special relationship between the media and 
‘experts’. A crucial question is whether journalistic genres and journal-
istic self-understanding in itself may be impediments to achieving the 
journalism the public need in an internationalised world. 
I will do this in part by trying to see the coverage through the eyes of a 
‘typical’ ordinary reader, attempting to make sense of all the comprehen-
sive information in a complex, globalised economy. 
Corpus and context
This article is based primarily on an analysis of the first two weeks after 
the news broke, in particular in the ICIJ partner Aftenposten. Two other 
important Norwegian newspapers have also been studied during the same 
period – Dagens Næringsliv and Klassekampen. Together these three are at 
the top of the list in the Norwegian monitoring agency Retriever when one 
searches for the phrase “Panama Papers”. Klassekampen, number three, 
shares its rank with another newspaper, Dagsavisen, but Klassekampen 
is particularly interesting for its broad coverage of issues at the intersection 
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between international and national economic affairs – a trait it shares 
with Dagens Næringsliv. There is also an interesting spread in political 
viewpoints between the the two papers I have chosen to supplement the 
major, mainstream (but liberal-conservative in editorials) daily Aften-
posten – namely the ecomomic liberalist, business daily Dagens Næring-
sliv and the more left-leaning Klassekampen. 
I have used the articles from Retriever as a base, but have also read 
all three newspapers during these two weeks carefully to be sure I did 
not miss any important articles that did not have the phrase “Panama 
Papers” in them.5 In addition I have checked the overall developments in 
journalism in relation to tax havens during the last five years in all major 
Norwegian news media using Retriever’s database, and therefore I occa-
sionally also refer to some broader trends.6 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the Norwegian coverage and an 
assessment of how informative the coverage may seem from the point 
of view of an ‘ordinary’ citizen, I will comment briefly on two specific 
aspects of the context in which the Panama Papers became media texts: 
(a) the (still) national character of news media, and (b) the news content 
of the Panama Papers case.
a) For one thing, the complexity of the international economy is to an 
extent mirrored in journalism. The news media have, to an increasing 
extent, cross-national owners, and when there are no language barriers 
they have a possible global reach. In addition, it is difficult to imagine a 
story on the finance pages, the life-style pages or the politics pages that 
does not have some kind of international link. Not least, a globalised and 
digitalised world makes exactly the kind of information transfer and 
international cooperation that characterised the Panama Papers possible.
5 Most references to dates refer to the print editions of these newspapers. Klassekampen was at the 
time a predominantly print paper, and as some of this work was done at a stage when Dagens 
Næringsliv had unfortunately withdrawn from Retriever, it was necessary to work with the print 
editions for practical reasons.
6 For the reason described above, Dagens Næringsliv is also not included in all this material. As 
these are broad trends, one can get a fairly good picture without including niche media, but due 
to this weakness in the underlying material I have not included any numbers.
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Nevertheless most news outlets also still have what Benedict Ander-
son (1991) has coined an ‘imagined community’ in mind. They must 
constantly strive to appeal to a sense of identity in their audience. There 
is basically nothing wrong with that. If one upholds a belief in journal-
ism’s democratic function, this is in fact a necessity. In the foreseeable 
future it is difficult to imagine democracy without some kind of national 
media monitoring what the national elites or other power elites do – and 
the nation state is still the entity with the best prospects of fulfilling 
democracy.
At the same time, this highlights the complexity of covering global 
issues for a national audience. They have to be deconstructed, interpreted 
and explained: Why is this important to ‘the little reader’ in society, and 
what issues can the readers influence? A story of international dimen-
sions will normally be given a domestic angle, or at least some domestic 
spectacles through which to view it – as Eide & Simonsen (2004) have put 
it, “the world is created from home”. This is seen as a necessity to catch the 
readers’ interest, but it also implies that attention may be led away from 
other, more comprehensive questions.
b) The other aspect of interest to us is what was the ‘news’ in the Panama 
Papers story? 
The news was not the fact that tax havens exist. Admittedly, there 
was not much international attention paid to tax havens until the 1990s, 
when the US and Switzerland both started investigations of this practice 
( Zucman, 2015, p. 16), but after that date the existence of tax havens has 
been more or less part of our common knowledge. The OECD started its 
work for more openness in 1998, an ambition that has been confirmed and 
deepened on several subsequent occasions. One can register almost one 
important media leak a year, at least for the last five years, and recently 
the international community has also seen the publishing of important 
books about tax evasion and tax avoidance. One very important contri-
bution was economist Gabriel Zucman’s The Hidden Wealth of Nations, 
published in its original French version in 2013 and in English in 2015. 
In this popularised and highly accessible book Zucman estimated that 
7600  billion  dollars – eight percent of the total financial wealth of the 
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world’s households – was stowed away in tax havens, which parallelled a 
total tax loss for the world’s nations of 200 billion dollars a year. 
In Norway, the question has furthermore been discussed in official 
Norwegian reports and research reports, and the work of the G20 or the 
OECD has been covered regularly by the press, albeit often without much 
enthusiasm. As a well-organised welfare state with a still quite solid tax 
base and relatively high tax ethics, tax havens have often been regarded 
as something that ‘happens abroad’ by Norwegian public opinion. Mul-
tinationals that run their businesses in Norway with considerable public 
funding and still stow away their profits in tax havens are occasionally 
mentioned, and the media outlets that cover economic issues on a regu-
lar basis are naturally more interested in tax issues than the mainstream 
press. But on the whole, when browsing through Retriever data from the 
last five years, I find that there are occasional peaks, which also often 
seem to coincide with various international leaks, but the issue is nor-
mally not very salient.
So what was the news? The news was rather that an enormous amount 
of information from a law firm in Panama, Mossack Fonseca, had become 
available to the press, and that this information had been subject to pro-
found, investigative journalism. The news was to a great extent, in other 
words, the journalism. 
We all agree that the investigation was a great achievement – which 
also won several of the participants important awards – but it is import-
ant to bear in mind this question of the news content when analysing 
it. In Norway it is also safe to say that the news to an extent was that a 
Norwegian newspaper had participated in the investigation. This was also 
an important point raised with admiration by Aftenposten’s competitors.7 
Norway is a small country, but often with some degree of international 
influence or international success, a point that is rarely overlooked in the 
national media.
This contrast between the celebration of the journalistic work in 2016 
and the varying degree to which the issue has regularly been covered was 
noted by debaters who had followed the issue closely. The British writer 
7 E.g. Dagens Næringsliv, 5 April 2016.
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George Monbiot wrote with unconcealed irony in an op-ed translated in 
Klassekampen that “nobody knew (before the Panama Papers) that tax 
avoidance was neoliberalism’s favourite activity”.8 The Norwegian pro-
fessor Guttorm Schjelderup, leader of an official Norwegian report on the 
issue (NOU, 2009, p. 19) wrote in Dagens Næringsliv on 6 April that the 
news was that “many journalists from all over the world (had) simulta-
neously become interested in tax havens”.9 Even more important was the 
criticism raised a month later by the Panama Papers’ own deep throat, 
“John Doe”. He wrote that the reason he had to leak the data, was that the 
media generally had failed completely when it came to tax havens.10 
The Panama Papers in Norway
I will now go through the coverage in the chosen outlets, divided into 
four different parts. I also want you to follow me through this coverage 
and see it through the eyes of an average reader, the reader that the fact-
based information is for. Let us, just to get a little acquainted with that 
person, assume that this ‘little’ reader is a she. We can imagine her as a 
busy person with a job and family, but she wants to stay relatively well 
informed. For this purpose, she mostly turns to the press. Let us say that 
she subscribes to one paper that she browses through, online, while hav-
ing her morning coffee – Norway’s major mainstream paper, Aftenposten. 
However she also likes to get her news from different angles, so sometimes 
at work she browses through two more quality papers, Dagens Næringsliv 
and Klassekampen, and apart from that she gets a more sporadic impres-
sion of public debate by checking other outlets on her phone or PC or 
sometimes by watching the news when the children are in bed. She knows 
very well that tax havens exist, but she finds the whole issue extremely 
complicated. She is an ardent taxpayer herself, but she often hears the poli-
ticians say that “we cannot afford” this and that aspect of the welfare state 
any longer. She sometimes worries whether the welfare state is under so 
much pressure that her parents will not get a proper nursing home when 
8 Klassekampen, 9 April 2016.
9 Dagens Næringsliv, 6 April 2016.
10 Aftenposten, 7 May 2016.
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they grow old, and it sometimes strikes her that she hopes her toddler’s 
kindergarten is not involved with a tax haven. But most of the time she 
has demanding, everyday tasks to attend to, and has little time to ponder 
these things. Then, suddenly, a major leak occupies all the front pages and 
newscasts. This raises her awareness of the issue considerably. Now she 
decides to seize the opportunity to understand it all. 
1) Actors and structure, episodes and themes
The fact that there are peaks and valleys in the coverage of this issue is 
somewhat understandable. It is impossible for the media to cover every-
thing all the time, and structural issues are hard to translate into interest-
ing media stories. That is one reason why journalism frames information 
as news, which also implies that specific events enhance the chances of 
an issue being brought to public awareness. Based on Goffman’s clas-
sic notion of ‘framing’ (1974), which was further developed by Entman 
(1993), Iyengar (1991) has claimed that journalistic stories will often have 
episodic as opposed to so-called thematic frames – thematic frames being 
attempts to describe structures and explain context. 
Personalisation is a technique that is often particularly associated with 
episodic frames. Through the use of certain narratives, journalism can 
choose certain persons to represent a more complex issue, or to serve 
as the public face of problems or conflicts in society, hereunder to be 
ascribed the role of ‘villain’. To an extent, this reflects a democratic neces-
sity: if nobody is held accountable, even if the issue is profoundly a result 
of a system failure, there may also be no incentive to try to improve the 
system. On the other hand, it is often argued that if the press can make a 
prominent person resign from his position, it is considered a professional 
victory in itself (Lindholm, 2015). This point is echoed in the op-ed by 
Aftenposten’s editor cited above. Thus a desirable result may sometimes 
be confused with the real goal.
The choice of frames is, however, not only a question of newsroom 
choice. Indeed, what the various types of framing do to the public’s 
understanding of an issue is also interesting. The extensive use of epi-
sodic frames, personalisation and other related forms has, over the years, 
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given rise to concern. Whereas thematic framing is believed to provide 
more profound information on the background of a special problem, 
it has been argued that episodic framing makes the public assume that 
responsibility in relation to a certain issue is both individual and able to 
be solved by individual action (Iyengar, 1991). If so, the public may react 
with cynicism and distrust in the system. 
Other scholars have also pointed out how different kinds of non-the-
matic frames can make members of the audience who do not care much 
about politics in the first place, more interested (f.ex. Norris, 2000). This 
is an unfinished debate. But it is important to bear in mind that any jour-
nalistic choice also implies leaving out something. It is likely that complex 
issues related to the international economy demand a certain amount of 
thematic coverage to be understood.11
In the Panama Papers, the major focus was on the prominent individ-
uals who had connections to Mossack Fonseca, as in Iceland, or alter-
natively the institutions with such connections. In the latter case, the 
individuals who represented these institutions were often brought to the 
foreground. This was the case in Norway.
Unlike Iceland, Norway had no national politicians involved in the 
scandal. Instead the Norwegian coverage very soon began to concentrate 
on Norway’s major bank, DNB. DNB’s Luxembourg branch had assisted 
customers with so-called discrete banking services. In 2007, the then 
finance minister requested that the bank cease doing so. In 2016, it turned 
out that DNB had been setting up mailbox companies in the Seychelles 
between 2006 and 2010, with strawmen from Panama as board members, 
and stayed in contact with Mossack Fonseca until 2015. As late as in 2012, 
the bank discussed whether they should extend their cooperation with 
the law firm. All this had taken place despite the fact that, almost ten 
years earlier, the bank had been publicly criticised for its practice. 
11 There is not much research on how the public reacts to different media approaches to complex 
international affairs. Two recent contributions however tie a focus on so-called “self-serving 
elites” specifically to the question of tax havens. They indicate that this may result in reduced 
democratic participation and reduced “faith in the social contract and confidence in political 
institutions” (Kolstad & Wiig 2018: 12), especially among people in countries where power is less 
evenly distributed. In countries with a properly functioning democracy, voters were more likely 
to react with mobilisation (Kolstad and Wiig forthcoming). 
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The DNB case was promoted as a major part of the coverage from the 
very start. Aftenposten devoted four of its 21 full pages on the first day 
to DNB. DNB became more or less the main Panama Papers story in 
Norwegian media, with a strong focus on DNB’s CEO, who appeared on 
front pages and in TV news headlines all throughout the period. How 
much had the CEO known, and was the bank’s practice so grave that he 
should resign? Politicians, professors, lawyers and PR consultants scram-
bled over each other to condemn the bank and question the position of 
the CEO. Even the Norwegian prime minister expressed disappointment 
in learning about DNB’s practice, and emphasised the neccessity of iden-
tifying those responsible.12 The minister of trade and industry sent the 
bank a letter alledgedly so inquisitorial that one professor described it 
as posing “the kind of questions you use when you reprimand a child”.13
It is important to note that DNB holds an important position in Nor-
way – for many reasons. For one thing, it is to an extent a state-owned 
bank. Originally a merger of two major Norwegian banks, it was partly 
nationalised in the wake of the Scandinavian banking crisis around 1990 – 
an early 1990s’ version of ‘too big to fail’. During the financial crisis 
of 2008, DNB was furthermore one of many European and American 
banks that had to be saved by the authorities. When the bank only a few 
years later raised its mortgage interest rates, with the CEO claiming that 
the customers were part of a necessary ‘Dutch treat’, the bank – and the 
CEO – were widely criticised for being greedy. 
This is important because it shows how the Panama Papers leak was 
immediately translated into a well-known national context with Norwe-
gian actors in central positions. There is a close connection between the 
media being nationally situated and the tendency to personalise disclo-
sures. Most scandals that survive for some time in the media are national 
(with a few exceptions, as when the person in question is president of the 
US). The DNB case illustrated this clearly: a national CEO who had not 
taken a request from the authorities seriously, overshadowed not only the 
12 Aftenposten, 9 April 2016.
13 Aftenposten, 14 April 2016.
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broader, international question, but even the story about the neighbour-
ing prime minister who was forced to resign. 
There are, however, indications that the Norwegian media must have 
realised even at an early stage that the DNB case was a national scandal 
of limited scope. Even after the first week, Aftenposten wrote in a sum-
mary that a corruption case in the partly state-owned company Yara was 
the most severe case disclosed during the last week – “yet DNB stole the 
show”.14 The paper explained the focus on DNB through the bailout after 
the financial crisis, and the lesser focus on Yara by the fact that the case 
was already partly known.15
2) The perception of investigative journalism
If the DNB case was not very serious, but still ‘stole the show’ – what does 
that mean? At this stage, the little reader might start wondering. What 
was, then, the DNB case about? A personalised focus on those responsible 
is not the only typical form investigative journalism can take. Another, 
sometimes related, aspect is that investigative journalism is often under-
stood as a practice that should be directed against violations of the law, 
or, alternatively, more or less hidden violations of strong social norms. 
In the op-ed about investigative journalism cited above, Aftenposten’s 
editor expressed this interpretation exactly when he stated that investi-
gative journalism is about “bringing into the open what someone wants 
kept in the dark”.16 
However, this understanding of investigative journalism is disputed. 
A definition published by UNESCO is more comprehensive: “Investiga-
tive journalism means the unveiling of matters that are concealed either 
deliberately by someone in a position of power, or accidentally, behind 
a chaotic mass of facts and circumstances – and the analysis and expo-
sure of all relevant facts to the public.”17 An even wider definition may 
14 Aftenposten, 11 April 2016.
15 Ibid.





entail brilliantly written feature stories that convey important facets of 
human life. 
Many of the examples exposed by the Panama Papers leak were ille-
gal, or at least shady, and in that way one can say that they satisfied the 
strictest understanding of investigative journalism. But many were also 
perfectly legal. As for the issues in the DNB case, it was technically not 
even an attempt to conceal their practice – information about the service 
in question had been available on DNB’s homepage for at least nine years 
when the Panama Papers story broke. To an extent one might even say 
that one reason it could be framed as a disclosure was that the press had 
not taken sufficient interest in the issue earlier. 
What implication does, then, this relationship between the legal, the 
shady and the illegal have for journalism? To answer that question, it may 
be helpful to recall one of the classic contributions to sociological theory, 
Robert Merton’s distinction between manifest and latent functions. If we 
apply this to journalistic disclosures, we can say that their manifest func-
tion is quite clearly to make someone accountable. But when the press 
focuses on the breaking of laws or norms, this also has a latent function: 
it serves to uphold the illusion of journalistic objectivity. 
Media research has contested – and for decades even rejected – the 
idea that it is possible for journalists to be ‘objective’ (f.ex. Tuchman, 
1972; Schudson, 1978). An important part of empirical journalism stud-
ies has furthermore shown how framing, rhetorical devices, the choice 
of sources, etc. combine into patterns of underlying – often unconscious 
– values. Ettema and Glasser’s seminal study of American investigative 
journalism from 1998 displays the paradox this entails: Modern inves-
tigative journalism constructs narratives that invite moral outrage, but 
the objectivity ideal demands that this moral outrage does not challenge 
the existing order. In a modern commercial press with a broad audience 
journalists are expected not to have political views. But as they cannot 
do without views at all, they must play within the spectrum of ‘domi-
nant values’. 
These dominant values are either enshrined in the law, or they are 
strong norms on which there is widespread agreement – and there is nor-
mally also a close relationship between norms and laws. The status quo 
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may thus be regarded as ‘apolitical’, and in that way the press can retain 
its image of being objective.
However sometimes the law differs too much from widely accepted 
norms. At other times, new norms emerge. In such cases, the ‘objective’ 
press may remove its value-free armour and, suddenly conscious of its role 
as a powerful actor in society, attempt to reconciliate the two by speaking 
its mind – not only in editorials, but also in news. This is not done by mix-
ing facts and opinions (at least not consciously), but rather the mere scope 
of an issue’s coverage can carry a strong message about which side the 
press has chosen. The recent coverage of #metoo is a good example of this. 
It is quite unlikely that #metoo would have had anything like the scope it 
had in the 1950s, even if the internet had existed at the time. 
Another way one can see what side the press takes, in particular in 
a situation where new norms are emerging and have not yet been fully 
established, is how far exposing actors who have not broken the law is 
taken. In #metoo several of the exposed power people had violated moral 
norms on harassment and gender equality – but not necessarily any laws. 
#Metoo was a strong message that sexual harassment is not acceptable, 
also when not covered by the law. 
In the coverage of the Panama Papers it is also evident that someone, at 
some stage, must have decided to include on a large scale people or insti-
tutions who had not broken the law. This choice is reflected in comments 
and editorials: Aftenposten for example made it clear from the very start 
that there were no indications that all those exposed had done anything 
illegal,18 and repeated this moral aspect on later occasions. One commen-
tator wrote that “we now need a lively debate on business morals and 
societal morals,” a stance also echoed in editorials.19 In the op-ed on 9 
April, which also functioned as a summary of the first week, Aftenposten’s 
editor wrote that “(i)nterestingly enough, it is […] not those cases where 
law violations have been exposed that have attracted the most attention, 
but those that focus on morals.” The editor exemplified this with both the 
Icelandic PM and DNB.
18 Aftenposten, 4 April 2016.
19 Op-ed, 6 April, e.g. editorial, 5 April 2016. 
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Other parts of the Norwegian press seemed to agree with this focus. 
This is also obvious from a case handled by the Norwegian Press Council 
(PFU) later the same year. A Norwegian shipowner family with holdings 
administered by Mossack Fonseca filed a complaint with the PFU. The 
complaint was turned down, on the grounds that although the family had 
not done anything illegal, the scope of and the problems posed by the tax 
havens as such justified publication.20
This means that we can regard the Panama Papers not only as an inves-
tigation, but as a campaign. As follows from the above, it is however quite 
rare that a major journalistic campaign of this sort takes place unless 
there is a clear sense that society is ready for it. Some op-eds and com-
mentaries even referred openly to what we could understand as the worry 
of the little reader – one Aftenposten commentator for example pointed to 
the fact that the ‘others’ – all the ordinary taxpayers – were about to “turn 
sour” on the ways elites had served themselves both before and after the 
financial crisis, and the commentator also used the word “rage”.21 The 
Panama Papers can therefore be seen too as a manifestation of emerging 
societal norms, both nationally and internationally. 
But with the spotlight turned on those who follow the law, and simply 
exploit it, we are again brought back to the question of structure. There 
will always be people who break or exploit the law. The question is how 
easy this breaking, and in particular, this exploiting, should be.
3) On the frontlines
As said, one reason why the focus could be so strong on the DNB CEO, 
was that in Norway no politicians had been involved. But even where 
politicians are concerned, focussing on those who exploit or break the law 
may take the focus away from those who make the law.
That there were aspects of tax haven use that were legal, but still 
immoral, might confuse the little reader, but also make her more inter-
ested. For when something is legal, but illegitimate, it normally means 
20 http://presse.no/pfu-sak/15516/
21 Aftenposten, 5 April 2016.
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there are loopholes in the law – and again, that means the law is not good 
enough. So why had the authorities not eliminated these loopholes?
In the lead of the first DNB story Aftenposten stated that “Norwegian 
authorities (had) for many years fought the use of tax havens”. Further 
down in the article this point was repeated and reenforced – the authori-
ties had been “on the frontlines of the fight against closed tax havens that 
facilitated money laundering and tax evasion”.22 The wording highlighted 
the contrast between DNB’s more dubious activities and the important 
work of the authorities. 
The reader was now eager to find out what the authorities had actu-
ally done. One question, however, that complicated this issue, was how 
much power politicians have in an internationalised world. A reference 
to ‘structure’ was not entirely non-existent. In some cases the workings of 
global markets were portrayed as some kind of force majeure – a natural 
law, something outside human control.23 But the activities of the politi-
cians were also mentioned, and as a relatively informed citizen the reader 
also knew that nation states and politicians were still important actors. 
She might for example have noticed, during the Lux Leaks of 2014, 
the allegations that the president of the EU Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, almost single-handedly created a tax haven out of Luxembourg 
when he was prime minister there.24 She might also know that a coun-
try well-known to Norwegians, the UK (around the time of the Panama 
Papers about to vote on their membership in the EU) was almost a full-
blown tax haven,25 or that many states in the country that still in many 
respects is regarded as a global hegemon, the US, were strongly involved 
in tax arranging as well. She could also have noticed the point made by 
the American media that was even cited in an article in Dagens Næring-
sliv in the middle of the Panama Papers leak: “In some states (in the US) 
22 Aftenposten, 4 April 2016.
23 E.g. Aftenposten, 5 April 2016.
24 E.g. Dagens Næringsliv, 7 November 2014; NTB and Adresseavisen, 8 November 2014; Nationen, 
11 November 2014; Aftenposten, 13 November 2014. Also mentioned in Aftenposten during the 
Panama Papers leak.
25 www.foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/04/britains-empire-of-tax-evasion-panama-papers-mos-
sack-fonseca/. For further information about Britain as a tax haven, see also Brooks 2016.
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it is more difficult to get a library card than to set up a company with 
anonymous owners.”26
In Norway during the leak, politicians prided themselves on how much 
progress they had achieved with this system within the confines of the OECD 
– which in itself implies that ‘the structure’ was something nation states had 
at least some control over. The Norwegian finance minister, with tax issues 
her particular responsibility, appeared in altogether five Aftenposten articles 
during the two weeks after the leak broke, one of them a debate article. In 
all articles she held forth the substantial effort of the Norwegian authori-
ties in order to enforce the principle of openness around tax havens.27 The 
finance minister also published a debate article in Klassekampen and was 
interviewed in Dagens Næringsliv,28 and stated that the opportunities for tax 
evasion would be dramatically reduced from 2017. A prominent member 
of the major government coalition party and a later member of parliament 
even stated in a debate article that all tax haven problems would be history 
by 2017. She denounced the current public and media sentiment surround-
ing the Panama Papers leak as “Panama Papers populism”.29 
On the other hand, there were several other participants in the debate 
who alleged that neither Norwegian nor other authorities had done 
enough to curb the use of tax havens, or to put an end to creative tax 
arrangements by multinational companies. Some debaters and interview-
ees claimed that all use of tax havens contributes to upholding devastat-
ing imbalances in the world economy – in other words, that the system 
needs a profound overhaul. Some criticised the Norwegian authorities 
directly for not exerting enough effort to end this problem.30 The leader of 
the International Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde, even said that the 
achievements within the OECD were far from sufficient.31
26 Dagens Næringsliv, 11 April 2016.
27 Aftenposten, 5, 6, 14 and 17 April 2016.
28 Klassekampen, 14 April; Dagens Næringsliv, 15 April 2016.
29 Aftenposten, 15 April 2016.
30 E.g. Aftenposten, 5 and 6 April; Dagens Næringsliv, 6, 8 and 12 April; Klassekampen, 8, 11 and 12 
April 2016.
31 Aftenposten, 14 April. In a debate article in Aftenposten on 15 April, a professor of political sci-
ence furthermore referred to a major research project which showed that it was easier to set up 
anonymous bank accounts and establish shell companies in the US and the OECD than the most 
well-known tax havens. The project is available on www.globalshellgames.com.
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What the reader could not find were articles that attempted to explain 
in more detail what really had been done, nationally or within the frame-
work of the OECD, in a language she could understand and related to 
things she could understand.
The most informative articles did in fact come from the authorities 
themselves, in the debate articles by the finance minister (one of them 
co-signed by Norway’s foreign minister), almost two weeks into the leak 
period.32 The point that Norway had contributed heavily to the progress 
in the OECD was repeated several times, but the claims were difficult 
to assess, both since the use of technical language implied a lot of back-
ground knowledge the ordinary reader would not necessarily have, and 
because it was difficult to know to what these achievements were related 
to. Where was the starting point, where was the end? What was the con-
text for all this information? The notion ‘on the frontlines’ meant little as 
long as one did not know where the ‘front’ was. 
The reader would also have noted that there were few critical questions 
directed at the authorities. Of course one country could not solve this 
problem alone. But as it was implied from the very beginning that the 
Norwegian government had played an important role in international 
work against tax havens, it would be useful to know exactly what the 
nature of that work was. This could also provide an important insight 
into how international bodies handle an issue like this.
4) The media and the experts
There was, however, an interesting simultaneous development focused on 
the Norwegian government. 
The fact that some Norwegian state companies use tax havens, or at 
least have business associates that are associated with disputed tax issues, 
is information that has appeared in regular intervals in the news over 
the years. During the first two weeks of the leak, new independent sto-
ries (not stemming from the Panama Papers leak) on this same issue 
appeared. One was about the state company Argentum, a company that 
32 Aftenposten and Klassekampen, 14 April 2016.
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invests in private equity and that according to Klassekampen had dou-
bled its investments in tax havens during the last five years.33 Another 
piquant story was about the consulting agency PWC, whose name had 
played an important role in the LuxLeak. It turned out that this company 
had not only assisted DNB in their tax planning, but had recently also 
been employed by the authorities to ensure openness in the Norwegian 
public sector.34 
However, the main question in relation to the Norwegian state and tax 
havens concerns the activities of the Norwegian Oil Fund. The Oil Fund 
is a huge international investor owning shares, obligations and real estate 
registered to companies in tax havens – according to Klassekampen the 
Fund had invested almost 200 billion kroner in tax havens at the time of 
the Panama Papers leak.35 
What kind of investments does the Oil Fund have? It would be obvious 
to the reader that a Fund managed by the Norwegian authorities would 
not in any way be illegal, but the companies involved would contribute to 
eroding other countries’ tax bases, so might some of the Fund’s invest-
ments be seen as immoral? The reader could not know much about this, 
but the press stated that it also wanted to illuminate immoral practices, 
and the Oil Fund was now entering the spotlight. Our reader might there-
fore have a feeling that at least some of the Fund’s investments might not 
pass the test of public opinion that was now about to emerge.36 
The year before, in the summer of 2015, three of the minor parties in the 
Norwegian parliament proposed that the Oil Fund withdraw its invest-
ments from tax havens. The parliamentary majority was against this, but 
the ensuing media coverage was paltry to say the least – I could only find 
four stories about it in all the Norwegian news media.37 This is not sur-
prising. When looking back on coverage of the Oil Fund in general, one 
33 Klassekampen, 9 April 2016.
34 Klassekampen, 8 April 2016.
35 Klassekampen, 5 April 2016.
36 The argument about public opinion with specific reference to the Oil Fund was also brought up 
in a convincing way in a report published in the immediate wake of the Panama Papers, Kapoor 
and Zeilina 2016. 
37 Aftenposten, 9 June; Dagsavisen, Nationen and Rogalands Avis, 10 June 1015. In addition, Retreiv-
er contains two references to it in trade union magazines. Dagens Næringsliv had withdrawn 
from Retriever at the time of this search.
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sees that criticising the ethics of the Fund’s investments, or (more rarely) 
its contact with tax havens, takes the form of a ritual. The media, NGOs 
or minor parties bring it up, there is a debate, and then the issue disap-
pears from the public agenda again. 
On one of the first days of the Panama Papers leak, the question was 
however brought up again, by two more opposition parties. This could 
have been a game changer. With two more parties (one of them even a 
major one), the situation was thus suddenly turned on its head. The par-
ties that now signalled a desire to reconsider the Fund’s portfolio were 
suddenly a parliamentary majority. Already on one of the first days of the 
leak, Aftenposten noted the contradiction between the way Norwegian 
politicians criticised DNB’s practice, and the way they had so far accepted 
the practice of the Oil Fund.38 Klassekampen even wrote on its front page 
that the Fund now might be forced to withdraw from tax havens.39
There was a discernible difference between the three outlets in this study 
in relation to the Oil Fund. Most of the articles that cited the connection 
between the Fund and tax havens in Aftenposten were signed by external 
debaters. Klassekampen reported heavily on Norwegian political practice. 
Five of its frontpage stories during these two weeks focused on tax issues 
relating to Norwegian state companies or the Fund,40 and the coverage was 
otherwise also broad. Dagens Næringsliv also played an active part in scru-
tinising the role of the state as such, for example, with a three-page feature 
story on 11 April about what they called the most important tax haven in 
the world – Delaware in the US (including the ease with which tax avoid-
ance could be facilitated in other American states mentioned above). A 
main point was that Norwegian state companies, among them Oil Fund 
subsidiaries, were present in Delaware.41 Questions concerning the Fund 
and tax havens also spread to other outlets, in particular through the Nor-
wegian News Agency NTB, which supplies other outlets with news. 
But then the experts were brought in. Not to discuss what seemed to 
be a single episodic practice in DNB, but rather the whole underlying 
38 Aftenposten, 5 April 2016.
39 Klassekampen, 5 April 2016.
40 Klassekampen, 5 April, 6 April, 8 April, 9 April, 13 April 2016.
41 Dagens Næringsliv, 11 April 2016.
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Norwegian question of the Oil Fund. Six days after a sudden parliamen-
tary majority suggested a willingness to reconsider the investments of 
the Oil Fund, Dagens Næringsliv published a two-page article about the 
Fund, and the question of withdrawal from tax havens.42 It turned out 
that the experts deemed a withdrawal to be difficult, on the verge of being 
impossible, because the Oil Fund’s mandate was to invest broadly (“to 
have well diversified investments” as the Fund’s own webpage reads). 
This point circulated quickly and was repeated by other outlets, among 
them NTB, other financial news sites, and tv stations.43 One frequent-
ly-cited professor of economics even argued that one had to differentiate 
between different kinds of tax havens. One should for example not define 
Delaware – on three pages in the same issue of Dagens Næringsliv por-
trayed as the world’s most important tax haven – as a tax haven. Why? 
Because if one did, it would be difficult for the Oil Fund to invest there.44
“Moral indignation,” the same professor continued, “must be directed 
primarily against countries that contribute to corruption and to hiding 
money.”45
After the experts had their say, and their analysis of the situation 
had made the rounds in the media, interest in the Oil Fund seemed to 
implode. It seems the global tax haven problem was not that huge after 
all, at least not when the state was involved. After all, the only real prob-
lems seemed to be the illegal ones – corruption and money hidden from 
taxation (and of course DNB). It was not that the press was unaware of the 
problem of Norway’s use of tax havens. Dagens Næringsliv for example 
used the phrase ‘double standard’ about the Oil Fund in its editorial.46 
But the question of the demarcation lines between legal and illegal, moral 
and immoral remained unsolved. This may be another important reason 
why the focus on DNB and its CEO became so heavy – it was the only 
tangible solution. 
42 Dagens Næringsliv, 11 April 2016.
43 E.g. https://e24.no/boers-og-finans/oljefondet/eksperter-vanskelig-aa-trekke-oljefondet-helt-ut- 
av-skatteparadiser/23656546; https://www.tv2.no/a/8212411/
44 Dagens Næringsliv, 11 April 2016.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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The outcome of the attempts to discuss the activities of the Oil Fund 
illustrates a recurring problem not only with Norway’s dependency on 
the Fund, but with economic journalism as such. Journalism is a trade 
where the actors are normally very dependent on their sources. This 
dependency increases with the complexity and international character 
of the issue. The more complex the issue, the more difficult it is for the 
journalist to question the authority of the ‘experts’, and economic jour-
nalism is in a special league being both extremely complex and interna-
tionalised (Bjerke et al., 2016). In this particular case, a few other debaters 
questioned the experts’ conclusions, but there is also often a hierarchy of 
sources, and the opinions of mainstream economists have a tendency to 
override the opinions of other voices. In economic journalism we see that 
the same people are often interviewed again and again (ibid.). 
It is of course quite unlikely that for the little reader everything then 
fell into place. The media, politicians and debaters alike had implied that 
the use of tax havens could be wrong even though it was not illegal. The 
major question in the Norwegian media, in relation to DNB, illustrates 
this clearly. The spotlight was then turned onto the practice of the Nor-
wegian state, with 7 trillion Norwegian kroner invested in the global 
economy. During the peak days of the coverage, the reader learned that 
politicians had made considerable progress in the fight against tax havens 
(but she still did not know in relation to what). Suddenly there was a par-
liamentary majority ready to reconsider the practices of the Norwegian 
Oil Fund. But according to the experts it turned out that there was no 
such thing as simultaneously legal and immoral. Moral outrage had to 
be directed towards corruption and attempts at hiding money. In other 
words, the most prominent feature of immorality was that it was illegal. 
No wonder the little reader felt she was back at square one, and that a 
number of things still remained in the dark. 
Epilogue
One and a half years after the Panama Papers a new leak broke, now 
called Paradise Papers. This was a much smaller leak, but one in which 
the major news was that companies like Apple were avoiding paying 
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taxes around the world. This was also hardly new information, but again 
it brought attention to the problem not only of global tax base erosion, 
but also to the law. Apple’s practice was not at all illegal, but still drained 
national treasuries. Again Aftenposten and other media criticised tax 
arrangements that were legal.47
Despite the massive media attention, it also eventually turned out there 
was not sufficient reason for the CEO of DNB to resign. By then the DNB 
case had more or less disappeared from the news. 
Two years on, the OECD still reports progress in its work against tax 
base erosion, but no breakthroughs. The Norwegian Oil Fund still writes 
on its homepage that withdrawal is difficult, but that it has “long-term” 
expectations that the OECD work will be effective. After all, the decision 
is not for the Oil Fund to make, its managers write – this power lies with 
the authorities.48
Conclusion
In many ways, the Panama Papers leak was a success – and a huge boost 
to journalism, a trade that is currently often described as “in crisis”. It is 
also often implied that the solution is more international cooperation. In 
this article, I have nonetheless tried to show that cross-border coopera-
tion may be a necessary, but not a sufficient factor for the success of cov-
erage of complex international issues. There are considerable challenges 
to journalism if it wants to understand, cover and explain the compexity 
of global issues. Through a study of three important Norwegian outlets 
during the leak’s first two weeks, I have pointed out a few problems that 
have to do partly with journalistic self-understanding, partly with the 
need to make journalism relevant to its (still often national) public, and 
partly with the strong dependency on journalism’s sources. 
The interesting question is the long-term impact on democracy and the 
public’s understanding of how to deal with the problems. A main issue in 
the Panama Papers was to track down individuals and institutions with 
47 Aftenposten, 18 November 2017.
48 https://www.nbim.no/no/apenhet/brev-til-finansdepartementet/2018/forventningsdoku-
ment-om-skatt-og-apenhet/
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a connection to Mossack Fonseca. The major Norwegian story that could 
be framed as a disclosure, was however the DNB case. That DNB had car-
ried on with this strategy for so many years was in itself no small issue. 
But when the hunt for an individual to be made accountable failed, and 
when the Norwegian state’s own investments disappeared from the news 
as quickly as they appeared, the impact on democracy and the public’s 
understanding of how to deal with these problems can be meager. 
Leaks are valuable journalistic tools, and international cooperation 
in deciphering the contents of the leaks is invaluable. But leaks are not 
enough. Issues that have to do with the global economy must be con-
textualised and explained. Great journalism cannot rely on politicians 
and experts. To make the system transparent, journalists have to monitor 
law-making and international cooperation (and the lack of such) also in 
between ‘the great leaks’. Global tax issues are complex, but there has 
also never before existed more open information: in the form of a huge 
landscape of national and international law, reports from international 
bodies, national databases, reports from international organisations and 
NGOs, university research, corporate websites, etc. They do not always 
expose individual wrongdoers, but they contain information that is at the 
very core of these problems. 
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Abstract: This chapter asks what investigative journalists working on revelations 
such as the Panama Papers, Paradise Papers, Lux Leaks, Swiss Leaks, etc. can teach 
journalism educators. Can this type of cross-border cooperation help prepare jour-
nalism education for a future in which money increasingly flows across borders? 
Without having some understanding of the core concepts of finance, it will be diffi-
cult to hold power to account. This chapter builds mainly on qualitative interviews 
with journalists around the world working on stories connected to illicit financial 
flows, corruption and tax havens. In the conclusion, we discuss the challenges and 
paradoxes educators must consider when designing journalism education for the 
future. Considering the growing importance of Problem-Based Learning (PBL), 
the journalists interviewed here emphasize the promise of teams learning together 
while investigating and solving problems as they arise. However, there are limita-
tions to the usefulness of PBL in understanding economic or financial theories. For 
instance, it is doubtful that PBL alone would be the best and most effective way to 
learn the quantitative methods needed to understand economic theories. It would 
be helpful if journalism education could include basic instruction, at least, in eco-
nomics and finance.





Imagine being at the receiving end of a massive leak such as the 
Panama Papers, consisting of c. 11.5 million documents including emails, 
bank statements, passport scans, etc. (Obermayer, 2017). Even an expe-
rienced auditor would be hard pressed to sift through much more than 
a few dozen, perhaps a hundred, documents per day, not to speak of the 
time needed to do in-depth analyses of the complicated and impenetrable 
(on purpose) transactions described in the documents. At the rate of 100 
documents per day, it would take a reader more than 300 years to get 
through the 11.5 million documents. 
Journalists allowed to visit the ‘war room’ at Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
speak of “whiteboards hanging on the room’s walls […] covered in comp-
licated-looking diagrams” (Zerofsky, Elisabeth, How a German newspa-
per became the go-to place for leaks like the Paradise Papers, The New 
Yorker, 11 November 2017). To make it possible to analyze the millions of 
files, the newspaper installed computers that had never been connected to 
the internet, “so that they could be used to store securely the 13.4 million 
files” of the so-called Paradise Papers. The journalists at Süddeutsche Zei-
tung understood that a much larger collective of journalists was needed 
to read and analyze the documents. At least 381 journalists in 67 coun-
tries, in collaboration with the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists, worked to make sense of the millions of files. So far, much 
of the academic literature dealing with journalistic coverage of the Pan-
ama Papers, Paradise Papers, Lux Leaks, Swiss Leaks, etc. focuses on the 
emergence of a global network of journalists working together and shar-
ing information, or the use of computers to analyze the data and facilitate 
secure communication among the journalists in the network. (See for 
instance Sambrook, 2017; Baack, 2016; McGregor, 2017.)
The Panama and Paradise Papers are not the only examples of jour-
nalists using leaked information to reveal illicit financial flows and their 
financial and political benefactors. Previously, the Lux Leaks exposed 
conditions many considered even worse: that large multinational compa-
nies were effectively allowed to write their own tax arrangements, which 
were signed by the authorities in Luxembourg. The revelation showed 
that the authorities allowed multinational companies to channel huge 
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sums of money through Luxemburg, thus avoiding billions of dollars 
in tax. Another leak, the Swiss Leaks, exposed how one of the world’s 
biggest banks, HSBC, had profited from helping over 100,000 custom-
ers hide $100 billion in Switzerland. The customers were multinational 
companies wanting to avoid taxes, as well as criminals. In South Africa, 
the journalists of AmaBhungane managed to expose the murky dealings 
of the so-called Gupta-Zuma scandal using 100,000 emails and scores of 
other documents. After many years the network collapsed upon those 
involved, leading up to former president Zuma’s resignation. 
Computers can indeed make the job of analyzing data quicker, easier 
and more user-friendly. For the individual journalist, however, the chal-
lenging task of understanding complex financial data and the workings 
of a complex financial industry remains. To be able to write stories that 
will hold under scrutiny, journalists must understand not only the legal 
and financial concepts used in the emails and documents. They also need 
to understand basic concepts in accounting, finance, economics and dif-
ferent countries’ tax laws in order to understand how transactions may 
work, and for which ultimate purposes they may have been done. In par-
ticular, in order to explain why a story is important, journalists need a 
good understanding of the difference between the legal forms created and 
the actual financial substance achieved. So far, relatively little research 
has been done on this aspect of this emerging form of global investigative 
journalism. 
Newspapers and weeklies around the world, such as the Financial 
Times, The Economist and other business dailies, can count on the exper-
tise of journalists educated and trained in economics and finance. How-
ever, many of the groundbreaking stories published on the leaks and 
scandals mentioned above have not been written by journalists speciali-
zing in economics and finance, but rather by generalists with little pre-
vious experience in investigating global finance, who had to rely on the 
expertise of financial investigators and forensic accounting to make sense 
of the data before them. 
We believe the experiences of these investigative journalists contain 
valuable lessons to be learned for the next generation of journalists. In 
this chapter, we are mainly interested in what such experiences can teach 
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journalism educators and others concerned with training and educating 
journalists for a future where money and information increasingly flow 
across borders. Without having some understanding of the core concepts 
of finance, accounting and law, and especially how they relate to the dif-
ferences in form and substance, it will be difficult for journalists to hold 
power to account. This chapter builds mainly on qualitative interviews 
with journalists around the world working on stories connected to illicit 
financial flows, corruption and tax havens. We organized conferences, 
workshops and seminars to discuss aspects of cross-border journalism 
with 20 investigative journalists from almost as many different countries. 
Ten journalists later provided short stories based on detailed questions 
about their investigative journalism. Additionally, we conducted open 
in-depth qualitative interviews with eight journalists. The main goal of 
this chapter is to contribute to a better understanding of how journal-
ists without formal training in economics, finance, accounting and law 
work to make sense of overwhelming amounts of complex financial data. 
Moreover, what can journalism education gain from these experienced 
investigative journalists when it comes to making sense of data on illicit 
financial flows and the complex service industry facilitating it? 
Literature review
Transnational networks of investigative journalists are a relatively new 
phenomenon, yet to be fully explored by researchers. So far, research on 
journalism related to leaks, such as the Panama Papers, has focused on 
cooperation among journalists and newsrooms across borders, on the role 
of technology, on safety and security issues, and access to information and 
sources. In comparison, relatively little has yet been published on how 
journalists understand the complex data on the complicated legal set-ups 
and financial transactions revealed by the leaks. Here, we understand this 
as a hermeneutical process where journalists draw on their own knowledge 
and experience to make sense of the information found in the leaks. How-
ever, we also frame it as a learning process, where the key issue is not so 
much the knowledge and experience the journalists already have, but the 
ability of journalists to find ways to learn about new topics. 
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The debate on how best to educate journalists is as old as journalism 
education itself. Often journalists and editors have been quite critical, 
if not negative, towards developing programs for journalism education 
around the world. Many have argued that journalism is best learned by 
doing. (See for instance Folkerts, 2014; Kjos Fonn, 2015; Hovden, 2016.) 
From this perspective, journalism should not be made into an academic 
discipline in itself, but rather be understood as a skill or trade that draws 
on all types of other disciplines, such as social science, history, economics, 
law, and so forth. Eric Newton represents a different view. According to 
Hilary Akers Dunn (Dunn, 2018), “Newton argues for knowledge-based 
journalism education environments, where journalism schools pull from 
their resources throughout the whole university to assist their students in 
specific beats of journalism. For example, knowledge-based journalism 
courses are taught under the instruction of journalism educators, as well 
as educators from other fields (e.g. business, economics, law, science) to 
better equip the student to create media knowledgeably on the specific 
subject.” (p. 13). To some extent, this was the predominant model in the 
early days of journalism education in the Nordic countries (Kjos Fonn, 
2015; Hovden, 2016). Still, a significant number of educators at journalism 
schools and institutions around the world have PhDs not in journalism 
studies, but in history, social science, sociology, media studies, anthro-
pology and similar disciplines. Nevertheless, as journalism studies has 
matured as an academic discipline, it appears that many journalism cur-
riculums emphasize language skills, storytelling and mastering new tech-
nical equipment, rather than subjects such as economics, social science 
and history, which were on the agenda in the early days. Hovden et al. 
note some important differences in the journalism education models of 
various countries and regions. Nevertheless, the authors find that “the 
general aims of teaching journalism in most countries are quite simi-
lar: students need to know how to express themselves, understand the 
genres, master the instruments of production and how to handle sources, 
become familiar with the national professional norms, and so forth. As a 
consequence, the teaching of journalism is in important ways quite simi-
lar all over the world.” As we see from the list of goals presented above, 
understanding economics, politics, law, etc. is not obviously amongst the 
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general aims of current journalism education. However, many journal-
ism programs do still teach politics and economics, if not as subjects on 
their own, then as part of courses designed mainly to train students in 
news reporting, understanding statistics, making documentaries, and so 
forth. 
Some journalism scholars such as Mark Deuze see the debate on 
practice and theory in journalism education as outdated (Deuze, 2001). 
Instead, education should focus on critical self-reflection. Nevertheless, 
according to Deuze, education needs to prepare students to understand 
ongoing changes in society, the economy and technology. Building on 
Deuze to make his argument, Hans Henrik Holm argues that journal-
ism education needs to break the national mold (Holm, 2001). Instead, 
journalism needs to build an understanding of globalization. According 
to Holm, the time has come to develop truly transnational journalism 
education. 
Richard Sambrook et al. in Global Teamwork: The rise of collabo-
ration in investigative journalism provide fresh lessons on cross-bor-
der investigative journalism from some of those closely involved 
in the investigations (Sambrook, 2018). Charles Lewis, sums up the 
need for 
broader, amassed knowledge and understanding across borders, professional 
disciplines, and cultures, perhaps through the precise prism of documented, 
reliably sourced, public accountability issues in the world, in the context of the 
uses, the occasionally glaring, wilful non-uses, misuses, and abuses of politi-
cal, corporate, and other power in the world.” Lewis imagines combining “the 
most authoritative, known information from various disparate sectors, includ-
ing journalism, but also such academic areas of expertise such as investigative 
history, forensic accounting, computer science and statistics, political science, 
economics, public anthropology, human rights, public interest, and other 
law-related fields (…). (Lewis in Sambrook, 2018)
Computers and digital communication accelerated the process of pro-
ducing ever-increasing complexity in ways not seen before. For inves-
tigative journalists, this means not only “breaking the national mold” 
and being able to “collaborate in global networks”, but also conducting 
making sense of  overwhelming flows of  f inancial  data
293
interdisciplinary investigations not only by drawing on experts from rel-
evant disciplines, but also by learning to understand basic concepts in 
key disciplines well enough to undertake independent investigations and 
source criticism. 
Through the Panama Papers and similar leaks, citizens all over 
the world have gotten a glimpse into a world of finance and financial 
flows of ever-increasing complexity. As Linn Anker Sørensen explains, 
ever-changing complex structures are being created on purpose to make 
it increasingly difficult for tax authorities and others to investigate and 
understand financial flows across borders (Sørensen, 2016). 
Richard Sambrook concludes that journalists “should stop thinking 
they can always ‘go it alone’”. 
International accountability is an issue for lawyers, economists, politicians and 
lobbyists, scientists, healthcare professionals, academics, accountancy, business 
and finance professionals, and more. In a modern approach to accountability 
journalism, newsrooms should seek to partner and collaborate outside their 
profession as widely as possible, being open to the expertise of others. (Sam-
brook, 2018)
Methodology
The field of journalism studies often lags far behind the historical develop-
ment of the subject of its study (Nash, 2016, p. 234; Conboy, 2013, p. 4). 
Digital investigative journalism and cross-border cooperation to uncover 
illicit financial flows are developing at increasing speed. Meanwhile, the 
research process and academic publication happen slowly. It can take 
years from when the research begins until results are published in peer 
review journals. Consequently, the research group within the project 
Making Transparency Possible has put emphasis not only on making 
the project interdisciplinary, but also making sure that researchers work 
closely alongside investigative journalists in analyzing this emerging 
field. This methodology is inspired by the Collaborative Action Research 
Network (CARN). CARN supports research that “involves active involve-
ment with practitioners and participants” and seeks to generate inquiry 
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“where practitioners actively contribute to the generation of knowledge 
and theory”.1
This chapter builds mainly on qualitative methodologies. We have 
organized conferences and workshops (December 2016 and February 
2018) with a total of 30 participating investigative journalists from Asia, 
Africa, Latin America and Europe. The participating journalists repre-
sent important backgrounds in investigative journalism from countries 
as diverse as Guatemala, Ecuador, Colombia, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Ethi-
opia, South Africa, Russia and Norway. In selecting participants, the 
diversity of experience also ensures equal representation of genders.
The workshops were organized to facilitate open discussion. Each par-
ticipant presented the main features and challenges of the investigation 
they had been doing. The other participants could then comment or ask 
questions before the presenter would sum up. In addition to the jour-
nalists, professors of journalism, economics and law also participated. 
The methodology in the workshops has much in common with ‘focus 
groups’. “Focus groups are typically used to reveal through interaction 
the beliefs, attitudes, experiences and feelings of participants” (Litosseliti, 
2003, p. 16). Here, the seminars were designed to reveal a multiplicity of 
experiences that most likely would not have been uncovered employing 
for instance individual interviews or surveys.
Additionally, ten participants were invited to write and publish 
accounts of the investigations they conducted. These stories were pub-
lished on the website of the NGO, Publish What You Pay Norway, and 
the journalists received a small compensation for the time spent writ-
ing the requested stories.2 These stories have been used in the research 
for this chapter. 
We have also analyzed more than 300 articles in the Norwegian daily 
Aftenposten during the publication of the Panama Papers. The articles 
have been analyzed in order to understand which expert sources the 
newspaper used to define and explain information arising from the inves-
tigation. We have also looked for stories that break the ‘national mold’, in 
1 CAR, Mission and philosophy. An outline statement. Retrieved from https://www.carn.org.uk/
about/ 2016, on 1.9.2018.
2 https://www.publishwhatyoupay.no/en/node/17478
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trying to explain the importance of the Panama Papers without using a 
national (Norwegian) angle. 
Finally, eight additional qualitative interviews were made with selected 
participating journalists. These journalists come from countries in the 
global South as well as from Europe. Some live in environments that are 
not very friendly to investigative journalists. Rather, they may be targeted 
for doing investigative journalism. Following the guidelines of the Nor-
wegian Centre for Research Data (NSD), we have not recorded any per-
sonal information on the interviewees from these interviews. These eight 
additional interviews are therefore anonymous.
Stories becoming more and more complex
“A very difficult topic to work with,” said Jan Lukas Strozyk3, an investi-
gative journalist for the German broadcaster Norddeutscher Rundfunk 
(NDR) and author in the International Consortium of Investigative Jour-
nalists (ICIJ). “Access. The main idea of using a tax haven is to make access 
to information impossible. We are talking about an industry where very 
rich people and clever companies are paying some of the most expensive 
lawyers to prevent our reporting from happening.” 
There are many reasons why investigating economic or financial sto-
ries is becoming ever more complicated. At least three parallel clusters of 
processes seem to make illicit financial flows more opaque. First, since 
the beginning of the Swiss banking secrecy laws in the early 1930s the 
intensity of establishing secrecy jurisdictions exploded in the 1970s, and 
today tax havens and their service industries play a prominent role in the 
global financial system (Baker, 2015). An investigative journalist trying to 
hold power to account today will find that almost a third of the world’s 
financial transactions pass through a tax haven. 
We should clarify that we do not find it necessary or even purposeful 
to discuss questions of legality and illegality in relation to the use of tax 
havens. In most cases, it is not possible to determine whether something 
3 Strozyk, Jan Lukas (2016, December 13). How can a journalist explain to the world what is 




is legal or not, because of the available secrecy. The secrecy provided in 
tax havens makes it possible to convert profit from criminal activities, 
through whitewashing, into legal activities while curbing traceability, 
since the core business idea is making access to information and trans-
actions opaque. 
Second, other developments of the past few decades are the signifi-
cant integration of the world economy and international trade, which has 
grown rapidly since the 1970s. By one estimate, the value of world trade 
has increased four to five times (at constant prices) between 1980 and 2015 
(Ortiz-Ospina, 2018). In fact, international trade has increased twice as 
fast as world GDP, according to statistics released by the WTO. Other 
indicators also illustrate how world economies are becoming increasingly 
integrated. According to a World Bank paper, there is “only one publicly 
available dataset on international intra-firm trade with a comprehensive 
set of partner economies” (World Bank, 2017). The US dataset shows that 
around half of all US imports are intra-firm. Estimates floating around 
the OECD and the EU suggest that between 60–70 percent of world 
trade takes place within groups of related companies. This makes clear 
why attention to transfer pricing becomes important. Anything that has 
a price can be mispriced. A reader may understand transfer pricing as 
the pricing of single transactions, which should take place between unre-
lated parties (arm’s length principle). This is a fully legal way to value 
transactions. However, if the reader views transfer pricing more broadly, 
it may include all transfer mechanisms available to multinational compa-
nies that enable the transfer of untaxed profits across jurisdictions. Trans-
fer mispricing is one of the most widely used techniques for extractive 
companies to transfer profits from host and home country to the com-
pany itself. Around 1/3 of all transactions go through tax havens, hiding 
significant amounts of global transactions from public scrutiny. When 
tax havens appear to be the world’s largest investment hubs, it has an 
effect on society at large.
Third, the problem of increasing inequality is seen as one of the defin-
ing issues of our time. When wealth is increasingly concentrated, this has 
implications for society at large, not only in terms of inequality between 
countries but also inequality within countries. The equivalent of 10 percent 
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of the world’s GDP is now held in tax havens globally, this average percent 
masking a range of a few percent of GDP in Scandinavia to up to 60 per-
cent in Gulf countries and some Latin American countries (Alstadsæter, 
2018; Aaberge, 2018). Hence, the accumulation of wealth in tax havens is 
also key to understanding both global income and wealth inequality. 
At the same time, the fragmentation of ownership and control of com-
panies and assets is becoming more complex at a staggering rate. Strozyk: 
“We need to get used to working on ever more complex stories.” 
According to Linn Anker Sørensen, increasing complexity is driven 
by powerful computer networks that facilitate rapidly shifting financial 
structures (Sørensen, 2016).4 At the same time, the center of gravity in 
the world economy is also shifting. While oil and mining companies, and 
producers of goods dominated the list of the richest companies in the 
world up until ten years ago, some the biggest companies in the world 
today are producers of online content and computer programs (Econo-
mist, 2017). Whereas the oil and mining companies were drilling non- 
renewable and finite resources at a huge environmental cost, today’s 
tech companies drill consumers’ data at a huge cost in privacy. The most 
profitable products today are also those that are easiest to move across 
borders. This poses added problems for authorities as to how to regulate 
such companies. The Economist also recognized this with a front-page 
headline reading, “How to tame the Titans?” Sometimes governments, 
investors, tax authorities, organizations and journalists can be said to be 
in in the same boat regarding access to information.
“I realize that there is not much we can do,” said Strozyk. “The real 
heroes are the whistleblowers.” 
The national mold
A key challenge for journalists working on global stories is to break 
‘the national mold’. While finance stories today almost always have 
4 Sørensen, Linn Anker (2016, December 13). The art of making a corporate maze with untrace-
able structures and owners. Conference keynote at Making Transparency Possible, Oslo. Avail-
able online from https://www.publishwhatyoupay.no/nb/node/17159 accessed 25.8.2018.
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international connections, which need to be explored, journalists may 
not believe their audience will be as interested in international connec-
tions as in more local or national ones. Therefore, investigative method-
ologies often produce strong national framing of the information. One 
Norwegian journalist (anonymous) explained: 
The volume of information we got was enormous. We began by doing a number 
of searches for Norwegian names of politicians, business leaders, celebrities and 
companies in the material. This was the first step. When we encountered infor-
mation on Norwegians, we investigated further.5 
To frame is to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a par-
ticular problem, definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/
or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993). 
In the case of this Norwegian newspaper, we see how the national frame 
is imposed by the methodology of researching the overwhelming flow 
of information. The overwhelming flow of information is simplified and 
systematized by organizing the information according to a perceived 
national relevance. The methodology is embedded within the national 
mold. 
However, this should not be taken to mean that the Norwegian jour-
nalists working on the Panama Papers wanted to publish only stories on 
Norwegians and Norwegian companies, or were unwilling (or unaware) 
to see the international dimensions of the phenomena unveiled by the 
Panama and Paradise papers. On the contrary, an analysis of 300 articles 
published by Aftenposten on the Panama Papers demonstrates a willing-
ness to deal with the global aspects of illicit financial flows. The newspa-
per ran stories as diverse as revelations of financial flows from Armenia, 
threats against investigative journalists around the world, and the murky 
world of finance and tax avoidance in professional football. Many of 
the stories published in Norway were researched and written by foreign 
members of the global team investigating the leaks. Still, these interna-
tional stories were seldom followed up in the same way as stories that 
5 Anonymous 1. Interview, August 2018. 
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dealt primarily with Norwegians or Norwegian companies implicated in 
the leaks. The story on DNB, a major Norwegian bank implicated in the 
leaks, evolved from shorter news items, via interviews with leading poli-
ticians and views of the users of the bank, to follow-up stories revealing 
how the bank promoted the use of tax havens over the years. 
There are good reasons why stories with a Norwegian angle generated 
follow-up stories. First of all these stories typically invited discussion of 
the legality of the financial flows. At the same time, the stories prompted 
Norwegian politicians to discuss the practice of using tax havens in gen-
eral, which again generated op-eds by NGOs and others working on issues 
related to illicit financial flows and transparency. Finally, the newspaper 
found it relevant to present opinions of ordinary customers of the bank. 
All this made the story live on, instigating further journalistic research 
on how the bank came to be involved in this type of financial flow. The 
result is that Norwegian stories came to dominate the coverage of the 
leaks, firmly placing this coverage within the national mold. 
Experts needed to define and frame  
the issues at stake 
According to Craig McKune, “It is very hard to explain complex and 
complicated information to our readers. The first thing we have to 
do is to understand it ourselves. Clear thinking is clear writing. You 
have to understand it first.” Still, as Jan Lucas Strozyk reminds us, it is 
“(s)ometimes hard to understand what we have. I spent a lot of time reading 
background papers, trying to understand general business procedures. In 
the beginning, you felt like you were not making any progress at all on 
the story, only reading background.” 
Aftenposten could draw on a network of experts willing to help define 
and explain the issues arising from working on the leaks.6 Among the 
experts were well-established academics from disciplines such as cor-
porate law, accounting and economics, as well as experts drawn from 
NGOs working on issues such as transparency and tax justice. Strozyk 
6 Anonymous 1. Interview, August 2018.
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also underlines the need to make effective use of experts: “We also need 
real experts – tax lawyers, investigators, and others that have seen from 
the inside, that have worked in banks, etc. These people are hard to find. 
However when we find them, they are usually very helpful in the end.” 
Nevertheless, several sources explain that in certain situations experts 
will not be able to resolve problems for investigative journalists.7 As one 
said, there will be situations when two experts have very different opin-
ions. “The final judgement will have to be made by us, the team of jour-
nalists.” These evaluations are difficult to make for journalists, especially 
when they do not have specialist training in economics or law. The conse-
quences of getting it wrong, another said, are grave and could potentially 
undermine a newspaper or television company financially.8
Anne Koch, Program Director at the Global Investigative Journal-
ism Network and former Director of Transparency International, has 
discussed partnerships where boundaries between investigative jour-
nalists and NGOs are becoming blurred as interests align (Koch, 2018). 
According to Koch, “(c)ooperation depends upon mutual independence” 
and “clear understanding of potential conflicts of interest”. However, 
the complexity of illicit financial flows is so great that “independence” is 
becoming an illusion. As informer # 1 explained, the issues are so com-
plicated that it is virtually impossible for the journalists to make indepen-
dent judgements.9 In these cases, the newspaper has to rely on auditors, 
economists or experts in law to make the final call on whether or not 
to publish a story based on the information available. As the informant 
told us, this raises important questions related to source criticism and the 
autonomy of journalism, as the journalists are not in control of the final 
judgements. The informant explained that the team of journalists did dis-
cuss these issues and tried to mitigate the potential problems by seeking 
out more than one expert. Still, the pool of experts was limited, and it 
was not unusual to use the same experts who in the first place decided if 
something was newsworthy or not, also as expert sources quoted in the 
7 Anonymous 2. Interview, February 2018; Anonymous 3. Interview, February 2018.
8 Anonymous 4. Interview, December 2016; Anonymous 5. Interview, December 2016.
9 Anonymous 1. Interview, August 2018.
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article to explain the issues to the audience or interpret the meaning of a 
particular piece of information. 
Based on the findings here, Koch is right to claim that “it would be 
a mistake to believe that journalists and advocates/activists can remain 
unchanged by this cooperation” (Koch, 2018).
Learning to understand and explain
Journalism studies scholars have noted that most news media produce 
too little critical journalism on economics considering the direct impor-
tance of the economy for people’s lives. Gans laments the fact that the 
economy is usually relegated to the business section, thus implying that 
issues related to the economy are mostly for specialists (Gans, 2004). 
Interestingly, the journalists we have met and interviewed for this article 
do not work for business papers or business sections. Instead, they are 
generalists working on a broad range of issues. If they have a speciality, 
it would be synthesizing – they are specialists in the fine art of drawing 
together information from a variety of sources, in order to make a coher-
ent whole and tell a story, which is meaningful and relevant to the reader. 
According to Kristine Aghalaryan, journalists do not have to know 
everything but they need to be able to learn many things. “In order to be 
a qualified journalist, in order to understand the issues, you need to read 
a lot of related material. If we don’t understand the material, we go to 
the experts.”10 Craig McKune recommends starting by recognizing how 
complicated it is: 
Just recognize that it is complicated. Pay attention to how others do it. Hungrily 
consume other reports by forensic investigators, […] other journalists, by pros-
ecutors. How do they explain it to the courts, what do the judges understand? 
Look at where they succeed and where they fail, see how the way those stories 
are explained might help your story that you are trying to unpack. Every sto-
ry is different, every set of financial flows is different, your audience might be 
10 Aghalaryan, Kristine (2018). Investigative journalism on illicit financial flows: How to explain 
complicated and complex financial transactions to the public? Conference keynote: Making 
Transparency Possible. Oslo Metropolitan University. 
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different – it might be a jury, it might be a judge, it might be a reader if you are 
a journalist. You have to tailor how you tell the story. If you can compare case 
studies, you will find lots of lessons that you can pull together.
McKune underscores the importance of learning what conclusions you 
cannot draw from the evidence. There will always be a degree of interpre-
tation, according to McKune. 
[Only] when we understand it ourselves very well, can we then understand 
what we are trying to explain to our readers. And then, if we can write well, and 
if we are well practiced at it, then we can do a good job of that. 
The work of the journalist is not complete when she understands the 
information in front of her. She needs to find a way to communicate that 
knowledge to readers, listeners and viewers. 
In the beginning, we did not explain these things very well. Our stories were 
often too dense. At the time, we were working only for a newspaper […] so we 
were restrained on word length. And we would try to unpack a lot of forensic 
detail, a lot of dry detail, into a very small space. 
Journalists such as Strozyk and Aghalaryan use drawings, figures and 
other forms of visualization only to explain complicated matters to the 
audience. However, journalists also draw and make figures as part of the 
process of trying to understand and grasp the meaning of the informa-
tion at hand. 
Strozyk finds it helpful to
Write down the story. If you have painted a whole complex web, it might be wise 
to describe only the bottom-left corner. It is painful to leave out information 
you know could have enriched the story. It is very important. In my view, break-
ing down the story might be the most important aspect of writing the story. 
According to Kristine Aghalaryan 
It is very difficult to explain complicated documents or reports or figures. […] 
We do not only use simple storytelling methods, like short phrases or short 
sentences, but visual tools like infographics, videos, photos and other graphics. 
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Now we are using other methods like writing down something or painting 
something as a picture to use in our stories […] we draw it and paint it by hand, 
so our readers can see those pictures. When the story or article is very com-
plicated, we have places for comments, and readers write, “What is this story 
about?” […] “We don’t understand.” 
Aghalaryan finds it useful to use ‘interactive platforms’ such as Facebook, 
Twitter and other social media accounts to “respond to questions from 
readers” and to “improve storytelling methods”. The complexity of the 
stories led the newspaper Aftenposten to organize a team with varied back-
grounds to work on the leaks. This included investigative journalists, some 
with experience from reporting on the economy and business related top-
ics, and experts on the use of visualization and storytelling skills. 
Understanding key concepts of accounting, 
auditing, corporate law and economics
The journalists interviewed here developed tools, such as visualization 
and interactive dialogue in order to understand and explain complex 
issues. In addition, most found it necessary to learn the language and 
key concepts used in the leaked documents. This meant learning key 
concepts in international banking, auditing and corporate law.11 In the 
process, the team developed an informal ‘dictionary’ defining the most 
central concepts. The dictionary had to be created in both English and 
the local language in order to translate correctly. 
Three concepts kept surfacing during the interviews with the journal-
ists: intra-group contribution, transfer pricing, and the arm’s length prin-
ciple. We will not attempt to define these concepts here, but only briefly 
explain that the arm’s length principle is the “international consensus on 
transfer pricing, the valuation for tax purposes of cross-border transac-
tions between associated enterprises” (OECS, 2010). The principle is used 
in contract law to arrange agreements when the parties have shared inter-
ests or are too closely related to be seen as independent. The Tax Justice 
11 Anonymous 1. Interviewed August 2018. 
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Network believes transfer pricing to be “the leading edge of what is wrong 
with international tax”.12 
Transfer pricing happens whenever two companies that are part of the same 
multinational group trade with each other (…). Transfer pricing is not, in itself, 
illegal or necessarily abusive. What is illegal or abusive is transfer mispricing, 
also known as transfer pricing manipulation or abusive transfer pricing. 
The Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee explain ‘intra-group loss transfer’ 
and ‘intra-group contribution’ in the following way:
The term ‘intra-group loss transfer’ covers both ‘group relief ’ and the ‘in-
tra-group contribution’. Both of these system types allow a definitive transfer 
of income between companies in order to relieve losses against profits with-
in a group. Under a ‘group relief ’ system a loss from one group member can 
be transferred (or surrendered) to a profitable group member. Under an ‘in-
tra-group contribution’ system, the profits from one group member can be 
transferred to a loss-making group member. (Communication from the Com-
mission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic 
and Social Committee, 2006)
Concepts such as ‘intra-group contribution’, ‘transfer pricing’ and the 
‘arm’s length principle’ are not easily accessible. They are connected to 
the increasing complexity of financial flows described above, and are 
needed to describe and understand financial mechanisms with huge 
consequences for profits as well as taxes and tax avoidance. As explained 
above, corporations, ownership and financial flows are growing increas-
ingly both opaque and fragmented. Journalists wanting to investigate 
illicit financial flows will have to learn the language of global finance, law 
and accounting in order to analyze and describe leaks such as the Pan-
ama Papers and Paradise Papers.
Understanding concepts and language, understanding the difference 
between structure and substance, connecting the dots and avoiding 
12 Quote attributed to Lee Sheppard, Tax Analysts, August 2012 on Tax Justice Network topics. 
https://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-tax/transfer-pricing/ 
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mistakes might be important, but will not in themselves lead to good or 
true stories on illicit financial flows. To tell stories of illicit financial flows 
journalists must be able to imagine the causes and consequences of finan-
cial flows, tax havens and so forth. As any storyteller will tell you, a good 
story needs to have something at stake (Rabiger, 2016). The storyteller 
needs to imagine the consequences of illicit financial flows.
The storytellers of Aftenposten, for example, envision how illicit finan-
cial flows cause corruption, undermine tax systems, drain local econo-
mies of resources, erode democracies, impede public access to hospitals 
and social services, make it possible for authoritarian leaders to amass 
wealth being invested in more or less private security forces and in the 
end destabilize democracies. These and similar ideas of what is at stake 
are informed by economic theories and theories drawn from the social 
sciences. 
What can journalism education gain  
from these experiences?
Telling good stories requires some ability to understand and interpret 
theories of economics and other disciplines outside journalism. This 
would seem to be a strong argument in favor of the view that journalism 
education should build on expertise from the established disciplines of 
economics, social sciences, history, and so forth. As Newton has argued, 
knowledge-based journalism courses could well be taught by journalism 
educators along with courses taught by educators from other fields (e.g. 
business, economics, law, science).13 Some training in economics or busi-
ness would, in the case of the Panama Papers, Paradise Papers and the 
like, have placed the investigative journalists in a stronger position to be 
able to make independent judgements, instead of relying too much on 
external experts. It is helpful to have some prior knowledge of concepts 
and theories. 
However, there are limitations to what established disciplines like eco-




conduct critical investigations into illicit financial flows.14 The majority 
of economists have traditionally been geared towards larger quantitative 
studies identifying patterns and structures, and building models.15 There-
fore, the discipline of economics to a large extent depends on investiga-
tive journalists and whistleblowers to investigate illicit financial flows. 
We need not overestimate what the established disciplines can do for 
journalism education. 
Another way of interpreting the experiences of these investigative 
journalists is to see these team-based investigations as a form of Prob-
lem-Based Learning (PBL). Problem-Based Learning is driven by chal-
lenging, open-ended problems with no one ‘right’ answer (David, 2014). 
Problem-Based Learning is becoming increasing popular in higher edu-
cation. It is a teaching method that employs real-world problems as vehi-
cles “to promote student learning of concepts and principles, as opposed 
to direct presentation of facts and concepts”.16 The philosophy of PBL is 
that learning can be considered a “constructive, self-directed, collabo-
rative and contextual” activity (Yew, 2016). Thus, students are asked to 
solve problems in collaborative settings, and develop skills for self-learn-
ing through practice and reflection. 
As seen above, teams of journalists working on leaks such as the Pan-
ama Papers and other similar investigations have been involved in learn-
ing by solving problems as they arise. Sometimes problems have been 
solved by reading or searching online or by interviewing experts. In the 
Nordic countries, this has been the traditional model for journalists’ 
learning. 
This method of learning has a number of benefits. Some studies indi-
cate that students learn more and better when using PBL (Wood, 2008). 
For journalists in particular learning about society includes economics, 
the social sciences and similar topics. Doing journalism by solving prac-
tical problems could have the benefit of broadening the student’s horizons 
14 Professor Kalle Moene, Interview 7.9.2018, and Professor Tina Søreide, interview 7.9.2018. 
15 There are of course important exceptions to the rule, for instance Gabriel Zucman and Annette 
Alstadsæter. 
16 The Center for Innovation in Teaching & Learning (CITL), Problem-Based Learning (PBL), 
http://citl.illinois.edu/citl-101/teaching-learning/resources/teaching-strategies/problem-based- 
learning-(pbl) accessed 10.9.2019.
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of knowledge in multiple relevant areas (Meadows, 1997). As Aghalaryan 
argues, journalists need to know how to learn many different things. 
However, as critics of PBL have argued, investigating to solve problems, 
finding new information and connecting the dots, will not necessarily 
lead to insight into the theories needed to imagine and understand the 
causes and consequences of a problem (Boud, 2013). 
Education and interdisciplinarity
The experiences outlined above invite reflections on interdisciplinarity 
in journalism education. Interdisciplinary education uses and integrates 
methods and analytical frameworks from several academic disciplines to 
investigate a topic. Interdisciplinary learning works best if “professionals 
from different disciplines work together to serve a common purpose, and 
to help students make the connections between different disciplines or 
subject areas” (Appleby, 2018). The teams of journalists put in place in 
South Africa, Norway and elsewhere comprised journalists with know-
ledge of and experiences from different fields and disciplines. Further-
more, the teams were enhanced by drawing on experts from various 
disciplines. In the process, the journalists learned concepts and ideas 
from economics, law, auditing, accounting and other disciplines, even 
producing informal dictionaries in the process. These experiences reso-
nate with existing literature on interdisciplinary research processes, and 
can be reflected in at least two different kinds of collaboration. A report 
from the Norwegian Research Council highlights the difficulties of doing 
truly interdisciplinary projects and outlines: “The key to success is a team 
of researchers each of whom possesses sufficient familiarity with the oth-
ers’ disciplinary backgrounds” (Snodgrass, 2003). “The greatest challenge 
for a multidisciplinary team is to find a common language with which to 
frame the actual concepts and phenomena under investigation.” We have 
seen that the familiarity with the others’ backgrounds needed to find a 
common language is not always present. Sometimes journalists have had 
to leave the evaluation of information in the hands of experts from other 
disciplines. Outside experts have decided whether or not a piece of infor-
mation is newsworthy or not, while journalists have focused on digging 
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up information and telling stories. In such cases, the research resembles 
more the definition of multidisciplinary research: “research in which sev-
eral disciplines are used in parallel to elucidate comparable problems” 
(Norges forskningsråd, 2003).
In other cases, journalists have themselves had to become experts on 
issues, such as transfer pricing and the arm’s length principle in order to 
investigate corruption or illicit financial flows. In these cases, “the theory 
and/or methods of several sciences are integrated into the same study and 
analysis” and could be seen as models for developing real interdisciplin-
arity in journalism. 
The debate on what journalism education should be, shows us that an 
almost unlimited number of interest groups and disciplines believe jour-
nalism education must dedicate more time to studying particular issues 
or epistemologies. It is of course impossible for journalism students to 
live up to all expectations. Concerning finance and economics, however, 
the journalists investigating illicit financial flows will encounter a par-
ticular set of challenges. The models and theories require more than a 
basic understanding of mathematics. These skills need to be developed 
gradually, step by step, and it takes years to reach the required level. Very 
few journalism programs offer in-depth courses in mathematics, statis-
tics or even economics. Without such skills, it is difficult to tell good and 
true stories about the causes and consequences of corruption or illicit 
financial flows. 
Conclusion
The purpose of this study has been to use the experiences of investigative 
journalists taking part in cross-border cooperation in order to reflect on 
journalism education. What can journalist educators learn from jour-
nalists around the world investigating illicit financial flows? The study 
is thus set within a broader debate about what journalism education is 
and should be. On the one hand, we find proponents of a model in which 
journalism education draws on experts from disciplines such as history, 
law, economics and social science to teach students a broad range of sub-
jects taken from established disciplines. On the other hand, there is a 
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model where journalists learn mainly by doing journalism. We have here 
compared the last model to Problem-Based Learning (PBL). 
For all the journalists interviewed here, their investigations have been 
learning processes. In particular, they have had to learn concepts, lan-
guage, analytical frameworks and theories from economics, finance and 
accounting. Most fruitfully then, the study can be used to reflect on the 
possibility of integrating fields such as economics, finance and account-
ing into journalism education.
Influenced by studies of interdisciplinarity, we distinguish between (at 
least) three levels of interdisciplinarity depending on the depth of inte-
gration (Shiou, 2014): cross-disciplinarity happens when a team works 
in a parallel or sequential manner, from a disciplinary-specific basis to 
address a common problem; interdisciplinary research happens when 
a team works jointly but from a disciplinary-specific basis to address a 
common problem; trans-disciplinary research can be said to be when a 
team works jointly using a shared conceptual framework drawing upon 
disciplinary specific theories, concepts and approaches to address a com-
mon problem, and makes inquiries on the disciplinary integration of 
creativity. 
More than revisiting the debate on practice and theory in journalism 
education, we wish to contribute to moving the debate forward by asking 
how journalism education can use critical self-reflection to prepare stu-
dents for ongoing changes in society, the economy and technology. More-
over, could cross-border cooperation on investigations help journalism 
break the national mold?
Rather than providing clear-cut answers to these questions, the study 
has illuminated the challenges and paradoxes educators must consider 
when designing future curriculums for journalism education. First, 
considering the growing importance of Problem-Based Learning meth-
ods, the journalists interviewed here demonstrate the promise of teams 
learning together while investigating and solving problems as they arise. 
However, there are limitations to the usefulness of PBL when it comes to 
understanding economic or financial theories. It is doubtful that PBL will 
be a very effective method for learning the mathematics needed to under-
stand economic theories. It would be helpful if journalism education 
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could include at least basic instruction in economics and finance. When 
journalists lack an understanding of the theories and concepts of eco-
nomics and finance, they become dependent on outside experts to make 
judgments. To uphold the autonomy of journalism, journalists need 
deeper insight into the concepts, language, methodological frameworks, 
and theories of economics and finance. 
However, there are also limitations to the usefulness of economics 
and finance for investigative journalists. Few economists conduct inves-
tigations of corruption or illicit financial flows of the type investigative 
journalists have done. Methodologies and analytical frameworks for the 
critical investigation of possible cases of corruption and illicit financial 
flows thus cannot merely be imported from other disciplines. In the inves-
tigations studied here, it was necessary to develop innovative conceptual 
frameworks drawing upon disciplinary specific theories, concepts and 
approaches to address a common problem. 
Many journalism courses today emphasize storytelling as particularly 
important for journalism students. The journalists interviewed here use 
a variety of techniques from visualization to drawing and making infor-
mal dictionaries, in order to make complex information available to the 
audience. Nevertheless there are limits to what the focus on telling good 
stories can do. Without proper understanding of the theories underpin-
ning economics and finance, it becomes impossible to imagine what the 
story is about, and what is at stake. Storytelling techniques will not help 
journalists tell the right stories if they are not supported by basic insights 
into theories. 
Moving journalism education ahead from the debate on theory and 
practice means considering these and other limitations to existing dis-
ciplines and methodologies for teaching when designing education for 
journalists that combine critical self-reflection with the ambition to 
develop trans-disciplinary conceptual frameworks and approaches to 
investigative journalism. 
So, finally, could cross-border cooperation help journalism break the 
national mold? So far, the evidence would suggest not. Even when journal-
ists work in truly global networks investigating a problem of global reach, 
and the economic and financial theories and conceptual frameworks are 
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global, the vast majority of stories seek to bring the problem home by 
finding national angles. As we have seen here, this is probably not because 
journalists are blind to the importance of the global aspects of the stories 
they tell. However, political debates are still firmly placed within the con-
finement of states. When journalists tell stories that affect ongoing politi-
cal processes, they spark public debate triggering more stories. When the 
stories are on international or global issues, however, they are more often 
about faceless systemic issues. Global capital tends to be faceless, abstract, 
like ‘an invisible hand’, almost like a natural law. When international sto-
ries do have a face, it is most likely the face of some far-away dictator or 
some distant celebrity. In both cases, there seems little the readers can do 
to fix the problems described in the articles. 
Investigative journalism thrives when journalists can hold power to 
account. It remains to be seen if journalism or journalism education 
manages to break the national mold as long as most readers and viewers 
feel powerless, confronted with the hard realities of global capital. 
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